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PREFACE 
The Tusk Force on Agricultural Policy, Trade and Development of the 
Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (PECC) held its fourth 
Workshop in Bangkok in May 1990. This Task Force had its origins in a 
study programme set up by the PECC in 1985, to consider policy issues 
related to livestock and feed grains. 
The Task Force's commodity coverage has been expanded since then and 
its original objectives of examining national policy priorities, the benefits 
and costs of past and current policy measures and the analysis of alternative 
approaches emphasising cooperation, has placed the Task Force in a strong 
position to contribute to current international debate on trade liberalisation 
in agriculture. Previous full conferences of the PECC had stressed the 
urgency of bringing the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations to a 
successful conclusion, and this has influenced the design of the work 
programme of this particular Tusk Force. 
The Task Force reported to the seventh PECC conference in Auckland late 
in 1989 that the Round should not be portrayed as seeking to reduce the 
incomes of farmers. Rather, the objective is to obtain a gradual reduction 
in protection and a challenge is to identify alternative machanisms to 
provide support to farmers where deemed necessary. 
The Fourth Workshop of the Agricultural Policy, Trade and Development 
Task Force took up that challenge, and several papers made proposals for 
trade policy reform and for alternative approaches to supporting the farm 
sector that will be less trade-distorting than many currently used. Other 
papers presented to the Workshop provided information on the often 
considerable progress that individual PECC economies have already made 
in liberalising their agricultural and other sectors. Governments around 
the Pacific Rim are increasingly recognising the rewards of deregulation, 
and many have moved unilaterally. Cooperative reductions in protection 
are required, however, if these gains are to be fully realised. 
Part I of the book includes four chapters that deal with proposals for trade 
reform:rhe Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations has provided 
a unique opportunity for the major agricultural exporting countries to 
rejuvenate agricultural markets through the reform of distortionary national 
policies. 
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The first of these chapters summarises the major findings of two recent 
publications of the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource 
Economics, both related to trade reform proposals. The two topics covered 
are the likely impacts of the EEC rebalancing proposal, and tariffication. 
Turiffication would introduce greater transparency into the policy 
environment and would allow market forces to provide efficiency gains. 
While some producers in certain countries would suffer from the 
implementation of tariffication, these can be overcome through decoupled 
income support. Rebalancing, however, appears to be a less efficient 
approach to economic reform. The EEC, as well as countries of the Cairns 
Group, would experience greater welfare gains from alternative reform 
approaches. 
An important reason for governments to intervene in agriculture is to reduce 
tne impact of unstable world prices on domestic farmers. Yet tariffication 
would lead to an increase in domestic price variability although global 
liberalisation would reduce to some extent the variability in world prices. 
In Chapter 2, th~ transmission of price variability under tariffication is 
examined. Alternative tariff-reduction formulae are considered that would 
allow world price variability to be gradually introduced into domestic 
economies at the same time as the present gaps between world and domestic 
prices are phased out. 
In Chapter 3, the economic impacts on agricultural production and trade 
of changes to the Western Grain 'Itansportation Act (formerly known as 
the Crow Rate) are assessed . The WGTA is one of the oldest and most 
controversial elements of agricultural policy in Canada and has come under 
increased pressure for reform during the Uruguay Round. Several scenarios 
are developed to test the various reform proposals presently being 
considered for the WGTA. The general conclusion of this paper is that 
the international trade impacts of the WGTA are minimal. The authors 
also point out that in many respects the WGTA is close to a decoupled 
type of programme. 
Historically, one of the pillars of Japanese agricultural policy has been 
the ensurance of self-sufficiency for the major foodstuffs. Chapter 4 argues 
that the total expenditure on food and drinks in Japan has recently 
increased sharply, while the share of agricultural production in GDP has 
declined rapidly over the same period of time. It is noted that there has 
also been a recent shift in agricultural policy away from the self-sufficiency 
objective. For example almost 27 percent of the total acreage under rice 
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was left idle in 1988. The author argues that Japanese consumers are 
becoming more cosmopolitan in their tastes and that there is a fast-growing 
market for imported food in Japan. 
Part II of the book contains six chapters that analyse liberalisation issues 
in developing countries in general, and experiences in the Peoples Republic 
of China, Chinese Taipei, Indonesia and the Philippines in particular. 
The first of these chapters develops a conceptual model to demonstrate 
that it is plausible that developing countries as a group stand to benefit 
from OECD countries liberalising their agricultural production and trade. 
The author also points out that even net importers of food could gain when 
risk and reductions in food price instability in OECD countries are taken 
into account. Although the exact magnitude of such gains remain an 
empirical question, the very existence of potential gains should act as an 
incentive for developing countries to lend their support to freer agricultural 
trade initiatives in the GATT Uruguay Round. 
The impacts of exchange rate and trade policies on the Chinese agricultural 
sector are analysed in Chapter 6. The trade protectionist measures currently 
used by the Chinese government include a complex system of a 
discriminatory exchange rate policy together with tariff measures. Using 
a general equilibrium model of the Chinese economy, the authors conclude 
the impacts on agriculture and trade from the discriminatory exchange rate 
policy far exceed the combined effects of all other forms of protection. 
The Thiwanese poultry sector is the object of Chapter 7, on which the 
impacts of trade liberalisation are estimated. An econometric model of 
the poultry sector is used to simulate changes in domestic price levels as 
a result of higher levels of chicken imports following trade liberalisation. 
The results show that trade liberalisation would lead to higher levels of 
chicken imports but would also result in lower demand for imported feed 
grain. It is concluded that the foreign exchange saved from lower feed grain 
imports would more than offset the chicken import bill. In this respect 
the author points out that the United States could be shortsighted in 
pressuring Tuiwan to liberalise its poultry sector since the bulk of feed grains 
is imported from that country. 
Chapter 8 reviews policy changes that have taken place in the Indonesian 
agricultural sector and makes proposals for further reform. The authors 
argue that Indonesia has comparative advantage in numerous commodities 
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and that reform measures should ensure that regional issues are adequately 
dealt with. The authors propose that regional diversification and 
commodity zoning be considered along with a reorientation of export 
policies and programmes. 
The Philippines government implemented a comprehensive trade 
liberalisation programme in 1981, with an objective of correcting distortions 
due to past tariff and non-tariff policies. Chapter 9 provides an evaluation 
of progress so far, presents an update of the tariff rate structure adopted 
by this country and discusses some implications of the current reforms 
for trade among ASEAN partners. It concludes that the Philippines 
programme of tariff rate reductions will continue to complement effects 
of the ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangement in increasing trade flows 
between these countries and a more efficient use of regional resources. 
The importance of the gradual implementation of trade liberalisation 
policies in Taiwan is discussed in the final chapter of this part of the book. 
The authors point out that Taiwan is committed to free markets, but that 
strategies should be developed in order to make the transition to a 
deregulated agricultural sector smooth. A proposal is that decoupled 
assistance to farmers could be useful to cushion the impacts of 
liberalisation. 
Part III of the book focusses on decoupled reform proposals. It is clear 
that the thrust of the reform proposals put forward during the Uruguay 
Round is concerned only with policies that distort trade, and that only 
policies that have this effect should be recognised by any aggregate measure 
of support. Thus governments who wishes to continue to support their 
farmers, or to cushion the impacts of liberalisation, could do so as long 
as adopted measures had little if any influence on the level of national 
production. The two concluding chapters discuss decoupled policy options, 
and one country's experience with a decoupled system of farm supports. 
Chapter 11 focusses on some difficulties in gaining acceptance of decoupled 
policies. Such acceptance is likely to require that the policies be politically 
acceptable, financially manageable and administratively feasible. The 
transparency of direct payments makes them politically unpopular with 
farmers, direct payments require government expenditures rather than 
'concealed' payments obtained through higher retail prices, and 
implementation of direct support payments to farmers might require the 
costly monitoring of individual farms. The chapter examines three 
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alternative direct payment programmes. It was found that all wottld be less 
attractive than border measures to some countries since they involve higher 
budgetary costs. However, the latter can be significantly reduced if limited 
to a 'small' production base as in, for example, the producer entitlement 
guarantee scheme that has been discussed in earlier proceedings of the Tusk 
Force. 
The book's final chapter makes the point that while most OECD countries 
are still contemplating the ways and means of reforming agriculture, New 
Zealand has almost completed a unilateral liberalisation of its agricultural 
sector. This paper outlines New Zealand's experience at implementing major 
reforms and argues that a fully decoupled agricultural sector is possible 
and that farmers can survive the withdrawal of coupled support to the 
benefit of the wider economy. 
Allan N. Rae (Task Force Coordinator) 
Doren D. Chadee 
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PART I 
Proposals for 
Trade Liberalisation 
CHAPTER 1 
PROPOSED STRATEGIES FOR INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE REFORM 
Graham H. Tie, Bruce Bowen, H. Don, 
B.H. Gunasekera and Brian S. Fisher* 
INTRODUCTION 
The Uruguay Round of Multilateral trade negotiations has provided a 
unique opportunity for the major agricultural exporting countries to 
rejuvenate agricultural markets through the reform of distorting trade and 
domestic policies. However, agricultural reform faces many obstacles. First, 
producers in the high income countries are well organised and are able 
to muster considerable political and popular support for existing 
interventionist policies. Second, the negotiation process itself is hampered 
by several technical problems such as how best to measure support across 
countries, how to estimate the tariff equivalents of non-tariff barriers and 
how to provide income support to farmers without creating distortions. 
Third, while some key participants in the Uruguay Round are seeking 
reform, the European Community has submitted a proposal which, in part, 
runs counter to this philosophy in that it would involve an increase in 
protection for some commodities. In particular, the Community's proposal 
envisages an increase in tariffs on oilseeds and non-grain feeds in return 
for reduced protection for EC grains. This proposal is commonly known 
as the 'rebalancing' proposal. 
The European Community has also attempted to link its 'rebalancing' 
proposal to the US 'tariffication' proposal which seeks replacement of non-
tariff barriers with tariffs and the subsequent reduction of those tariffs. 
The Community has indicated that it would accept a 'modified' form of 
tariffication provided other countries accepted its rebalancing proposal. 
ABARE has prepared two discussion papers which examine some of these 
issues. In the first (Andrews, Bowen, Gunasekera, Haszler and Field 1990) 
the likely impacts of the EC rebalancing proposal are analysed in detail. 
"' Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Canberra. 
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In the second (Riethmuller, Roberts, O'Mara, Tie, Tulpule, Hossain and 
Klijn 1990) a number of the technical issues involved with tariffication are 
addressed. 
The major findings of these two ABARE studies are highlighted in this 
paper. For the sake of brevity they are referred to as the rebalancing and 
the tariffication papers. 
'TARIFFICATION' 
One of the key principles of the GATT is that any protection given to an 
industry should be by means of tariff rather than non-tariff barriers. The 
US proposal on tariffication recognises this key GATT principle. The 
proposal envisages that the wide range of measures that countries now use 
to restrict import competition would be replaced by tariffs, the level of 
which would be gradually reduced over time. According to this proposal, 
in some cases there will be a transition phase before the complete 
replacement of non-tariff with tariff barriers. This transition phase would 
involve the use of tariff quotas to partially open domestic markets. 
To facilitate and monitor the process of support reduction, an aggregate 
measure of support is required. Two separate approaches to the definition 
of an aggregate measure of support have been proposed in the current round 
of trade negotiations. These include the producer subsidy equivalent and 
the European Community's support measurement unit. The former is 
already being used by the OECD, while the latter has yet to be specified 
exactly. Both measures have their weaknesses as they measure 'support' in 
different ways. The producer subsidy equivalent incorporates movements 
in international prices, whereas the support measurement unit would 
employ a fixed price. 
Any possible practical approaches to negotiating and implementing 
reductions in support need to address two basic issues. First. how to ensure 
that aggregate trade distorting support is reduced and, second, how to 
ensure that such reductions in support cannot be circumvented using other 
means. The ABARE study on tariffication provides several practical 
examples of reducing support under the US proposal. In these examples, 
it is assumed that support would be reduced by 40 per cent over a five 
year period. The support measures included were tariffs, tariff equivalents 
of non-tariff barriers, internal subsidies subject to GATT disciplines and, 
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export subsidies. 
1\vo alternative reform paths were considered for reducing border support. 
The first was ~pure tariffication', under which countries would replace 
existing non-tariff barriers with their specific tariff equivalents. These tariffs 
would then be reduced over time. The second approach involved the· use 
of tariff quotas, which would be expanded annually over a transition period, 
thus gradually increasing access to protected markets. 
However, it is important that the level of base support, from which 
reductions in assistance are to be negotiated, is set at an appropriate level. 
For example, if commitments to reduce assistance are based on excessively 
high base support levels, then countries may not need to reduce actual 
support in order to meet those commitments. A way around this problem 
would be to reduce administered prices rather than support levels. In that 
way commitments to reduce protection would be expressed in terms of 
policy instruments rather than possibly unrepresentative and variable 
measures of assistance. 
In the examples, the base support level from which assistance is reduced 
is the average of the five year period between 1984 and 1988, excluding 
the highest and lowest years. The examples provided in the tariffication 
paper include reducing support for Japanese rice, US sugar and wheat and 
EC wheat. 
Under pure tariffication, if a 40 per cent reduction of support were to apply 
to Japanese rice over five years, with the first cut to be applied in 1991, 
the specific tariff would fall from Y237 000/t in 1990 to Y142 000/t in 
1995 (with the intervening levels being Y218 000/t in 1991, Yl99 000/t in 
1992, Yl80 000/t in 1993 and Yl61 000/t in 1994). On the other hand, 
negotiators could agree to a transition period in which Japan adopted tariff 
quotas and ensured staged reductions in imports. The eventual tariff to 
apply after the transition period would again be Yl 42 000/t. By the end 
of the adjustment period, the tariff quota would need to be some 3 Mt. 
To reach that level over a five year adjustment period, imports under the 
tariff quota could rise by an estimated 600 kt a year. 
The fall in prices to Japanese producers in response to a 40 per cent 
reduction in support over the five year period is estimated to be of the 
order of 34 per cent. The resultant increase in the world rice price was 
estimated to be 8 per cent. However, the effect of the price fall on farmers' 
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incomes, on average, would be relatively modest. This is because over 80 
per cent of Japanese farm family incomes are now derived from non-farm 
activities (ABARE 1988). 
Under pure tariffication, the specific tariff for US sugar would have to 
fall from US$186t in 1990 to US$112t in 1995 in order to achieve a 40 per 
cent reduction in support at the end of the five year adjustment period. 
(The negotiated reductions in tariff equivalents over the intervening period 
in this example would be US$ 171/t in 1991, US$156/t in 1992, US$141/t 
in 1993 and US$126/t in 1994). Thriff quotas could also be negotiated to 
ensure a staged increase in access to the US sugar market. In order to obtain 
a 40 per cent reduction in sugar support, the tariff quota would need to 
be set at 3.2 Mt by the end of the transition period. 
The phased reductions in total US support for wheat over the five year 
transition period are from US$63/t in 1990, to US$58/t in 1991, US$53/t 
in 1992, US$48/t in 1993, US$43/t in 1994 and finally, to US$38/t in 1995. 
However, if during this five year transition phase world wheat prices were 
higher than those applying during the base period, actual support levels 
would be likely to be lower than the negotiated levels. In that case, an 
alternative approach could involve reductions in the target (or administered) 
price over the transition period. To achieve a 40 per cent reduction in the 
base level of support over the five year transition period would involve a 
cut in the target price for wheat of about US$3/t a year. 
Support is provided to EC wheat producers by a combination of border 
measures and government intervention, which results in internal prices to 
producers and consumers being maintained around administratively set 
target prices (Figure 1). Under pure tariffication, to achieve a 40 per cent 
reduction in support for EC wheat at the end of the five year adjustment 
period the specific tariffs would need to be adjusted down from 72ECU/t 
in 1990 to 43ECU/t by 1995 (with the intervening levels being 66ECU/t 
in 1991, 61ECU/t in 1992, 55ECU/t in 1993 and 49ECU/t in 1994). 
As the assumed base period in the example includes the extremely low world 
price and high support levels of 1985, 1986 and 1987, the European 
Community would have a high base level of protection to negotiate down. 
Therefore, unless very large reductions in support were negotiated, the 
exercise may do little more than restore support to levels that had previously 
applied. 
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There is an alternative approach to tariffication for EC wheat that could 
help overcome the associated risk of using an unrepresentatively high base 
support level. This would involve negotiated cuts to those administered 
prices that determine the actual level of assistance to producers in the 
Community. The prices affected would be the target price, the intervention 
price and the threshold price. 
In all these examples discussed, reductions in support are likely to lead 
to a fall in farm land values and profits in the affected agricultural 
industries. Compensation for this could possibly be provided by a form 
of direct income (or decoupled) support or, alternatively, from a modified 
form of µroducer entitlement guarantee scheme. 
A crucial element in any successful implementation of tariffication is the 
need to prevent countries replacing the resultant reduced support with other 
forms of assistance. Therefore, unless all countries participating in the 
Uruguay Round have a firm commitment to broadly based reform of all 
policies that distort agricultural trade, there is a distinct danger that any 
reforms achieved under tariffication could be undermined. 
EC 'REBALANCING' 
In ABARE's rebalancing paper, the implications of the EC proposal to 
reduce its protection on grains in exchange for increases in border protection 
for oilseeds and non-grain feeds were analysed using a world agricultural 
trade model. 1Wo alternative types of reform, which reflect a 'tops down' 
approach to reducing protection, were also analysed in the paper. In the 
first, the EC import duties on oilseeds and manioc were maintained at 
current levels and the protection levels on grains reduced. In the second, 
import duties on oilseeds and manioc were again unchanged and support 
levels on highly protected EC agricultural products reduced. 
The results of this analysis show that, with EC rebalancing, world prices 
for wheat and corn would increase (Figure 2). This is due to reduced EC 
wheat exports and increased corn imports. The EC proposal could thus 
offer other wheat exporting countries the prospect of an increased share 
of world wheat trade. Increased EC corn imports would be important to 
the United States, as it is currently the major corn exporter to the 
Community. On the other hand, the results .also show that EC rebalancing 
would reduce the world prices of oilseeds and meals. This is because of 
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reduced EC imports of these products. The world price of manioc would 
remain unchanged because the Community would continue to import 
manioc at the level set by the voluntary export restraint. Changes in the 
world prices for grains in the first alternative reform analysed in ABARE's 
rebalancing paper would be similar to those which occur with EC 
rebalancing (Figure 3). In contrast, changes in world oilseed prices would 
be very small. 
In the second alternative reform, where support levels for highly protected 
EC farm products were lowered, world prices for most of these products 
would increase (Figure 4). The largest increases in world prices would be 
for products that are highly protected in the European Community. These 
include butter, sugar and sheep meat. 
The welfare results of the ABARE rebalancing paper suggest that the EC 
proposal would generate large net welfare gains to the Community, as shown 
in Th.ble 1. This is because of reduced expenditure on grain export subsidies 
and increased revenue from tariffs on corn, oilseeds and manioc. EC 
rebalancing would not, however, necessarily be beneficial to other countries. 
Although US producers would benefit from higher world meat prices and 
increased EC corn imports, those gains would be partly offset by reduced 
world oilseed prices. On balance, it appears that this type of change might 
not have a significant net effect on the economic welfare of US producers 
- some agricultural industries would benefit while others would lose. 
According to the welfare results, net economic gains for the developing 
country members of the Cairns Group would decline as a result of EC 
rebalancing (Table 1). This is because, as a group, these countries are net 
importers of wheat and net exporters of oilseeds. However, it is important 
to recognise that wheat and corn producers in these countries would gain 
from the increase in world prices of these products. In contrast to some 
of the developing country members of the Cairns Group, Australia, as a 
wheat exporter, would benefit from EC rebalancing. This is because of 
improved world wheat prices. 
Although economic welfare would be likely to improve in the Community 
as a result of rebalancing, greater welfare gains could accrue to the 
Community under an alternative approach to reducing disparities in 
protection. Reducing protection for the most highly protected EC farm 
products, while leaving import duties on oilseeds and manioc unchanged, 
offers the prospect of even larger welfare gains for the Community. Such 
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an approach would also generate large gains to the United States. developing 
country members of the Cairns Group and Australia. 
If these alternative approaches were extended by further reducing EC levels 
of protection for a wide range of farm products, welfare gains to the 
Community and its trading partners would likely be even larger again. Such 
an approach would also be consistent with the proposals submitted by the 
United States and the Cairns Group to the Uruguay Round. 
CONCWDING REMARKS 
If implemented, tariffication would introduce greater transparency into the 
policy environment and allow international market forces to play a greater 
role in the allocation of resources in agriculture. This, in turn, has the 
potential to lead to greater efficiency in agricultural sectors. 
The examples of the practical application of tariffication indicate that a 
phased reduction in support would have beneficial effects on world markets. 
At the same time, however, some agricultural industries in the countries 
which adopt reforms would be adversely affected. For example, in both 
Japan and the United States the major adverse effect appears to be the 
likelihood of a decline in land values. This, in turn, would be likely to exert 
pressure on governments to provide compensation to the affected producers. 
In the event that such compensation were in fact provided, it is clear that 
this should be done through measures which give direct income support 
to producers while have a minimal effect on market prices. 
Examination of the actual process by which tariffication and the reduction 
of external and internal support measures could be implemented reveals 
the importance of several practical issues. These include the adequacy of 
information on the extent and effects of non-tariff barriers and of internal 
support measures; the base period from which n·egotiated reductions in 
protection would commence; and uncertainty as to whether various internal 
support measures are decoupled. 
For both the PECC countries and the European Community, rebalancing 
does not appear to be the 'first best' approach to economic reform. Resource 
allocation and net welfare in the European Community could be improved 
further by alternative ways of reducing disparities in support. In particular, 
the welfare gains accruing to the European Community could be increased 
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further by a 'tops down'· approach - by reducing protection for highly 
assisted feedstuffs while leaving import duties on oilseeds and non-grain 
feeds at current levels. Even larger gains to the European Community would 
accrue from a general reduction in assistance to highly protected agricultural 
industries while leaving import duties on oilseeds and non-grain feeds at 
current levels. Higher welfare gains were indicated from both these 
alternative policy changes for the European Community, the United States 
and Australia compared to rebalancing. For the developing Cairns Group 
of countries a general reduction in EC protection would result in an increase 
in net economic welfare. 
Another finding that emerges from ABARE's rebalancing paper was the 
small size of the overall gains to the United States from the 'tops down' 
approaches to reducing EC farm support. This finding may, at first, raise 
questions about the United States pursuit of agricultural trade reform, 
particularly its insistence on reform in EC agriculture. However, the welfare 
gains need to be viewed in the context of the small number of commodities 
for which protection is reduced and the limited extent of policy changes 
undertaken in the ABARE paper. It is also important to recognise that 
while the overall economic gains for the United Sates are small relative 
to the size of the US economy, they are of some significance relative to 
the size of its agricultural sector, and particularly the grains industry. Also, 
it is significant that the United States has wider objectives in the Uruguay 
Round - in particular to secure agreements in trade in services and 
intellectual property rights. Some observers have argued that the United 
States sees agricultural trade liberalisation at a multilateral level as a 
prerequisite for agreement on these other issues. 
Tariffication and rebalancing constitute two significant elements in the 
Uruguay Round negotiations with different but not necessarily mutually 
exclusive objectives. Tariffication provides a means of improving market 
access, the achievement of which would benefit considerabiy the multilateral 
world trading system generally and agricultural markets in particular. While 
the introduction of tariffication would certainly require modifications to 
domestic policies, its major impact would be essentially international in 
nature. Rebalancing on the other hand essentially represents a change to 
the domestic policy of the European Community which nevertheless has 
international implications. 
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Table 1. Summary of changes in total welfare under EC rebalancing 
EC Alternative 1 Alternative 2 
proposal (a) (b) 
$m $m $m 
Australia 96 96 131 
European Community 2029 2259 2642 
United States ~93 83 15 
Developing Cairns 
Group countries -28 -33 14 
(a) Alternative 1 ·import duties on oilseeds and manioc maintained at 
current levels; protection levels on grains reduced. 
(b) Alternative 2 - support duties on oilseeds and· manioc maintained 
at current levels; support levels on highly protected EC agricultural 
products reduced. 
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CHAPTER 2 
DOMESTIC PRICE VARIABILITY AND 
TRADE LIBERALISATION 
Dermot J. Hayes, Thomas L Wahl, 
and S.R. Johnson* 
INTRODUCTION 
Recent proposals to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
have called for the conversion of all nontariff trade barriers into their tariff 
equivalents and for the subsequent reduction of these tariff equivalents 
over time. The purposes of tariffication are to provide a methodology to 
quantify nontariff trade barriers, thereby making them more visible, and 
to provide a framework within which to reduce them. Many nontariff trade 
barriers are designed to stabilise domestic prices by breaking the link to 
world prices and, thus, the link with the variability of world prices. 
'Turiffication has the side effect of replacing domestic price-stabilising 
policies with a policy that dramatically increases domestic price variability. 
For example, if a country replaced its nontariff barriers with a 100 per 
cent tariff and world prices then increased from $2 to $4, the domestic 
price would increase from $4 to $8. This example illustrates that ad valorem 
import tariffs magnify world price variability, which will affect the political 
acceptability of tariffication proposals. 
This paper examines the transmission of price variability under tariffication. 
Alternative tariff-reduction formulas are considered, including a proposed 
modification of an existing formula that is developed to slowly introduce 
world price variability into domestic markets while reducing the price wedge 
over time. A two-country, one-commodity model, which includes random 
error terms in the supply and demand equations, demonstrates the effects 
of tariffication and the reduction of the tariff equivalent using existing 
formulas and the proposed reduction formula. 
First, the advantages and disadvantages of existing tariff-reduction formulas 
"' Assistant Professor, Postdoctoral Research Associate, and Professor, respectively, Department of 
Economics, Iowa State University. 
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are presented. One of the existing formulas is then modified to slow the 
transmission of price variability from world to domestic markets. Next, 
the results of simulating tariffication and reduction of the tariff equivalent 
using the two-country, one-commodity model are presented. Finally, a 
summary of the important results is presented. 
TARIFF EQUIVALENT REDUCTION FORMULAS 
Several alternative adjustment formulas for the tariff are available. Perhaps 
the most intuitive and reasonable from a modelling viewpoint is to reduce 
the tariff by lX of the initial tariff level in each year, where X is the number 
of years over which the tariff is to fall to zero. Unfortunately, this concept 
may not appeal to trade negotiators because the measured tariff levels in 
each year would depend on domestic policies and world price levels. 
Countries are not likely to agree to a tariff adjustment system that makes 
domestic agricultural policy a function of potentially volatile world prices. 
Indeed, the motivation for the protectionist policies of many countries is 
to insulate domestic markets from the frequent wild swings in world prices. 
Hence, those countries will be reluctant to accept a proposal that would 
immediately transfer this volatility to domestic prices and markets, at least 
until the impact of liberalisation has stabilised world prices. The agreed-
upon adjustment path~ therefore, needs to allow for annual changes in 
world price levels. 
A second alternative is the Swiss formula considered in the Tokyo Round 
t>f the GATT negotiations (Tangermann, Josling and Pearson, 1987). This 
formula can be written as 
(1) 
where Tt is the tariff level that must be achieved in a given year, Tt-1 is 
the tariff level in the previous year, and A is the negotiated coefficient of 
adjustment. 
The formula allows for a lagged response to changes in world price levels. 
The tariff adjustment is not instantaneous, however. Thriffs in this formula 
are determined in advance; consequently, large changes in world prices will 
have an impact on domestic prices. The tariff will adjust to these world 
price changes, but the adjustment occurs a full year after the changes in 
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world prices. In addition, the nature of the formula guarantees that, for 
all probable levels of the negotiated coefficient, the brunt of the adjustment 
will be borne in the early years of the agreement. The rapid adjustment 
of tariffs with this formula may be more suited to the industrial trade 
barriers considered in the Tokyo Round of the GATT negotiations than 
to agriculture. Adjustment costs in agriculture would be relatively high. 
At the same time, the level of protectionism in agriculture is greater now 
than was the case during the Tokyo Round. Also, the Swiss formula does 
not allow for a reduction of a given tariff to zero over a given number 
of years. Unless the value of the adjustment coefficient is zero, the value 
of the tariff will never reach zero. 
The following proposed modification of the Swiss formula addressed the 
problems inherent in the first two alternatives. 
(~)AT~-1 
(-;)A + Tf-1 
(p - p ) 
a d,t-1 w,t T t-1 = ---'---....:.._ p 
w,t 
(2) 
(3) 
where Tta_1 is the ex-ante tariff, n is the negotiated length of the adjustment 
period, r is the number of years remaining in the agreement, Pd is the 
domestic price, and Pw is the world price. This formula allows for a wide 
range of adjustment paths. The advantages of the proposed formula are 
that a target date by which zero trade barriers must be achieved can be 
stipulated and that the formula automatically adjusts the tariff to allow 
for world price movements. 
In addition, under the proposed formula, the tariff adjusts instantaneously 
to compensate for changes in world prices, which serves to isolate the 
domestic market from changes in world prices without transmitting 
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domestic price variability to the world market. 
A second alternative is to replace Pd,t-1 with Pct, tin (3). This substitution 
is feasible but would allow the tariff to adjust for domestic disturbances 
and would allow the importing country to export domestic price variance 
to the world market. This version of the formula would be unacceptable 
to exporting countries. 
The practical implications of these alternatives can best be understood with 
a simplistic example. Consider an importing country that uses a variable 
export levy to maintain domestk price stability. Should This country shift 
to an ad valorem tariff, disturbances in world markets would be transmitted 
to domestic markets. The modified Swiss formula shown in (2) and (3) 
would at first isolate the effects of domestic and world disturbances; i.e. 
the prices in the importing country would reflect disturbances in that 
country, whereas prices in world markets would reflect disturbances in 
world markets. As world and domestic prices moved together, then so too 
would the variance of world and domestic prices. In the last year of the 
agreement, the two disturbances would be identical. (Presumably world 
price variance would be lower after trade barriers have been removed). 
AN EMPIRICAL EXAMPLE 
To demonstrate the claims made in this paper, we have constructed a simple 
empirical model. For realism, we have used actual prices and elasticities; 
however~ the model is too simplistic to provide real-world predictions. These 
results are presented only to demonstrate the concepts that underlie the 
formulas just discussed. Any attempt to introduce more realism (such as 
introducing other countries and commodities) would unduly complicate 
the model and disguise the more relevant results. 
This model contains two countries (the United States and the EC). The 
United States begins as a net importer and the EC as a net exporter. 
However, these situations are reversed as markets are liberalised. We assume 
in the base case that the EC replaces it variable import levy when this occurs. 
Thble 1 presents the base year data and assumed elasticities. 
The supply and demand specifications for each country take the general 
form: 
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(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
where QSi is the quantity supplied in country i, QDi is the quantity 
demanded in country i, ES1 is the excess supply in country 1, ED2 is the 
excess demand in country 2, Pi is the price in country i, f1i is a supply shifter 
in country i, ai is a demand shifter in country i, and ti and Vi are randomly 
distributed mean zero error terms with variance ei and Wj, respectively. 
The world market is represented by 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
(11) 
where E is the exchange rate, s 1 is an ad valorem export subsidy, S 1 is a 
specific export subsidy, s2 is an ad valorem import subsidy, S2 is a specific 
import subsidy, t 1 is an ad va/orem export tariff, Tt is a specific export 
tariff, t2 is an ad valorem import tariff, T2 is a specific import tariff, and 
C is the transportation cost between country 1 and country 2. 
Several alternative policies can be represented by (10) and (11). For example, 
to examine the effects of changes in the import tariff on the importer's 
price, (10) reduces to E•(l+t2)•P1, and (8) reduces to E*C. 
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Under a variable levy, the link between the importer's price and world prices, 
equation (10), is replaced by a constant import price P2. The effect is to 
prevent the transmission of the variability of world prices into the importer's 
markets. 
To analyse the transmission of variability under various trade policies, the 
model was simulated for 100 iterations by using the programme @RISK. 
The programme solves for the equilibrium prices and quantities for a given 
set of disturbance terms. A new set of disturbance terms is then generated 
and new equilibrium values are found. This process is then repeated 100 
times to generate a price distribution for each policy and/or year. The 
parameters of the resulting price distributions can then be used as proxies 
for those of the true distributions. 
The policies include no trade, free trade, ad valorem import and export 
subsidies and tariffs and a variable levy. The resulting means and variances 
of the endogenous variables are presented in Table 2. 
In the no-trade scenario, the EC price is much higher than is the US price. 
Under free trade, the prices differ only by the transportation costs, and 
the variances are similar. Under an import or export subsidy, US prices 
rise and EC prices fall relative to the free trade levels, and the variance 
of EC prices falls. Under an export or import tariff, US prices fall and 
EC prices rise relative to free-trade levels, and the variability of EC prices 
increases by a factor of 10. Under a variable levy, the US prices fall and 
variability increases relative to free trade, whereas the EC prices are much 
higher than the free-trade results. The variability of the EC prices under 
the variable levy is zero because the prices are set exogenously. The 
implication for tariffication is that US prices will increase and their 
variability will decrease while EC prices decrease as their variability 
increases. The extent of the increase in variability of EC prices will depend 
on the formula chosen to decrease the tariff equivalent over time. 
TARIFFICATION OF THE EC VARIABLE LEVY 
The tariff equivalent of the variable levy can be found in this two-country, 
one-commodity model by driving a wedge between the prices until prices 
and quantities under the tariff are exactly equivalent to those under the 
variable levy. The calculated tariff equivalent of the variable levy is 0.64. 
The tariff equivalent is then reduced over time using the modified Swiss 
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and the Swiss formulas. 1 
The results of simulating the reduction of the tariff equivalent over 10 years 
are presented in Figures la through 3b. The modified Swiss formula is used 
in Figures la through 3a and the Swiss formula is used in Figures lb through 
3b. The results presented are for year 1 (Figures la and lb), year 5 (Figures 
2a and 2b), and year 10 (Figures 3a and 3b). 
As shown in Figures la and lb, the variability of the EC prices is less in 
year 1 under the modified Swiss formula because the modified Swiss 
formula adjusts the tariff as the world price changes, and therefore the 
variability of world price is not transmitted into the domestic market. The 
variability of domestic prices is attributed to only domestic disturbances 
and not to variability in world markets. 
Turiffication of a variable levy results in domestic producers being subjected 
to price variability where previously none existed. This would be the case 
for tariffication of all nontariff trade barriers that are designed to set price 
levels. Other nontariff trade barriers that allow some degree of domestic 
price variability, such as quotas, would have a modest increase in domestic 
price variability under tariffication using the modified Swiss formula but 
a much larger increase when the Swiss formula is used. 
In the fifth year of the reduction, the means of the distributions for the 
exporter and the importer move closer as the tariff is reduced (Figures 2a 
and 2b ). However, the variance of prices under the modified Swiss formula 
continues to decrease whereas the Swiss formula maintains a larger variance. 
By the last year of the reduction, the distributions of price under the 
modified Swiss formula are separated only by transportation costs, whereas 
the price distributions under the Swiss formula remain widely separated 
because the Swiss formula does not force the tariff equivalent to reach 
zero by the end of the agreement (Figures 3a and 3b ). 
1 A small-country assumption was necessary because the degree of simultaneity in the large-country 
version caused convergence problems. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The tariffication proposals to the GATT promise to provide a framework 
for the reduction of barriers to trade. However, a drawback of such 
proposals is that ad va/orem tariffs cause domestic price variance to be 
greater than world price variability. Given that many trade barriers were 
implemented to reduce price variability, a policy that dramatically increases 
price variability would likely be politically unacceptable. 
A proposed tariff-reduction formula that gradually transmits world price 
variability to domestic markets is presented. Simulation results using a two-
country, one-commodity trade model support the claims made for the new 
formula. 
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Table 1. Base year data and assumed elasticitiesa 
Elasticities 
Supply 
Demand 
1986 Data 
Supply 
Demand 
Net Imports 
Price 
Coefficients 
rn 
fi2 
ri 
8il 
gi2 
Vi 
United States 
(Country 1) 
0.65 
-0.70 
11.292 
12.031 
0.739 
1.878 
3.952 
3.908 
1.271b 
20.453 
-4.484 
0.352c 
European Community 
(Country 2) 
0.55 
-0.70 
7.445 
6.991 
-0.454 
3.221 
3.350 
1.271 
0.596b 
11.885 
-1.519 
0.444c 
a The base year is 1986. The data and elasticities are taken from 
Roningen and Dixit. 
b Variance of the random term in the supply equation in 
country i. 
c Variance of the random term in the demand equation in 
country i. 
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Table 2. Mean prices and variances under various trade policies 
US Price EC Price 
Protection 
level Mean Variance Mean Variance 
(%) ($/kg) (ECU/kg) 
No trade NA 1.97 0.0261 3.05 0.0682 
Free trade 0.00 2.18 0.0214 2.53 0.0242 
US export subsidy 0.50 2.50 0.0242 1.55 0.0069 
US export tariff 0.50 1.93 0.0264 3.28 0.2597 
EC import subsidy 0.50 2.50 0.0215 1.55 0.0061 
EC import tariff 0.50 1.93 0.0258 3.29 0.2469 
EC variable export 
restitution 0.75 1.87 0.0320 3.44 0.0000 
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CHAPTER 3 
TRANSFORMING GRAIN TRANSPORTATION 
POLICIES IN CANADA: IMPACT ANALYSIS 
H. Bruce Huff, Kurt K. Klein, Jeff Corman* 
INTRODUCTION 
'Itansportation policies have long been an integral part of agriculture policy 
in Canada. The Western Grains Transportation Act (WGTA) which 
compensates the railways for the movement of grain from the prairies to 
export points is currently the largest single government statutory programme 
expenditure for the agriculture sector. Hence, significant agriculture policy 
reforms must involve some consideration of this transportation policy. 
The objective of this paper is to examine some of the proposed options 
for modifying this programme and the impact of adjustments, particularly 
with respect to its international implications. These options include a 
complete phase-out of the subsidy, a change in the method of payment 
which limits any production incentive, and a change in the method of 
payment to reduce the production distortions among commodities. 
For the implementation of these options, it must be recognised that the 
1980's were a particularly difficult time for the Canadian prairie economy. 
Land prices declined significantly in response to a cost-price squeeze and 
lower production from a series of droughts. This economic hardship is 
continuing as interest rates have reached record levels in real terms, the 
Canadian dollar has appreciated against the US dollar, export subsidies 
by the US and the EEC are rising and payments under the Canadian grain 
stabilisation programmes which are based on moving average prices have 
ended. In addition, the international environment presents a number of 
unknowns. These include revisions to the US Farm Bill with provision for 
expanded export subsidies, the potential for free imports of US grain under 
the terms of the Canada-US trade agreement and a possible GATT 
agreement resulting in new trading rules and limits on domestic policies. 
At the same time, the Canadian government is faced with a large and 
persistent budget deficit which may restrict the level of transfers to the grain 
sector of the magnitude seen during the past few years. 
*Agriculture Canada, Ottawa. 
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Canada is in the process of a comprehensive review of all agriculture 
policies. In November, 1989, the Minister of Agriculture released a 
discussion paper Growing Together. This paper describes the four basic 
pillars of a new policy framework - more market responsiveness, greater 
self-reliance, recognition of regional diversity, and increased environmental 
sustainability. The process has been undertaken with establishment of 
fourteen Tusk Forces composed of federal and provincial government and 
industry representatives that are currently discussing options to propose 
to federal and provincial ministers of agriculture. The WGTA is one of 
the principle programmes under review by the Transportation Task Force. 
It must respond to the criticism of the programme that it involves large 
budgetary costs, production and trade distortions, inequities among 
commodities and regions, constraints on diversification, and inefficiencies 
in the transportation and handling system. 
Canada, as a member of the Cairns group is a proponent of comprehensive, 
integrated and equitable policy reforms for the agriculture sector under 
the current GATT round of negotiations with respect to import access 
barriers, internal support measures, export subsidies, and health and 
sanitary standards. An objective on which Canada places high importance 
in the GATT negotiations is to not only limit the level of assistance to 
agriculture but to restrict assistance programmes to the types that have 
no trade distorting impact. The WGTA, in terms of international 
discussions is a critical element of such agricultural policy reform for 
Canada. 
The next section provides a background to the domestic and international 
trade policy issues outlined above. The following section describes the 
analytical techniques for evaluating the modifications of the WGTA 
currently being considered. The further section provides the empirical 
results using a regional programming model for Canada. The fifth section 
discusses the implication for domestic and international trade policy, and 
the paper finishes with a summary and conclusions. 
BACKGROUND 
The majority of Canadian grains and oilseeds are produced in the prairies 
and exported as primary products. The attached graph indicates the regional 
importance of this production and the proportion exported. In recent years, 
the large traditional markets in Europe have tapered off while the growth 
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markets have been in the Pacific Rim shifting the location of export ports 
for grains and oilseeds from eastern to western Canada. 
The Crow Rate (now the WGTA) refers to the statutory freight rates for 
moving grain from the prairies for export. It was set originally in 1897 as 
a guarantee to the Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) for the construction 
of railway through the Rocky Mountains (the Crow's Nest pass). It was 
not.until the early 1960's that the increase in energy costs seriously affected 
the railways willingness to move grain at these rates. In 1984, the WGTA 
was introduced which provided compensation directly to the railways for 
the difference between the producer contributions and the rates based on 
a negotiated cost formula. Producers were to pay an increasing percentage 
of the full cost over time. The total federal government cost is $720 million 
in 1989/90, which on average represents a subsidy of about $21/tonne. 
The WGTA subsidy results in a higher farm level price for grain. In 1986, 
the province of Alberta introduced a programme to offset the impact of 
the higher prices for grain fed to livestock arising from the WGTA subsidy. 
During the past year, the provinces of Saskatchewan and Manitoba have 
also introduced similar (but more limited) programmes. 
There have been a number of studies on tne affects of this programme 
(see summary by Kerr et al). In general, from these studies it is well 
recognised that the freight subsidy raises the farm level price for grains 
and oilseeds This increases the livestock feed price and reduces livestock 
and meat production and net exports. At the same time grain and oilseed 
production and exports are higher. The effect is largely restricted to western 
Canada as the feedgrain market in the eastern part of the country is on 
a corn import basis which determines their feed costs. As well, the dairy 
and poultry sector are regulated by supply management policy with output 
prices set using cost of production formulae. Thus, any impact on the dairy 
and poultry sectors is through a decrease in domestic consumption arising 
from the higher grain prices. 
There have been a number of changes affecting the trade in Canadian grain. 
For example, as part of the Canada-US trade agreement, import licences 
for grains regulated by the Canadian Wheat Board will no longer be 
required when assistance levels (as defined in the agreement) in the US 
drop to the level of those in Canada. Import licences for oats were 
discontinued in 1989. The calculations for 1990 indicate that, largely as 
a result of the drought, the assistance level for wheat is only marginally 
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higher in the US. 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
In order to assess the options and to aid the debate of the issues relating 
to the WGTA identified above, four types of scenarios of program 
modifications were analysed - (i) status quo or pay the railways, (ii) 10 
year phase out of benefits with no compensation, (iii) pay the producers 
the benefits, and (iv) payout to producers via an annuity for ten years. 
The empirical evaluation was conducted using the Canadian Regional 
Agriculture Model (CRAM). 1 CRAM is a large mathematical programming 
model representing the major agricultural sectors in Canada. Grains and 
oilseed production in the prairie provinces is disaggregated at the crop 
districts level (22) and at a provincial level for the remainder of Canada. 
Livestock and poultry commodity production is modelled at a provincial 
level, except for the four Atlantic provinces which are treated as one. For 
this study, CRAM was calibrated for the 1989 costs, prices, government 
payments and livestock inventories, but used average grain yields from the 
1982-88 period. 
The elasticities in the model are assumed to be medium term responses 
showing the adjustment after about 5 years. The model not only captures 
the production adjustments among the grains and the livestock 
commodities, but also examines the gross and net income changes for each 
commodity, changes in government expenditures, asset value changes, and 
an approximation of efficiency (using the objective function which 
represents the producer and consumer surplus). 
The issue of equity and the nature of appropriate compensation is a difficult 
one. The freight subsidy increases the prices not only for that grain which 
is exported, but all the grain that is produced on the prairies. An increase 
in the freight rates would not only reduce the price of grain exported, but 
all grain produced. The so-called 'dilution' effect. Thus there are persuasive 
arguments for compensation to be based more fairly on all marketings or 
even production rather than only on exports. 
• Details of the Canadian Regional Agriculture Model can be obtained from the authors. 
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It is contended that changing the method of payment is a necessary 
condition for improving efficiency in the grain transportation and handling 
system. There would also need to be other regulatory changes in order to 
achieve these efficiencies. It is estimated that such changes could stimulate 
an improvement in efficiency by approximately three per cent per year. 
The four scenarios noted above are described below in more detail: 
(i} Scenario 1: Status Quo. This option represents the current situation. 
Western Canadian grain producers pay a freight rate close to one third of 
the full compensatory level, and the shortfall is paid by the federal 
government directly to the railways. There is an offset programme in place 
in the province of Alberta which compensates feed grain users for the price 
distortion caused by the subsidised producer freight rates under the WGTA. 
This is the base policy ag'ainst which the modifications are compared. 
(ii) Scenario 2: Complete removal of WGTA, no compensation. The major 
assumptions in this scenario are that producers freight rate will gradually 
rise to the full compensatory rates with no provision made for 
compensation due to the change in policy. The full compensatory freight 
rate level are reached after a 10 year phase in period. This represents the 
most extreme modification of the programme. 
(iii) Scenario 3: Partial removal of WGTA, with compensation. In this 
scenario, the producers pay 81 % of the full compensatory freight rate and 
the remaining 19% is paid directly to the railways (as a means of ensuring 
an appropriate level of service). However, 81 % of the annual WGTA benefit 
of $720 million is paid directly to the producer. That payment is on the 
basis of all marketings, rather than just on eligible shipments (those 
movements now covered under the WGTA). 
(iv) Scenario 4: Total removal of WGTA, with compensation. The 
producer pays the full compensatory freight rate with the Crow benefit 
eveJltuall§ ended. The Crow benefit for the next 25 years is discounted into 
a present value and this amount is distributed directly to producers by the 
payment of an annuity over a 10 year period. A single producers's share 
of the annuity is based on historical production, thereby avoiding 
distortions of current production decisions. 
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RESULTS 
This section reports on some of the results from the study, focusing on 
those that have an international interest. Table 1 illustrates the changes 
in the level of western Canadian production and shipments of the major 
grains and oilseeds and the herd size and export changes in the beef and 
pork sector. As a result of the higher freight rates charged under scenarios 
2, 3 and 4, production of wheat and coarse grains would decline while 
the production of oilseeds would increase. This is due to the shift in relative 
profitability of the various crop enterprises. The major exception to this 
rule is in scenario 4, where barley/oats production and exports would 
increase. The reason for this is that since individual producer compensation 
is based on production, some areas which enjoy a large comparative 
advantage in producing barley would benefit from producing more of it. 
The largest decline in cereal production would occur in scenario 2 where 
no compensation would be paid to producers. Another important factor 
in the cereal production decline is that more crop land would be 
summerfallowed (left idle for one crop year). 
For scenarios 2, 3 and 4, it is estimated that Canadian cereal exports would 
decline 1-2 per cent, which directly reflects production changes due to the 
fact that exports in CRAM are treated as a residual after domestic needs 
are met. Therefore, since the change in domestic uses of wheat and oilseeds 
would be minimal for the different scenarios, reduced production would 
translate into reduced exports. 
However, the exports of coarse grains would decline more than production 
as domestic grain consumption would rise from the expanded livestock 
herd. The cowheifer and sow herds are estimated to increase in scenarios 
2, 3 and 4, due to the lower domestic price of feed grains. The cow/heifer 
inventory increase is estimated to be the same in scenarios 2 and 4 because 
the feed/grain price declined by the same amount whereas in scenario 3 
the cowheifer herd would be somewhat smaller. Also, the relative increase 
in sow numbers would not be as great as for the beef cow herd because 
the majority of the pork is produced in Ontario and Quebec where there 
would be no impacts on feed prices due to the removal of WGTA freight 
rates. This is because Ontario and Quebec feed grain prices are based on 
the world corn price. 
The export estimates for beef and pork (expressed in meat equivalents) 
show considerable variability. Once again, in the analysis exports are treated 
32 
Toward Freer Trade 
as a residual after domestic needs are met, and if the domestic needs remain 
relatively constant across scenarios, the export figures will increase by the 
total increase in production. Beef exports increase significantly as would 
be expected since western Canada has always been a net exporter of beef. 
It is assumed that the export market would absorb the expanded production 
without affecting the product price. 
In Tuble 2, the estimated net income (defined as gross returns above variable 
costs) level for all major agricultural commodities are shown for each of 
the scenarios. The crop sector net income shows an estimated decrease in 
scenario 2, combining full compensatory rates and no direct producer 
payments by way of compensation, compared with the base scenario 1. 
However, the crop sector income is expected to increase for scenarios 3 
and 4 compared to the ba,se scenario. This would result from a shift to 
higher valued crops and from the total value of the direct producer 
payments. 
Beef and particularly pork sector net income is estimated to increase over 
the base level for scenarios 2, 3 and 4. This is expected since the removal 
of the railway subsidy would remove the farm level price distortion, resulting 
in lower feed grain prices for western Canadian livestock producers. It is 
anticipated that the lower prices would translate into increased sector net 
income. This conclusion is reinforced by the results of the two supply 
managed sectors net income (dairy and poultry). Since it is assumed that 
there would be no change in production in these sectors, the increase in 
net income would be due to decrease feed costs in western Canada. Since 
the supply managed sectors are concentrated in Ontario and Quebec, the 
total income increase in Canada would be rather small. Table 3 shows the 
estimated shadow values of land for the three prairie provinces. Although 
these numbers do have specific economic interpretations in simple linear 
programming models, it is not as straight forward given the complexity 
of CRAM. Nevertheless, it can be asserted that the shadow values are a 
measure of the marginal value of an extra hectare of cropland in the model 
(the rental value). The major problem with interpreting these values as an 
actual measure of land value is that marginal change in value refers to a 
marginal change in total welfare, rather than producer surplus. 
In Table 3, the base scenario values are reported and the percentage change 
from this value is reported for the rest of the scenarios. The land shadow 
values are estimated to decline for all regions in all provinces in scenario 
2. The reason for the decrease in scenario 2's shadow values is easy to 
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understand: the loss of the annual Crow subsidy of $720 million would 
not be totally compensated by the improvement in efficiency and the 
increase in net sector incomes in the beef and pork sectors. This is 
confirmed by the fact that scenario 2's objective function value is the lowest 
of the four scenarios. 
However, the estimated land values generally increase in scenario 3. The 
exceptions are in Alberta wherein some regions the shadow values are 
estimated to decline. The shadow values of land calculated in scenario 4 
is the same as scenario 2. Producers would likely incorporate the knowledge 
that the annuity payments would end after 10 years, and thus discount 
its value. 
IMPLICATION 
The production distortion from the WGTA subsidy are estimated to be 
relatively small. The quantitative analysis indicates that grain production 
would decline slightly (1-2 per cent) while oilseed and livestock production 
would rise slightly even in the most extreme scenario ( eg a phase-out with 
no compensation). Consequently, the trade distortions of this programme 
are also estimated to be small. The largest impact would occur for coarse 
grain exports. The expanded livestock herd would increase the domestic 
consumption of feedgrains and reduced exports more than production. 
With the small production and trade effect, the world price impact of the 
WGTA subsidy would therefore be negligible. 
These changes in trade patterns refer to a unilateral policy change. If there 
was a multilateral reduction in assistance the trade changes noted above 
would be intensified (ie more livestock and less cereals production). Most 
studies show that under a multilateral reduction in assistance, there would 
be a sizable rise in livestock and dairy prices and little change in grain prices. 
While the production and trade impacts may be small, there are important 
income implications for grain and oilseed producers in Canada. Under 
certain scenarios there would likely be a large decline in net income and 
asset values. These losses are highly dependent on the nature of the 
compensation during the programme transition. The no-compensation 
option would likely cause large losses to the grain producers. Where 
compensation paid to producers which approximates the current level of 
payments to the railways, this study estimates that there would be a rise 
34 
Toward Freer Trade 
in crop producers net income and cropland values. For individual producers, 
the basis for compensation (eg on exports, marketings or production) would 
also be an important consideration as to the income implications. In 
addition, there are considerable regional differences from these policy 
changes. 
The grain handling and transportation system could also experience income 
and asset value declines by these programme changes. Lower volumes of 
grain would be marketed and shipped for export. The optimum location 
and size of elevators would likely be affected thereby requiring further 
consolidation. The magnitude and the distribution of the implications to 
the grain handling firms are not well understood. 
From an international trade perspective, the modifications to the existing 
WGTA programme can be made in a way to decouple payments from 
production. The trade implications of this option, however, would appear 
to be little different from the current policy or even a pay the producer 
option. As a result there are few international gains - such as reduced 
exports or higher world prices - from changes to the WGTA or even its 
complete phase-out. The WGTA is close to a decoupled type of programme. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The Crow rate and its successor, the WGTA have been a fundamental part 
of Canadian agriculture policy for almost 100 years. The increasing 
concerns in Canada about its production distortions and its restriction on 
the structural adjustments in efficiency have more interest for possible 
changes to the programme. At the same time it must be recognised that 
the contribution of the programme on farm income in western Canada 
is substantial - the transfer represented close to 30 per cent of total net 
farm income in the prairies in 1989. Changes to the programme would 
impact quite differently on various producers and grain handling firms 
in the west. Hence there are differing views on whether and how it should 
be changed. 
This study used a large regional p.mgramming model (CRAM) to quantify 
the impact of the changes in the WGTA. These included (i) maintaining 
the status quo, (ii) a phase-out with no compensation, (iii) pay the producer, 
and (iv) a buy-out using an annuity to producers. 
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The international impacts from the programme appear to be modest. There 
would be reductions in grain production and exports, but these would be 
partially offset by increased oilseed and livestock production and exports. 
The net trade affect for Canada would be a small decrease (less than 1 
per cent) in the value of exports of agricultural products. It is important 
to understand the linkages among commodities and the likely impacts from 
policy adjustments. For example, the increased livestock exports would likely 
go to different markets than current grain exports. 
Changes in the method of payment or reduction in assistance would change 
production patterns on the prairies with a shift to more livestock feeding 
in response to the lower feed costs. If these changes occurred at the same 
time as a multilateral reduction in assistance to agriculture it would likely 
accentuate these trends, as livestock prices are estimated to rise faster than 
feedgrain prices under a more liberalised international agriculture. 
Crop producers could face a substantial decline in net income and land 
values, if producers were required to pay the full cost of transportation 
and there was no compensation. However, higher freight rates with 
compensation near existing levels could result in higher net income and 
land values. Net income to livestock producers would increase in all cases. 
In terms of the international proposals on 're-instrumentation', the WGTA 
provides a good example of a programme that can provide a similar level 
of assistance to the sector in a variety of ways. The trade impact form the 
changes, however may be small. 
The implication of the type of policy adjustment on the other hand is very 
important to producers, as this has implications not only for net income, 
but more importantly for asset values. 
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Table 1. Crop and livestock production and exports - resuJts 
from alternative transportation scenarios 
Scenario I Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 
Production (000 tonnes) 
Wheat 22372 22510 22397 21952 
Barley /Oats 11508 11372 11400 11802 
Flax 552 581 576 551 
Cano la 3769 4174 4104 4239 
Export (000 tonnes) 
Wheat 18690 18460 18706 18261 
Barley /Oats 3248 3000 3054 3488 
Flax 552 581 576 551 
Cano la 2186 2203 2150 2233 
Livestock Herd Size (000 head) 
Cows/Heifers 3886 3940 3924 3940 
Sows 1029 1031 1031 1031 
Meat Exports (000 tonnes) 
Beef 77.6 110.5 106.7 109.0 
Pork 109.7 113.7 112.2 113.7 
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Table 2. Net income for major agricultural sector in Canada • 
in million dollars 
Scenario I Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 
Crop Sector 
(Western Canada) 4257 3681 4371 4412 
Beef Sector 1199 1120 1211 1220 
Pork Sector 779 813 801 813 
Dairy Sector 1955 1959 1957 1959 
Poultry Sector 
(Broilers Eggs 
& Turkeys) 1935 1943 1941 1943 
Total Agricultural 
Net Income 10125 9616 10281 10347 
Total Gov~t Payment 1626 970 1591 1710 
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Table 3. Shadow values of land and objective function values 
Scenario I Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 
($ hectare) - percentage ch(Jnge over scenario I -
Alberta 
Region 1 136.54 -11.2 1.8 -11.2 
Region 2 203.52 -10.5 1.6 -10.5 
Region 3 169.15 -14.6 -0.8 -14.6 
Region 4 183.81 -13.0 min.neg. -13.0 
Region 5 203.92 -10.4 -3.6 -10.4 
Region 6 159.88 -19.2 -1.4 -19.2 
Region 7 187.32 -12.8 min.pos. -12.8 
Saskatchewan 
Region 1 116.85 -11.0 4.6 -11.0 
Region 2 134.64 -10.9 3.1 -10.9 
Region 3 103.35 -11.8 3.9 -11.8 
Region 4 92.32 -15.4 2.4 -15.4 
Region 5 142.25 - 9.3 8.0 - 9.3 
Region 6 133.41 -13.0 2.1 -13.0 
Region 7 143.33 -13.4 1.8 -13.4 
Region 8 153.95 -12.99 1.4 -12.99 
Region 9 158.36 -14.9 min.pos. -14.9 
Manitoba 
Region 1 163.74 -10.9 3.0 -10.9 
Region 2 149.26 -12.3 3.4 -12.3 
Region 3 186.76 - 8.4 4.2 - 8.4 
Region 4 186.81 - 8.1 4.9 - 8.1 
Region 5 175.66 - 7.6 5.2 - 7.6 
Region 6 146.86 - 9.1 6.6 - 9.1 
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CHAPTER 4 
RECENT DEVELOPMENT IN JAPANESE AGRICULTURAL 
STRUCTURE AND ITS FUTURE PROSPECTS 
Kenzo Hemmi* 
STRUCTURAL AllJUSTMENT IN JAPANESE AGRICULTURE 
Consumer expenditure on food and drinks in Japan has declined from 35.2 
per cent of total consumption expenditure in 1960 to 24.1 per cent in 1987. 
This trend reflects a rapid increase in the per capita income of Japanese 
consumers. A more important fact, however, is the dramatic decline in net 
agricultural production. As a proportion of the Gross Domestic Product, 
agricultural production has declined from 9.8 per cent in 1960 to 2.0 per 
cent in 1985. Increases in food and agricultural imports, the development 
of food processing industries and the increasing popularity of eating out 
among Japanese explain the difference between the two trends above. 
Recent trends indicate that the number of full time farmers has declined 
more rapidly than the number of farms. As is often cited, there has been 
an increasing number of part-time farmers in Japan. This trend can be 
explained by the following factors: (1) agricultural production has declined 
since 1985, (2) agricultural prices at the farm gate has declined since 1985, 
(3) the number of those who entered into agriculture after completing their 
education has declined rapidly over the 1965-1987 period. 
Currently there are approximately 4 million farms in Japan and in order 
to maintain this number there should be approximately 100 thousand new 
entrants into agriculture every year. The information in Table 1 shows that 
in 1987 there were only 4,000 new entrants into farming compared to 72,000 
in 1965. Table 1 also shows the extent to which Japanese agriculture is 
becoming more and more capital intensive. 
About half of Japanese farm workers is over 60 years old and still adheres 
to farming. One of the reasons why these farmers are generally reluctant 
"' Professor, Asia University, Japan 
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to give up farming is that they view their farms as their most important 
assets. However, it is expected that farm lands will be subject to higher 
taxes in the near future. Consequently future farming activities might not 
be as attractive as in the past. Various sources suggests that about a fourth 
to a third of present farms will disappear in the decade to the year 2000. 
The rate of decline is also expected to increase after year 2000. 
The share of total income derived from agriculture for the average farm 
household has declined from 44 per cent in 1965 to 13 per cent in 1987. 
This highlights the increasing importance of non-farm activities for the 
average farm households. The income of farm household has been larger 
than that of non-farm households. This is because there are generally more 
people per family in agriculture than in the non-agricultural sector. 
However, the per capita income of a fulltime farm labourer has generally 
been less than that of a fulltime labourer in the non-farm sector (see Table 
2). As such, one cannot expect farmers to continue to work harder than 
their urban counterparts. 
GOVERNMENT POLICY 
At the end of World War II, Japan was in the midst of a severe food 
shortage. As a result, the Japanese government made every effort to increase 
food production. In a remarkably short period of ten years, Japan had 
attained a stable supply of food. 
Since 1955 the focus of Japanese agricultural policy has gradually shifted 
from increasing food production to developing a healthy agricultural sector. 
With increasing food supplies, food prices have declined steadily and as 
a result, the income of farmers has deteriorated. After several years of 
deliberation, the 1 apanese government enacted the Basic Agricultural Law 
of 1961. This law prescribes that the basic objectives of Japanese 
agricultural policies are to increase productivity and to raise farm income 
to a level comparable to other sectors. 
At the same time, the government had launched the 'Doubling National 
Income Plan' and the policy for opening up the Japanese economy; both 
contained in the Basic Guide of Thlde and Foreign Exchange Liberalisation 
Programme of June 1960. The Japanese government tried to liberalise both 
the agricultural and the manufacturing sectors. By the end of the period 
of rapid economic growth only 23 food and farm commodities were under 
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residual import restriction. This figure compares favourably to that of 
France. The Japanese government thought that the target of the Basic Guide 
of Trade and Foreign Exchange Liberalisation was achieved. 
The oil and grain crisis crippled the Japanese economy in 1972 and 1975. 
The Japanese were very surprised in finding that the self-sufficiency ratios 
of such important food commodities as wheat and soybean were extremely 
low, generally less than ten per cent. Japanese awareness of the extent to 
which the country was dependent on foreign supplies of food was further 
increased by the soybean embargo. Consequently the Japanese government 
redirected its policy from increasing productivity and promoting 
liberalisation to increasing food production by protecting agriculture. Since 
then, food security has become the primary objective of Japanese 
agricultural policy. Resolutions calling for an increase in the domestic food 
supply capacity were unanimously adopted in both the Upper and Lower 
Houses in 1980. 
However, due primarily to the increasingly abundant food supply on the 
world market since 1980, the emphasis of government programmes has 
shifted quietly from increasing food production to one of increasing 
productivity. Several announcements by the Japanese Government in 1987 
and 1988 have indicated that the Government has been trying to reform 
its agricultural programmes. A significant part of the present level of 
Japanese agricultural protection can be explained by the recent appreciation 
of the currency exchange rates. Prime Minister Nakasone accelerated the 
process of the reforms which, unfortunately, was stopped as a result of 
internal political problems (the recruit scandal). The Liberal Democratic 
Party was extremely unpopular and weak among Japanese. The Socialist 
Party which is more protectionist than LDP has gained more popularity 
recently. In the last election of the Upper House in the summer of 1989, 
candidates of both the LDP and the Socialist Party have promised that 
farmers would be protected from imports from overseas. 
NEW DEVELOPMENT IN JAPANESE AGRICULTURAL ECONOMY 
Rice is the symbol of food and agriculture in Japan. Due to surplus rice 
production since 1971, the Government has put in place a set aside 
programme. The acreage set aside has increased steadily to reach 791,000 
hectares in 1988, representing 27 percent of the total area under rice 
production. Further increases in acreage set aside is likely to severely impede 
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on the maintenance of the present way of rice farming in Japan. As a result, 
farmers) organisations are very reluctant to accept further increases in 
acreage set aside. Hence, the rice programmes will soon be unworkable 
regardless of whether the Japanese market is made accessible to overseas 
rice growers. Moreover, only 5.3 per cent of rice producers sold more than 
9 tons of rice (valued at less than Yen 3 million), 5 per cent of the total 
rice production was by farms which had no full-time worker, 17 per cent 
was by farms which had only one male (60 + years old) and/or a female 
full~time worker. When an these facts are taken into account, the future 
of Japanese rice production looks extremely gloomy. 
Given the importance of rice in Japan, Japanese rice programmes have 
been at the centre of agricultural policy. Reforms of rice programmes would 
necessarily involve the relaxation of the entire government intervention 
policies in agriculture. The information in Tub le 3 shows that more than 
70 per cent of poultry, pig and vegetable production involve farms which 
have at least one male full-time farm worker. These farms do not receive 
any support from the government and are not controlled by the government. 
As a result many young and promising farmers are· moving away from the 
production of controlled products to the production of uncontrolled 
products. 
The above trend has been particularly apparent in several areas. For 
example, the number of ornamental plant producers has increased from 
21,000 in 1980 to 27 ,000 in 1987 although the imports of cut flowers and 
other ornamental plants have increased from US$17 million to US$58 
million over the same period. Mushroom production is another such 
example where production has increased very rapidly. The number of 
horticultural farms equipped with glasshouses has increased from 172,000 
in 1975 to 254,000 in 1987. Even among rice producers the emphasis has 
shifted from the production of directly controlled standard rice to the 
indirectly controlled quality rice. 
Japanese consumers are 'in the midst of a glorious spending boom.' As 
a part of this boom 'Japan's consumers have splashed out on gourmet food.' 
(Economist September 9, 1989). In 1990, about 10 million Japanese will 
travel overseas and will taste foods and drinks in other countries. In this 
respect, it is predicted that the Japanese consumer will have a more 
cosmopolitan taste in the future. Already, the Japanese food market is 
expanding extremely rapidly. Progressive (young) farmers are trying to take 
a reasonable share jn this expanding Japanese food market. Some of them 
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are trying to export their products too. 
The number of children from farm families who were engaged in farming 
after finishing their schooling declined steadily from 68,000 in 1965 to 9,900 
in 1975 and to 3,500 in 1988. However, only a small percentage of those 
who were engaged in farming after finishing their education in 1965 were 
graduates of colleges and universities compared to more than 10 per cent 
in 1975 and about 30 per cent in 1988. Recent surveys show that about 
70 per cent of the children of full-time farm families who are studying 
in colleges and universities expressed their intention of going into farming 
after finishing their education. They generally would like to be involved 
in livestock farming, vegetable growing and ornamental plant production. 
This trend indicates that Japan will have fewer and fewer farmers but with 
more education. 
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Table 1. Main Indicators of Japanese Agricultural Economy 
1960 1970 1980 1985 1987 
Agricultural Production 69.4 87.3 90.3 100.0 98.0 
(1985 = 100) 
Agricultural Price Index 22.4 43.7 96.9 100.0 93.5 
(1985 = 100) 
Agricultural Exports 167 370 905 732 930 
(US$ million) 
Agricultural Imports 884 3284 14917 14600 18345 
(US$ million) 
Number of Farms (000) 5985 5261 4614 4331 4240 
Full-time Population in 1196 811 506 444 432 
Agriculture (10,000) 
Entrants into Agriculture after 72 32 6 5 4 
their education (000) 
Arable land (000 hectares) 6071 5796 5461 5379 5340 
Total Agricultural Capital 240 1091 3674 3674 3919 
Formation {Yen billion) 
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Table 2. Farm Household Economy 
Population per farm household 
Gainfully occupied population per 
farm household 
Income per farm household (a) 
Agricultural income per farm 
household (b) 
{b)/{a) 
Per capita income of farm household 
Y'OOO 
Y'OOO 
% 
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1987 
5.28 4.84 4.56 4.40 4.34 4.32 
2. 70 2.66 2.55 2.52 2.46 2.43 
835 1596 3966 5603 6926 7173 
365 508 1146 952 1056 944 
44 32 29 17 15 13 
population ( c) Y'OOO 158 330 870 1273 1596 1660 
Per capita income of worker's 
household ( d) 
(c)/(d) 
Per capita income of gainfully 
occupied population in farm 
household ( e) 
Per capita income of gainfully 
occupied population in worker's 
household (t) 
(e)/(f) 
Y'OOO 194 357 760 1111 1421 1479 
% 81.5 92.3 114.4 114.6 112.3 112.3 
Y'OOO 309 600 1555 2223 2815 2952 
Y'OOO 524 891 1931 2817 3431 3432 
% 59.0 67.3 80.5 78.9 82.0 86.0 
47 
Japanese Agricultural Structure 
Table 3. Value of Agricultural Production by Type of Farm 
(1987 : per cent) 
Classification I Classification II 
Farms with Farms with Farms with Full time Part-time 
at least only an no full- I I 
1 male full- old and/or time worker 
time worker* female full-
time worker 
Total Agric. 57 19 24 28 38 
Rice 28 17 55 13 30 
Vegetables 
in house 81 17 2 36 50 
Vegetables in 
field 61 23 16 30 38 
Fruits 62 24 14 31 34 
Silk 56 31 13 19 29 
Poultry 71 28 1 55 23 
Pig 80 18 2 42 47 
Dairy 90 9 1 46 47 
*Full-time farm workers are those who are between the ages of 16 and 
60, and work 150 days or more a year on their farm. 
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PART II 
Liberalisation Initiatives 
and Experiences 
CHAPTER 5 
DEVELOPING COUNTRY INTERESTS IN FOOD TRADE 
LIBERALISATION FOLWWING THE URUGUAY ROUND 
Kym Anderson* 
INTRODUCTION 
There is a commonly-held presumption that if markets for temperate food 
products were to be liberalised as a result of the Uruguay Round of 
multilateral trade negotiations, developing countries would be harmed. The 
basis of this view is that, as a group, developing countries are net importers 
of those food prices in international markets and their food import bills 
would be higher. 
The purpose of this paper is to show that for a number of reasons this 
is too restrictive a view of the effects of including _agriculture in the Uruguay 
Round. In fact it is quite possible the majority of developing countries 
would be net beneficiaries of such a liberalisation. The paper uses standard 
economic analysis to demonstrate key steps in the conceptual argument 
leading to that opposite conclusion. It begins with the conventional, static, 
partial-equilibrium view, adds distributional and risk considerations, and 
then raises further issues that add increasingly to the probability that 
developing countries could gain from the inclusion of agriculture in the 
Uruguay Round. Empirical modelling r~sults (reported elsewhere) show 
that even when attention is confined just to the markets for temperate food 
staples, it is plausible that virtually all developing countries could benefit 
from a global liberalisation of those markets and that the vast majority 
of the world's poor would be better off. The second section refers to these 
studies and points to areas where further empirical research is needed to 
improve our understanding of the likely effects of reform. Some· policy 
implications of the analysis for both rich and poor countries are drawn 
out in the final section. 
" Department of Economics and Centre for International Economic Studies, University of Adelaide, 
Adelaide, South Australia 5001, Australia. 
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SOME CONCEPTUAL STEPS IN THE ARGUMENT 
The conventional view of effects of OECD food trade liberalisation 
Figure 1 depicts the conventional view of what would occur if the advanced 
industrial countries alone liberalised their protectionist policies toward food 
trade. Suppose that following the international price rise the domestic 
producer and consumer prices in a food-importing developing country rose 
from Po to P1. (Throughout the P's refer to the price of food relative to 
the price of other tradables. For the moment assume there are no distortions 
in the developing country.) Then producer surplus would rise by area abfg 
while consumer surplus would fall by area acdg. The net loss to this 
economy therefore is seen as area bcdf. Note, though, that the food import 
bill would he greater only if the price elasticity of excess demand for food 
is less than unity. 
However, it need not be the case that this developing country continues 
to be a net food importer. Suppose., for example, that the post-liberalisation 
price is P2 rather than P 1 · In that case it is possible that the country's 
loss would be less than if the price rose only to P 1 · The required condition 
is that area fde is less than are eih, and the net welfare loss in this case 
is area bee less area eih. It therefore follows that if the international price 
rose sufficiently, this country could even be a net beneficiary. If it rose 
to P3, for example, the net gain would be area ejk less area bee. And food 
would be a net contributor instead of a net drain on foreign exchange 
earnings. 
Needless to say, an undistorted developing country which is a net food 
exporter at the pre-liberalisation price gains unequivocally from 
liberalisation. If P2 and P3 were the pre- and post~liberalisation prices, 
for example, then the net gain to that exporting country would be area 
hijk if the price change is fully transmitted. (If none of the change was 
transmitted to the domestic market, the gain would be confined to the 
export tax revenue which is hi times the international price rise P2P3). 
Net economic welfare measured in this way is not the only effect on society's 
well-being. Many people would also be concerned about the effects of food 
trade liberalisation by the OECD countries on the djstribution of well-being 
within the developing country and on the instability of domestic food prices. 
These are considered in turn. 
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Distributional considerations within developing countries 
Focussing only on the net national welfare change masks the important 
fact that there are large welfare transfers between groups within each 
developing country. JYpically, the gain to producers and the loss to 
consumers, following a rise in international food prices that would result 
from agricultural trade liberalisation in OECD countries, will be much 
greater than the net change in national welfare which, in the absence of 
distortions in the developing country, is simply the difference between these 
two. This is especially so if a developing country is and remains close to 
self sufficient in food products. As well, in most low-income countries the 
number of people who are net seJJers of food is well above the number 
who are net buyers of food, and the former group is usually poorer on 
average than the latter group. Thus in terms of numbers of people affected 
and in terms of income inequalities, the food price rise might well be judged 
to be an improvement in social conditions; 
Risk considerations associated with stability of food markets1 
If OECD countries were to liberalise their food markets, this would mean 
reductions in the degrees to which they export their domestically generated 
market instability and insulate their domestic market from international 
price fluctuations. The net effect of several large countries liberalising in 
this way would be a reduction in the degree of fluctuation in international 
food prices. Insofar as developing countries transmit those fluctuations 
to their own domestic markets, and insofar as their food producers and 
consumers are averse to risk, welfare in those countries would be enhanced 
by the reduction in food price instability that would follow from the 
reductions in protectionism and insulation in OECD countries. 
Thus taking distributional and risk considerations into account as well as 
standard economic welfare measures ensures that it is even more likely that 
even food-deficit developing countries would be better off, in terms of 
overall social well-being, from a liberalisation of food trade following the 
Uruguay Round. 
' The issue of market stability is discussed in more detail in 1)rers (1990). 
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Dynamic. effects through induced innovations 
The argument does not end here, however, because the above comparative 
static view ignores the dynamics of innovation. It is likely that the rate 
of induced technical change in a sector is positively related to the sector's 
expected mean level of profitability (Ruttan 1982, Alston, Edwards and 
Freebairn 1988). It is probably also negatively related to the expected 
variability of profits through time. Therefore the permanent reduction of 
protection which would lower domestic food price levels (and p~rhaps their 
stability) in industrial countries on the one hand, and the once and for 
always increase in the level and stability of food prices in developing 
countries on the other, following a liberalisation of OECD agricultural 
policies, is likely to boost agricultural productivity growth in developing 
countries while slowing it in industrial countries. (This would be especially 
so if some of the gains to OECD countries from their trade liberalisation 
were to be redistributed in the form of increased foreign aid to agricultural 
research programmes in developing countries.) 
The welfare effects of this in a developing country are shown in Figure 
2 where it is assumed (a) that the rise in the average international price 
for food and the greater stability of that price level has induced a shift 
in the country's food supply curve, for example from S to S'; (b) that the 
net effect of the faster shift of food supply curves in developing countries 
as a group,· the slower shift in the food supply curves of industrial countries, 
and the increased excess demand for food in industrial countries because 
of their food policy reform, is to raise the mean level of the international 
price of food; and (c) that the increase in the international price is passed 
on to the domestic food market in the developing country. 
In the case of a food-importing developing country faced with a rise in 
the price of food from Po to P 1, consumer welfare is still reduced by area 
acdg in Figure 2 but producer welfare is increased not just by area abfg 
but also by area mqf less the amortised· cost of the research which generated 
the shift in the supply curve (assuming producers paid for that research). 
It is possible that the gain in producer welfare could outweigh the loss 
in consumer welfare in this dynamic case, even if the country were to remain 
a net food importer. This would be the case if area mqf minus the amortised 
cost of research area bcdf, which is more likely the larger the shift in the 
supply curve and the smaller the cost of the investment required to generate 
the shift, ceteris paribus. 
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For the food-exporting developing country, dynamic considerations simply 
add further to their positive net benefit from the international food price 
rise. 
What if developing countries also liberalised their own food markets? 
So far it has been assumed that developing countries do not distort their 
own food markets. To the extent that they in fact do, the economic gains 
to developing countries could be even greater if those distortions also were 
to be removed. In the case of foods grown in temperate zones, developing 
countries on average (across all countries and commodities) probably keep 
the domestic price level closer to the international price level than OECD 
countries but still above it at official exchange rates ('fyers and Anderson 
forthcoming). Thus a liberalisation of those m~rkets as well would raise 
further the international price of temperate foods in aggregate. In addition, 
there would be the usual gains to each liberalising country from removing 
differences in rates of assistance/taxation between the various food markets 
within its food sector. 
Furthermore, if all developing countries reduced their market-insulating 
behaviour, the instability of international food prices would be reduced 
even more than if just OECD countries were to liberalise. While the latter 
may raise the extent of price fluctuations in the developing countries that 
currently have the most insulated food markets, it would reduce fluctuations 
in the somewhat more-open, less-insulated economies. 
Whether food consumers or producers in developing countries would be 
better or worse off depends on whether the terms of trade change more 
or less than offsets the effect on domestic prices of eliminating the country's 
own food policy. The net change in national economic welfare also depends 
importantly on whether prices in other sectors are distorted and whether 
the net distortion in the relative domestic price of food "is increased or 
decreased following the Uruguay Round, a point to which we now turn. 
What if developing countries have distorted industrial 
and foreign exchange markets? 
The World Bank/IFPRI study led by Krueger, Schiff and Valdes (1988) 
shows clearly that agricultural production is effectively taxed and food 
consumption subsidised in developing countries not so much directly but 
rather -in indirect ways, particularly via manufacturing protection policies 
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and overvalued official exchange rates. According to the Krueger et al. 
estimates, these indirect ways of lowering the relative price of food much 
more than offset the positive effect on the food sector of export taxation 
of non-food primary products. Reducing the latter distortions would give 
a tremendous boost to farmers in developing countries, and alone would 
be sufficient to turn many food-importing poor countries into food 
exporters. In the absence of these policy distortions in non-food sectors 
such developing countries (i.e. those with a natural comparative advantage 
in food production) would gain unequivocally from the international price 
change that would accompany OECD agricultural trade liberalisation. 
Even if such a country does not alter its price distortions in non-agricultural 
sectors; it may still gain from an increase in international food prices 
provided a sufficient proportion of that increase is transmitted to its 
domestic market. This point is illustrated easiest with the help of the general 
equilibrium diagram in Figure 3. The slope of line PC represents the pre" 
liberalisation international price of other tradables relative to food. 1 If the 
developing economy is distorted by, for example, trade restrictions which 
alter its domestic price ratio to the slope of the tangent at P', then instead 
of producing at P and consuming at C, as it would under free trade, this 
country produces at P' and consumes at C'. This means instead of exporting 
the quantity PE of food and importing EC other tradables, the economy 
imports C'E' food and exports E'P' other tradables. And its overall welfare 
is lower than it would be in the absence of its own trade restrictions, as 
indicated by the indifference curve through C' being below that through C. 
If this economy did not restrict trade, its welfare would increase following 
a rise in the international price of food from the slope of line PC to the 
slope of line P'C': production would shift from P to P' and consumption 
from C to C', the latter representing a higher level of national economic 
welfare than at C. Even if it is using trade restrictions of the sort depicted 
at P' and C' in Figure 3, this economy could be better off as a result of 
OECD agricultural trade liberalisation provided it transmits a sufficient 
proportion of the rise in the relative price of food internationally to its 
domestic market, (and/or domestic price support for other tradables is 
lowered). 3 Indeed, it is possible for this country to gain from that relative 
2 For simplicity, and without loss of generality, non-tradables are ignored in this section. They are discussed 
in detail in Anderson and 'fyers (1990). 
' The importance of the extent of price transmission to the sign of the net welfare effect of a terms 
of trade change for a distorted economy has been pointed out by 'fyers and Falvey (1989) in a somewhat 
different context. 
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price change even if the developing country remains an importer of food. 
In terms of Figure 3, all that is required is for P' to move sufficiently toward 
P, as a result of the higher relative price of food domestically, such that 
the new consumption point to the left of the new production point along 
a ray parallel to P'C0 and P'C' is on a community indifference curve further 
from the origin than the curve through C'. 
An important corollary to the point just made is that even if the country 
would have been a net food importer under free trade and has anti-food 
sector policies in place, it may be made better off by OECD liberalisation 
which worsens its terms of trade if enough of the increase in the relative 
price of food internationally is transmitted to its domestic market (and/or 
domestic price support for other sectors is lowered enough). This is a 
specific example of one of Bhagwati's (1971) general points that apparently 
paradoxical outcomes are possible in a distortion-ridden economy. 
THE NEED FOR EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
Unambiguously, a food-exporting developing country would gain from 
OECD food trade liberalisation, regardless of whether its own economy 
is distorted and regardless of how much of the increase in the relative price 
of food internationally is transmitted to its domestic market, ceteris paribus. 
What the above analysis shows is that it is also possible that a food-
importing developing country could gaiq from OECD food trade 
liberalisation. Whether any particular food-deficit country would gain is 
an empirical question that cannot be answered a priori. This puts the 
burden on quantitative modellers to address this question. 
Early partial-equilibrium modelling work, including studies by the present 
author (e.g. Tyers and Anderson 1988), suggested that as a group developing 
countries might be net losers from OECD food trade liberalisation. General 
equilibrium modeller such as Burniaux et al. (1985,1988) and Loo and 
Towers (1989), on the other hand, report results suggesting developing 
countries as a group might gain from that reform. These two sets of results 
are easy to reconcile in the light of the above analysis: the first corresponds 
to Figure 1 and the second to Figure 3. That is, the general equilibrium 
modelling result also incorporates the effects of policies assisting non-
agricultural producers in developing countries. 
The point made in a section earlier, that product prices and hence price 
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and trade policies also affect the rate of technical change, has not been 
taken into ac,count in the above-mentioned empirical studies. It has been, 
however, by Anderson and 'fyers (1990). They suggest that long-run price 
elasticities of food supply may be effectively greater than those traditionally 
measured because of the re·sponsiveness of productivity growth to 
permanent price shocks. If those elasticities for individual commodities 
were greater by 0.5, this would be sufficient to ensure that developing 
countries as a group would not lose from OECD food trade liberalisatfon, 
as measured by their model. They also show, incidently, that developing 
countries could be substantial net gruners if in addition they were to reduce 
the _insulation of their domestic markets from international food price 
changes in response to OECD food policy reform. 
As Gardner (1989) and Goldin and Knudsen (1990) point out, there is an 
obvious need for further empirical work in this area to obtain a clearer 
picture of which developing countries are likely to be net beneficiaries of 
OECD food trade liberalisation and by how much. But the available studies 
at least illustrate the main point of this paper, namely,_ that many more 
developing countries than just the current food-exporting ones would 
benefit from such a reform - even though they may remain net importers 
of food. 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
In additiQn to many developing countries - including some food-importing 
ones in the Asian-Pacific region - being net beneficiaries of high 
international food prices resulting from OECD policy reform, three further 
points should be . reiterated. First, the income redistribution within 
developing countries between food consumers and producers, as a result 
of liberalisation, i~ likely to improve equity. Second, risk-averse actors in 
relatively open economies would be better off beca_use, following 
liberalisation, international food prices wqul<:f fluctuate less - indeed l~ss 
than in aJI but the currently most insulated economies, according to Tyers 
and Anderson (forthcoming). A third, both the number of developing 
countries that would be net gainers and the extent of their gain would be 
larger, the more these countries were prompted by OECD reform· to 
liberalise their own policies which discriminate against domestic food 
production. 
If it is true that not only the world economy but also developing economies 
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and especially their farmers would be better off if food policies were 
liberalised under the Uruguay Round, it remains to convince developing 
country governments to support agriculture's inclusion on the GATT 
agenda. It is unlikely to be insufficient to demonstrate that their economies 
would benefit in the sense that their farmers could gain more than their 
food consumers would lose, for many of these governments clearly have 
chosen unilaterally to forego economic benefits by adopting price, trade 
and exchange rate policies which harm their farmers. They _have done this 
presumably because those policies yield political benefits to those 
governments which more than outweigh the political_ costs (Anderson and 
Hayami 1986; Anderson 1989). Other carrots therefore need to be found. 
It happens that OECD countries would benefit more if developing countries 
joined them in liberalising their food markets than if they abstained. They 
would benefit not just in a net economic welfare sense but also politically 
in that OECD producer prices would not have to fall as much if developing 
countries also reform their food price policies (Anderson and l)rers 1990). 
Nor would OECD export prices· of manufactured goods fall as much if 
resources in developing countries are attracted back into agriculture so that 
those countries net imports of OECD manufactured goods expand 
(Burniaux and Waelbroeck (1985), Mathews (1985)). In addition, OECD 
countries would enjoy greater stablility in international food prices. 
Developing countries might stress these facts in their negotiations with 
OECD countries, and seek from them some liberalisation of other markets 
of interest to developing countries such as tropical primary and processed 
products and textiles, clothing and footwear. 
There is a clear lesson to be drawn from this analysis for PECC member 
countries. Within the PECC group of countries the Cairns Group members 
and the United States have been virtually alone in advocating freer 
agricultural trade during the Uruguay Round negotiations. What the above 
discussion suggests is that several other developing country members of 
PECC are likely to benefit from agricultural reform by OECD countries. 
_Hopefully they will come to realise that soon and lend support to that cause 
before the round is over. 
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Figure 1: Comparative static partial equilibrium effects on a 
food-importing economy of a higher international price 
for food 
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Figure 2: Dynamic partial equilibrium effects on a food-
importing economy of a higher international price of 
food 
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Figure 3: General equilibrium effects in a developing country of 
& higher international price for food with and without 
reform to its own non-food policies 
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CHAPTER 6 
IMPACTS OF TRADE AND EXCHANGE RATE 
POLICIES ON CHINESE AGRICULTURE 
Will Martin and Peter G. Warr* 
INTRODUCTION 
As the Chinese economy continues to develop, its dependence on 
international trade will almost certainly increase. Given its resource 
endowments, China can be expected to become a major exporter of 
manufactured goods and importer of agricultural products (Anderson and 
Tyers 1987). Certainly, agriculture can be expected to decline in relative 
terms and manufacturing and services to increase in both absolute and 
relative terms. Some observers have worried whether, given China's 
enormous size, international markets could accommodate the effects of 
rapid growth in China's imports or exports without major disruption. While 
these fears are probably misplaced, there seems little doubt that China will 
become an increasingly important participant in international agricultural 
markets. In this paper we focus on the role of China's own trade and 
exchange rate policies in influencing this outcome. 
The implications of pricing policies for China's agricultural trade were 
examined by Anderson and Tyers (1987) who reported initial estimates of 
nominal rates of assistance for China's agricultural sector. As they noted 
(1987, p145), the effects of distortions in agricultural trade will be influenced 
by the existence of protection in other sectors, and by the behaviour of 
the exchange rate. The purpose of this paper is to examine the implications 
that trade and exchange rate interventions in Chinese agriculture and 
industry have the Chinese agricultural sector. 
The subject of this study is related to that of the World Bank comparative 
study of the political economy of agricultural pricing policies (Krueger, 
Schiff and Valdes 1988). This study differs, however, in focussing on a 
* National Centre for Development Studies and Department of Economics, Research School of Pacific 
Studies. 
petails of the authors' general equilibrium model have been omitted from this edited version, but can 
be obtained from the authors. 
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socialist economy, and in its methodology. While the World Bank studies 
used an elasticities model to analyse the indirect effects of trade distortions 
and trade imbalances, the present study uses a multi-sector general 
equilibrium model of the post-reform Chinese economy. The World Bank 
study identified a general pattern from a sample of eighteen developing 
market economies. Of interest is whetner this pattern (where direct trade 
interventions discriminate against the agricultural sector, and where indirect 
effects resulting from protection elsewhere have an even larger negative 
effect on the agricultural sector) carries over into a post-reform socialist 
economy. 
An important finding of recent studies of protection in the Chinese 
agricultural sector (eg Anderson and Tyers 1987; Webb 1989) is that most 
agricultural commodities receive negative direct assistance in China. While 
it is widely known that parts of the industrial sector receive positive 
assistance, no comprehensive evaluation of the combined effects of these 
interventions on the Chinese agricultural sector has previously been 
undertaken. 
The absence of previous estimates of the effects of protection policies on 
the Chinese agricultural sector reflects, in part, the difficulties in obtaining 
adequate information on the nature and extent of this intervention. Even 
where this information has been available, there was considerable difficulty 
in determining the consequences of price distortions in a planned economy 
where prices performed primarily an accounting function. Only since the 
development of the twowtier pricing system (Byrd 1987; Sicular 1988, Wu 
and Zhao 1987) has it become possible to assess the effects of intervention 
through its effects on prices. 
Given the complexity of the institutional arrangements involved in the 
Chinese economy, and particularly the foreign exchange and foreign trade 
systems, a short summary of the main features of these systems is provided 
in the second section of this paper. The nominal and effective rates of 
protection estimatl!d ~or each major sector in the economy are presented 
and discussed in the third section. Then, in the fourth section, the 
implications of these protective measures for sectoral output and trade levels 
are considered. 
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PLAN AND MARKET IN THE CHINESE ECONOMY 
Internal markets 
A major thrust of the reforms in China's economy since 1978 has been 
to decentralise economic decision-making away from central planning 
towards provincial governments and producing enterprises. This process 
has involved increased use of markets as a means of allocating resources, 
although planning by central and provincial authorities remains very 
important (Naughton 1985; Wong 1985), particularly in determining the 
distribution of gains and losses. 
The extent to which decision-making has been decentralised varies across 
sectors. It appears, for instance, that de~ision-making has been substantially 
decentralised in the agricultural sector (Sicular 1988, Lardy 1983). Progress 
has been viewed as having been somewhat less rapid in the industrial sector, 
(Naughton 1985, Wong 1985), Chinese Economic System Reform Research 
Institute (CESRRI) 1987), although recent work suggests that secondary 
market prices now have an important influence on industrial sector 
decisions (Byrd 1987, Wu and Zhao 1987). The foreign trade system has 
also been substantially decentralised, although significant elements of 
central planning remain (World Bank 1988). 
The introduction of two-tier pricing has been a crucial development. Part 
of total production takes place under a planning system in which specific 
quantities of output are supplied at specified official prices, and part of 
consumption demand is met by allocations or rationing at state-determined 
prices. Under this system, enterprises are generally able to produce 
additional output at market, rather than official, prices and consumers 
are able to buy or sell additional amounts at market prices. As Byrd (1987) 
and Sicular (1988) have argued, in principle, only the prices prevailing at 
the margin have any effect on short-run output levels under a system of 
legal secondary markets such as those developed under the dual-tier pricing 
system. In fact, the existence of these legal markets greatly simplifies the 
analysis relative to the case of illegal parallel markets considered by Roemer 
(1986). 
Foreign trade 
Prior to 1978, the Chinese economy was relatively closed, with decisions 
on exports made within the planning process, in accordance with an 
assessment of the level of imports requir.ed for particular purposes. All 
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foreign trade was channeled through centralised Foreign Trade 
Corporations, with minimal opportunities for direct interaction between 
producing enterprises and importers of Chinese exports. 
By 1989, Shan (1989, p43) was able to conclude that ' ... a decentralised 
foreign trade system with a mechanism of regulatory control has taken 
shape and has become institutionalised'. The following account of China's 
export and import system is based heavily on the comprehensive World 
Bank (1988) study which provides a 'snapshot' of the system operating in 
late 1986. Other sources and author interviews have been used to update 
the assessment. 
The export regime 
Despite substantial reform and liberalisation since 1978, the 'command plan' 
system still covered 120 commodities, including coal, oil, agricultural 
products, textiles, garments and handicrafts in late 1986, and 'command 
plan' exports accounted for an estimated 70 per cent of the total value of 
export (World Bank 1988). 
An influential 1984 report on reform of the trade system by the Ministry 
of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (MOFERT) recommended a 
number of reforms, some of which have begun to be implemented. The 
major recommendations include (World Bank 1988): 
direct participation by large producing enterprises in foreign 
trade; 
eliminating the state's responsibility for profits and losses in 
foreign trade; and 
adoption of an agency system for Foreign Trade Corporations. 
Direct participation by selected producing enterprises in foreign trade was 
strongly endorsed by the World Bank (1988). The 'airlock' imposed by 
forcing enterprises to deal through separate_ Foreign Trade Corporations 
prevented producing enterprises from obtaining necessary information from 
buyers about production techniques and produc-~ quality. Some larger 
producing enterprises are now allowed to engage in foreign trade on their 
own account. 
An important move towards achieving the second objective was made 
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through the introduction of an experimental system for exports from several 
major sectors in early 1988. Under this system, subsidies for exports were 
eliminated for exports of apparel, light industry, arts and crafts, and 
mechanical and electrical (Chan 1989). Instead, Foreign Trade Corporations 
are now able to retain a much higher percentage of the foreign exchange 
earned from exports in these categories (7 5 per cent for apparel, arts and 
crafts and light industry, and 100 per cent for some mechanical and 
electrical exports). 
In 1987, requirements that local Foreign Trade Corporations be responsible 
for their own profits and losses were strengthened (Shan 1989), reducing 
the degree of direct central government intervention in export trade. The 
link between world prices and domestic prices for exports was also 
strengthened in 1988 by the introduction of higher rates of foreign exchange 
retention for exports above target levels. 
The import regime 
The import regime appears to have undergone relatively little change in 
recent years. The key features of the system are: 
command plan imports of seven key raw materials - steel, 
chemical fertiliser, rubber, timber, tobacco, grain, polyester 
and other synthetic fibres (World Bank 1989); 
central allocation of foreign exchange for imports on priority 
investment projects; 
allocations of foreign exchange for other priority imports of 
raw materials, spare parts and equipment; and 
non-centrally funded imports or imports subject to import 
licensing. 
The World Bank estimated command plan imports to be around 40 per 
cent and non-centrally funded imports to be 30 to 40 per cent of total 
imports in 1986. From interviews by the author in June 1988, it appeared 
that central purchases of many commodities had declined markedly since 
that time, with a corresponding increase in local orders, although some 
recentralisation appears to have occurred since that time in response to 
'disorder' at the peak of liberalisation. 
Non-plan imports are divided into restricted and non-restricted goods. 
Restricted goods, of which there were 45 (World Bank 1988) included most 
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of the command plan imports (e.g. steel, rubber, timber, synthetic fibres, 
tobacco), 'luxury' consumer durables such as motor vehicles, televisions 
and refrigerators, and assembly lines for such 'luxury' consumer durables. 
Since the primary objective of import licensing is to keep the current 
account in reasonable balance, the extent to which it constrains imports 
will depend upon the seriousness of imbalances in the exchange rate, and 
in domestic spending. For restricted goods under the import plan, an import 
licence can generally be obtained relatively readily (World Bank 1988), while 
applications outside the plan are subjected to more careful scrutiny. While 
the total imports by a province or enterprise, as well as imports of particular 
goods are apparently constrained by import licensing, it appeared, in 1986 
at least, that a restricted import with suitable finance, and for which no 
domestic substitutes were readily available, would eventually receive 
approval. Under these conditions, imports are essentially being constrained 
by the general shortage of foreign exchange rather than the commodity-
specific import licensing system. 
The overall pattern of the tariff schedule appears to be broadly consistent 
with the structure of import licensing, with those goods ess.entially banned 
under the import licensing system (such as motor vehicles) facing very high 
tariffs (200 per cent in the case of motor vehicles). However, given the range 
of control instruments available to the authorities, estimation of prices 
is likely to be necessar} if a comprehensive picture of the effects of trade 
distortions in China is to be developed. We report the results of such a 
comparison in a later section. 
The foreign exchange system 
The foreign exchange system in China introduces an additional source of 
divergences between domestic and world prices. A persistent policy of 
exchange rate overvaluation has systematically undervalued exports and, 
by inducing a shortage of foreign exchange, restricted the availability of 
imports and raised their prices on secondary markets. In this way, the 
foreign exchange system has driven a price wedge between broad classes 
of importable and exportable commodities, as distinct from the numerous 
differentials induced by the various control mechanisms us~d in the foreign 
trade system. 
Since 1979, the foreign exchange system has been substantially reformed. 
A major effective devaluation, at least for trade related transactions, was,. 
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implemented with the introduction of the Internal Settlement Rate for Trade 
in 1981. The 1981 reforms, however, also involved a highly centralised system 
of foreign exchange control with tight restrictions on holding of foreign 
exchange (Zhang 1987). Successive devaluations resulted in the official 
exchange rate being devalued from 1.49 Yuan/US$ in 1980 to 3.72 
Yuan/US$ in 1986. The exchange rate was pegged to the US dollar at 3.72 
Yuan/US$ from July 1986 to December 1989 when it was devalued by 21 
per cent. 
A particularly important institutional change has been the introduction 
of legal secondary markets for foreign exchange. The existence of these 
Foreign Exchange Adjustment Centres in each province allows foreign 
exchange to be transferred between enterprises to reflect differences in its 
value in each use, and reduces the waste resulting form hoarding of foreign 
exchange. Some degree of arbitrage between centres is possible, and 
reportedly keeps the extent of divergences between provincial markets 
relatively small. 
There are a number of clear indications that the exchange rate has been 
substantially overvalued. One is the 'shortage' of foreign exchange which 
necessitates a policy of strong controls on its use and retention (Zhang 
1987). Such a shortage arises because, at the official rate of exchange, 
imported goods are artificially cheap, and selling goods on the export 
market is not sufficiently attractive to generate the volume of imports 
demanded. 
Another indication of overvaluation is provided by the substantially higher 
rates apparently prevailing in the secondary markets for foreign exchange. 
The prevailing secondary market rate in 1988 was· estimated by the State 
Price Bureau (1988) to be 4.7 Yuan/US dollar. In March 1989 the rate on 
the Shanghai secondary market for foreign exchange was reported1 to be 
around 6.6 Yuan/US dollar, well above the official rate of 3.72 Yuan/US 
dollar and subsequently2 rose to around 7 .0 Yuan/US dollar prior to a 
decline in late 1989. Even after the devaluation of the official exchange 
rate in December 1989, the secondary market rate remained above the 
' Far Eastern Economic Review, 2 March 1989, p.103. 
• China Daily, 3 December 1989. 
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official rate. Since transactions in these secondary markets are a legal means 
of transferring foreign exchange between entities, these rates do not reflect 
the risk premium likely to be associated with black market transactions. 
Rather, such high rates in the secondary market would appear to reflect 
a very marked overall shortage of foreign exchange. 
Structure of Industry Protection 
As discussed above, trade distortions in the Chinese economy arise from 
both the foreign exchange system and the foreign trade system. The 
structure of the foreign exchange system allows for the imposition of 
protection (tariffs or subsidies) on imports and taxes (or effective subsidies) 
on exports. These trade distortions may vary from commodity to 
commodity and even from enterprise to enterprise. The foreign exchange 
system also allows for the imposition of trade taxes. In the absence of 
foreign exchange retention arrangements, it imposes a uniform tax on all 
trade--raising the prices of imports and lowering the prices of exports. Once 
foreign exchange retention arrangements are introduced, these raxes become 
non-uniform, varying by region, by type of enterprise and by commodity. 
The two major components of total protection - exchange rate protection 
and trade interventions - can be considered either individually or together. 
One approach is to consider the .effects of all distortions relative to world 
prices at some estimated equilibrium level for the exchange rate. Another 
approach is to consider the effects of these two distortions separately. In 
this paper, the effects of the two distortions have been considered together 
in calculating the effects of total trade distortions on relative prices in the 
economy. The first step in calculating the effects of these distortions was 
to calculate the implied nominal rates of protection. 
Nominal rates of protection 
In the late 1980s there were two main differences between China's price 
structure and international prices. First, the domestic prices of primary 
products, including most agricultural products, wood and energy products 
(e.g. coal, crude oil and petroleum products), were generally lower than 
their international prices, converted to domestic currency at the official 
exchange rate. This was also true of the prices of metallurgy products and 
building materials. Second, the domestic prices of most chemical products, 
machines and manufactured goods were close to or higher than world price 
levels. A similar description was also applicable to individual sectors. In· 
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the textiles and clothing sectors for instance, the prices of cotton yarn and 
grey woven cotton were lower than world prices and the prices of dyed 
woven cotton and clothing were close to or higher than the corresponding 
world prices. 
This price structure, in which more highly processed goods were protected 
relative to primary products, had developed under an industrialisation 
policy which was biased towards industry and against agriculture and, 
within industry, was biased towards manufacturing sectors and against raw 
material extraction and processing sectors. The cascading structure of 
protection resulting from this combination of policies is typical of 
developing countries anxious to promote manufacturing. The prices of 
manufactured output are raised relative to agricultural prices and prices 
of inputs used in manufacturing sectors are kept low. Cheap agricultural 
products reduced costs of production in manufacturing. 
Profit rates in primary sectors were substantially lower than the economy-
wide average. Some primary commodities, including energy and mineral 
products, even suffered occasional heavy losses, whereas manufacturing 
sectors, as a group, reaped consistently high profits. Until the mid 1980s, 
the taxation and tariff systems strongly reinforced this imbalance in the 
price structure. 
Until the mid 1980s, China's taxation system was mainly based on a 
turnover tax. Primary or less processed commodities were taxed at low rates 
in order to keep their prices low. The more a -product was processed, the 
more it would be taxed, and the higher its price would be. Therefore, 
industry, and especially manufacturing, had been the main source of 
government revenue before the early 1980s. The relatively high prices of 
manufactured goods were partly a result of this taxation system. Moreover, 
since the world prices of raw materials were frequently higher than the 
controlled domestic prices (at the official exchange rate), imports of these 
goods involved losses. To provide cheap inputs to the domestic producers, 
the government subsidised the importers. Hence, the domestic 
manufacturing industries could be protected from intemational competition 
and still maintain low input cost and high prices and profits. 
One simple method of summarising the impacts of various intervention 
measures is the nominal rate of protection (NRP). This measure indicates 
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the extent to which domestic prices differ from international prices. For 
commodity j, the NRP, denoted Nj, is given by 
Nj = (Pj - Pj)/Pj, 
where pis the domestic price and Pj is what the price would be in the 
absence of protection, sometimes called the free trade prices. This 
hypothetical free trade price, Pj, is equal to the international price of the 
commodity adjusted by an exchange rate to convert this price irito domestic 
currency. The absolute magnitude, and even the sign of Nj for any one 
commodity will clearly depend on the exchange rate used in this calculation. 
1\vo methods for estimating the free trade prices of traded commodities 
are in common use. One method looks at official tariff and export tax 
rates, and assumes that observed market prices differ from free trade prices 
by 
Pj = Pj(l + tj) 
where tj is a tariff in the case of an import and -tj is the rate of export 
tax in the case of an export. The second method makes price comparisons 
between domestically produced goods and similar goods traded 
internationally. Both methods are problematic. Use of official tariff .rates 
is clearly appropriate only when tariffs, and not quantitative restrictions, 
are the instruments of protection. When they are not, this method breaks 
down. This method also faces problems when smuggling causes domestic 
market prices to differ from border (free trade) prices by less than the 
amount predicted by the officialtariff rate. The price comparison method 
faces the practical problem that applying it is more time consuming. It 
is often difficult to identify the precise commodity traded internationally 
which matches exactly the domestically produced one. Even then, it is often 
difficult to obtain reliable information on market prices. 
In China, further problems arise in using official tariff rates as guides to 
nominal rates of protection. First, some domestic prices of traded 
commodities are controlled without reference tc;, international prices and 
tariffs. For example, imports of grains persist even though the domestic 
prices at which they are sold are well below the costs of importing. The 
importing agencies consequently incur losses which, as noted above, are 
financed by transfers from the central government. The soft budget 
constraints of these agencies thus act as hidden import subsidies. 
Even more important for China, exchange rate policy has served as an 
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instrument for protecting import-competing industries relative to exporters. 
Importers must pay the secondary market price for foreign exchange, but 
exporters receive the much lower official exchange rate when their foreign 
exchange earnings are converted to the domestic currency. In 1988 these 
exchange rates were approximately 5.70 and 3.72 RMB/$US, respectively. 
Allowing for the basic foreign exchange retention rate of 25 per cent, the 
rate obtained for exports becomes 4.22. A marginal unit of a commodity 
which sells for $100 internationally would thus cost a Chinese importer 
RMB 570, but a Chinese exporter would receive only RMB 372 for the 
same commodity. This form of exchange rate discrimination is equivalent 
to an implicit uniform export tax of 26 per cent. 
Table 1 presents estimates of NRPs for 18 groups of traded commodities. 
Because of the importance of non-tariff instruments of protection in China, 
our calculations are based on the price comparison method. 
Effective rates of protection 
The structure of commodity protection affects individual traded goods 
industries, not only through its effects on their output prices, but through 
their input prices as well. The nominal role of protection captures the 
former effects but not the latter. The effective rate of protection (ERP) 
is intended to capture both effects. 
The purpose of ERP studies is to determine the way in which the pattern 
of industrial outputs observed under the existing price structure differs 
from what would be observed under free trade. This is studied empirically 
by focusing not only on output but also on value added - the difference 
between the value of output produced by an industry and the value of 
intermediate goods required by an industry per unit of its output - unit 
value added - given the existing structure of protection and compare it 
with a hypothetical calculation of what unit value added would be in the 
absence of .protection. 
The central assumption of effective protection studies is that those 
industries for which value added has been raised proportionately the most 
by protection, relative to their estimated unit value added under free trade, 
are the industries whose outputs will have been increased proportionately 
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the most by the structure of protection. This leads to the concept of the 
effective rate of protection: 
Ej = (vj-Vj)/Vj 
where 
n 
Vj = Pj - "[ 3.ij Pi 
i=l 
and 
n 
V· = p. -~ 3.j· pi 
J J ti ~ 
In this notation 
Ej = the effective rate of protection of industry j, 
Vj = observed unit value added of industry j, 
Vj = estimated unit value added of industry j under free trade, 
Pj = the observed price per unit of commodity j, 
aij = the amount of intermediate input i required to produce one unit 
of commodity j, 
Pi = the observed price of intermediate input i, and 
P· J 
and= the estimated free trade prices of output j and intermediate 
Pi input i, respectively. 
In this formulation we have assumed for simplicity that each industry 
produces a single output. This assumption is easily relaxed. We have also 
assumed that the unit requirements of intermediate inputs, aij, are the same 
with and without protection. 
An analytical problem in effective protection studies involves the treatment 
of non-traded intermediate inputs. It is obvious that the value of these 
inputs is not a part of value added, since value added is thought of as 
the contribution of the primary factors used by an industry to the value 
of an industry's output. To calculate this, the value of all intermediate goods 
used must be subtracted from the value of output produced. Calculations 
of ERP require estimates of value added at (observed) producer prices and 
at (hypothetical) free trade prices. The problem with non-traded 
intermediate goods is how their prices at free trade are to be estimated. 
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The solution known as the Corden method deals with the problem of non-
tradables by redefining the concept of value added. It decomposes the non-
tradable inputs used by an industry into their traded input components, 
their non-traded input components and their primary factor components. 
The non-traded input components are then further decomposed in a similar 
way. By tracing through the input-output table in this way, the non-tradable 
inputs used by an industry are eventually split into just two categories: 
their traded inputs used directly and indirectly, and their primary factory 
inputs, used directly and indirectly. The value of the former is included 
in the value of all the intermediate inputs subtracted from the value of 
output in calculating value added. This new measure of value added, which 
we will call net value added is the one used in calculating ERPs. It is the 
method used in calculating value added both with protection and under 
free trade. Tuble 1 presents estimates of effective rates of protection based 
on the 1981 input-output table updated to 1988 relative prices and the ratio 
of international to domestic prices implied by the NRP estimates in Tuble 1. 
Negative effective protection is indicated in most sectors. This reflects the 
suppression of traded goods prices in China resulting from the overvalued 
exchange rate and made possible by the system of foreign exchange controls. 
Despite the controls, in the base period for these calculations, 1988, China 
had a substantial current account deficit. For resource allocation purposes, 
it is important to focus upon relative, rather than the absolute, values of 
ERPs. Sectors producing primary goods have the lowest ERPs. Examples 
are crops (sector 1), animal husbandry (3), coal (6), and petroleum mining 
(7), and some manufacturing sectors using primary goods intensively, such 
as metallurgy (5), petroleum refining (6), wood (13), food processing (14) 
and paper (17). A comparison between the effective and nominal rates of 
protection shows that the former exhibits a more cascading structure than 
the latter. This pattern discriminates against the primary sectors and induces 
resources to move towards manufacturing. 
A comparison of the results for nominal and effective rates of protection 
reveals a significant difference in agricultural protection rates. The crops 
sector (1) receives a slightly negative nominal rate of protection but a 
substantially negative effective rate - the lowest in the economy. Animal 
husbandry (3) receives a negative nominal rate of protection I?ut its effective 
rate is roughly zero. Clearly, nominal rates of protection are a poor guide 
to effective rates in this instance. The difference lies in the types of 
intermediate inputs used by the two sectors. 
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In the crops sector, inputs of 'chemicals' dominate. These are predominantly 
chemical fertilisers and other agricultural chemicals. The chemicals sector 
receives one of the highest nominal rates of protection in the economy. 
The dominant input into 'animal husbandry' production is crops, used as 
animal feeds. Crops receive a much lower nominal rate of protection than 
chemicals. The ranking of effective rates is the reverse of the ranking of 
nominal rates. The main point is that the crops sector is more directly and 
more severely disadvantaged by the protection of China's manufacturing 
industries than animal husbandry. 
In summary, the results confirm that the effect of China's protection 
policies has been a pattern of price distortions and resulting allocational 
inefficiencies typical of those observed in developing countries pursuing 
important-substitution-oriented development strategies. It is found, first, 
that the structure of nominal protection exhibits a cascading structure, from 
high rates on more sophisticated manufactured goods to low rates on 
primary and semi-processed goods. Second, the structure of effective 
protection differs from that of nominal protection in a way that accentuates 
the discrimination against primary sectors and in favour of manufacturing 
sectors. Overall, the primary sectors are taxed to support the development 
of manufacturing. 
MODELLING THE EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN 
CHINA'S PROTECTION POLICIES 
A complete analysis of the effects of trade distortions on the Chinese 
economy requires the use of a disaggregated model of the Chinese economy. 
The effects of the exchange rate system are inherently general equilibrium 
in nature. All of the key aggregates in the system are affected by exchange 
rates and any satisfactory model must take into account these interactions. 
One means of overcoming this problem is to develop a computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) model of the Chinese economy. Dervis, de Melo and 
Robinson (1981) h:ave demonstrated the feasibility of using such a model 
to analyse foreign exchange shortages while Kis, Robinson and Tyson (1986) 
have applied models of this type to post-reform socialist economies. The 
technology for constructing such models has improved .substantially with 
the development of specialised programmes such as GEMPACK (Codsi 
and Pearson 1989), making it possible to focus on the economic rather 
than the computional issues. 
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Two recent World Bank papers (1985a, 1985b) provide consistent input-
output tables on an SNA basis and estimates of many of the relevant 
parameters (e.g. income elasticities) needed to construct a model of the 
ORANI type (Dixon, Parmenter, Sutton and Vincent (1982). Data 
shortcomings pertinent to this analysis are the lack of distinction between 
domestic and imported intermediates in the intermediate use matrix and 
the high degree of aggregation of the agricultural sector (into crops and 
animal husbandry) and the textiles and clothing sector (one industry), The 
somewhat dated nature of the latest available database is also of some 
concern given the dramatic changes in the structure of the Chinese economy 
in recent years. More fundamentally, the database is based largely on official 
prices, rather than the free-market prices which are relevant for resource 
allocation at the margin. 
In developing a model of the Chinese economy, a number of adaptations 
of the techniques used in modelling other developing countries (Robinson 
1989) were required. The more important of these adaptations were: 
adapting the input-output and price data to reflect secondary-market 
rather than official prices for material inputs; 
modelling the effects of the foreign exchange retention scheme; and 
updating the database to reflect changes in the composition of trade 
(Reynolds 1989). 
Given the evolving policy changes in the Chinese economy associated with 
rapid economic growth, any modelling exercise can lead, at best, to a highly 
stylised representation of the economy. Despite this constraint, modelling 
can provide many useful insights. It provides an explicit framework for 
analysis, frequently leading to the discovery of important, but otherwise 
overlooked, casual linkages. 
Broad features of the model 
Like most models of the ORANI type (Dixon et al. 1982, Vincent 1985, 
Dee 1989), this model focuses on the real side of the economy, with 
particular emphasis on the response of the economy to trade policy changes. 
The behavioural assumptions of the model involve cost minimisation by 
producers and utility miximisation by households, and the assumption that 
there is sufficient competition for unit profits (at market prices) to be driven 
to zero. The crucial assumption is that economic agents respond to marginal 
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market prices for inputs and outputs, rather than official prices. Official 
prices are thus irrelevant to the behaviour of the model. Although it is 
recognised that the income redistribution induced by divergences between 
official and market prices may have an impact on demand behaviour, this 
second round effect seems likely to have-a relatively minor impact on the 
results and hence has not been incorporated in the model. 
While agents are assumed to respond in a manner consistent with neo~ 
classical theory to the market prices which they experience, these market 
prices are affected by distortions such as overvaluation of the official 
exchange rate, the foreign exchange retention system and import tariffs and 
licensing, all of which can be incorporated in the model. 
To facilitate solution by Johansen's method, the model is linearised in 
percentage changes, with domestic and imported products treated as 
imperfect substitutes. A standard simplifying feature of COE models 
adopted in this model is a two-level representation of technology in which 
intermediate inputs and a composite primary factor input are demanded 
in fixed proportions to output levels which, in the presence of any fixed 
factor, require substitution between factors. In general, this substitution 
is represented using constant elasticity of substitution (CBS) technology. 
For many goods, there are marked differences between the product 
produced for the export market and that produced for the domestic market 
both in the product's physical characteristics and in its less tangible 
marketing requirements. To capture these differences, it is assumed that 
products sold on the domestic market are differentiated from those sold 
on the export market. These differences are represented using constant 
elasticity of transformation (CET) functional form. 
The model is short-run in character, with capital assumed to be fixed in 
each sector. It would be possible to build a longer-run version of the modd 
in which the capital stocks in each industry were endogenous, although 
investment behaviour in China seems likely to be difficult to modd 
adequately. In the absence of a well-developed theory of investment for 
China, investment in each sector has been specified as simply changing 
in line with total real absorption. As is common in short-run modeb 
investment does not add to the effective capital stock. The underlying tim1 
period is assumed to be sufficiently long for new equipment and machineri 
to be produced, but not brought into production. 
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Given the complexities of the government revenue and expenditure system 
in China (Blejer and Szapary 1989), an explicit set of fiscal accounts was 
not incorporated in the model. Implicitly it is assumed that the authorities 
make whatever adjustments to fiscal policies are needed to keep real 
absorption at an exogenously determined level. Similarly, monetary policy 
is assumed to be able to control the money supply. Accordingly, a skeletal 
monetary sector is incorporated to allow determination of the aggregate 
price level as a numeraire. 
Data and structure 
The initial source of data for the model was the World Bank (1985a) table 
for 1981, the latest currently available. This table has the advantage of 
having been prepared using the SNA conventions, rather than the material 
product system (MPS) used in Chinese input-output tables. Some use was 
made of the Chinese input-output tables for 1981 (State Planning 
Commission/State Statistical Bureau 1987) and other sources where needed. 
Details of the construction of the complete data set are given in Thompson 
(1990). 
In the development of standard CGE models, it is assumed that the 
economy is in equilibrium in the benchmark year. Clearly, the conventional 
approach or assuming that the value shares in the model were in equilibrium 
would not be appropriate since the flows in the input-output table are valued 
at official prices rather than the market prices required for the analysis. 
To make the model operational, it was assumed that the (largely) planned 
system operating in 1981 resulted in the same set of quantity variables as 
would have resulted from a market system in equilibrium. Some support 
for this (admittedly strong) assumption is provided by Anderson's (1989) 
conclusion that the pattern of development in the Chinese economy since 
1949 has been consistent with the predictions of Western economic theory. 
Under this assumption, a data set corresponding to a market equilibrium 
could then be obtained by adjusting the prices. These price adjustments 
were made with a set of relativities between official and free-market prices 
collected3 in 1988 when a fairly well-developed set of secondary markets 
was operating. 
Personal communication, Peng Zhaoyang, University of Adelaide. 
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The price adjustment process changed the gross output value of all 
industries. Since dual-tier pricing is not generally used in the labour market 
these price changes were assumed to cause changes in profits. This 
assumption seems reasonable in the light of the widely held proposition 
that the official pricing system leads to major distortions in the relative 
profitability of different industries in China (e.g. Chen 1988). The resulting 
estimates of factor intensities appear to be more consistent with 
expectations, and with the range of estimates observed in market economies, 
than the set of estimates obtained in the non-adjusted table. 
The modified input-output table on which the model is based can be 
obtained from the authors. It contains 27 sectors: the 23 sectors presented 
in the original World Bank table, with textiles and clothing split into 
separate sectors, and additional production sectors identified for each of 
the fibre inputs to the textile sector. 
Separating out the sectors not explicitly identified in the original table (e.g. 
textiles, apparel, wool, cotton and chemical fibres) necessitated the use of 
information from a wide range of sources as detailed by Thompson (1990). 
Following standard practice in CGE modelling, the elasticity parameters 
used in the study were largely obtained by surveying the econometric 
estimates obtained in countries for which empirical estimates are available. 
The set of equations making up the model are divided into 17 blocks 
explaining final demands for goods, investment, external trade, the input 
sector market clearing identities, and accounting identities. Details on the 
structure of these equations can be obtained form the authors. 
ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF TRADE DISTORTIONS 
The two major sets of trade policy distortions in China--exchange rate 
overvaluation and trade restrictions - are each considered in this section. 
The exchange rate overvaluation is considered first, and then the effects 
of a range of protection policies on the agricultural sector are examined. 
Effects of exchange rate overvaluation 
The policy of maintaining an overvalued exchange rate taxes both imports 
and exports. The overvaluation of the official exchange rate directly reduces 
the returns to exporters. By constraining the available supply of foreign 
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exchange in the economy, it leads to a rise in the secondary market price 
of foreign exchange, and hence in the price (at the margin) of foreign 
exchange. The rise in the price of importables can be expected to raise the 
price of nontraded goods through substitution effects in both production 
and consumption. However, the artificial price depressing effects on the 
prices of exportables will tend to depress the prices of nontraded goods. 
Thus, the overall effects on the prices of nontraded goods, and hence their 
demand for resources, will be ambiguous. 
The effects of overvaluation of the official exchange rate on production 
and trade have been examined by performing an experiment in which the 
official exchange rate was devalued by ten per cent from a base value of 
3.72 Yuan/US dollar. This experiment results in an appreciation of the 
secondary market exchange rate of 6.6 per cent. Given the secondary market 
exchange rate of 5.7 Yuan used in forming the relative prices used in the 
model, this implies that a total devaluation of 27 per cent would have been 
sufficient to remove the direct exchange rate overvaluati6n. The implications 
of this policy change for the volume of production, imports and exports 
for each traded good sector have been presented in Table 2. As might have 
been expected given the discussion in the previous paragraph, the changes 
in output of the lightly traded service sectors in the model were small and 
have not been reported. 
The effects of the exchange rate distortion on a particular industry depend 
primarily upon whether that industry is a net importer or a net exporter. 
The model results presented jn Thble 2 are consistent with the general 
expectation that devaluation of the official exchange rate would stimulate 
the export oriented sectors. The export oriented animal husbandry sector 
experiences an increase in output while the other (import competing) 
agricultural industries in the model experience a decline in output. The 
increase in output from the animal husbandry sector is small relative to 
that in industries such as textiles and clothing which are strongly oriented 
towards the export market. 
The crops sector in the model experiences a small decline in output 
following the devaluation. This is clearly because the sector was a small 
net importer and the decline in the price of import-competing output 
outweighed the increase in the prices received from exported output. Even 
though the livestock sector expands its output and hence increases its 
demand for crop output as feedstuff, the net effect is a decline in output 
from the crops sector. Output declines more substantially in the wool and 
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cotton industries which were import-competing despite the fact that the 
derived demand for their outputs from the textile sector increased. 
The devaluation causes trade volumes to increase significantly in virtually 
all industries. This beneficial effect arises because the devaluation increases 
the availability of foreign exchange by stimulating exports and hence lowers 
the price of foreign exchange on the secondary markets. An important 
feature of the results is an increase in intra-industry trade, with both imports 
and exports increasing at the same time; 
Effects of removing trade distortions 
The measures of trade distortions presented in Tub le l were used to measure 
the effects ·of trade distortions (quotas, tariffs, subsidies etc) in addition 
to the effects of exchange rate protection. Because of the wide number 
of possible trade distortion instruments available, and the preliminary 
nature of the analysis, it was decided to focus on the crops sector and on 
some of the key policy variables likely to influence the crops sector. The 
results of these experiments for the removal of distortions affecting the 
crops and animal husbandry sectors within agriculture and the important 
chemicals sector from industry are presented in Tuble 3. 
The information presented in Tuble 3 shows the estimated effects of 
removing trade distortions in three industries. The first row shows the effects 
on crop outputs, exports and imports of the removal of the implicit seven 
percent tax on the crops sector. The price of crop outputs rises and the 
quantity supplied responds positively. Exports of crops rise both because 
of the supply response and because of domestic demand declines, and 
imports of crops fall for the same reasons. The second row shows the 
changes in output, exports and imports of crops when the implicit (54 per 
cent) tax on the animal husbandry sector is removed. Output of crops rises, 
in response to the increased demand for crops as inputs into livestock 
production. Exports of crops fall, because of the increased domestic 
demand for crops in the livestock sector, and imports of crops rise for the 
same reason. 
The third row of Tuble 3 shows· the effects on the crops sector of removal 
of the implicit subsidy to the chemicals industry - a net import commodity 
which is the most significant material input into crops production. The 
removal of the protection of chemicals causes output of crops to rise, 
exports to rise and imports to fall. This pattern of events mirrors our 
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discussion of effective protection of chemicals protection has significant 
effects on the crops sector, but they are outweighed by the effects of removal 
of the implicit tax on the crops· sector itself. 
Finally, by comparing Tuble 2 and 3 we compare the effects on the crops 
sector of exchange rate liberalisation (Tuble 2) and trade liberalisation (Tu.hie 
3). Because a 27 per cent devaluation is required to eliminate the gap 
between the official and secondary exchange rates incorporated in the 
model, the results in Th.ble 2 should be multiplied by 2. 7 to facilitate 
comparison with Tu.hie 3. Clearly, the effects of exchange rate liberalisation 
dominate. The effects on Chinese agriculture of discriminatory exchange 
rate policy far exceed the combined effects of all other forms of protection. 
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Table 1. China: nominal and effective rates of protection, 1988 
Nominal rate Effective rate 
of protection of protection 
(%) (%) 
1 Crops - 7 -553 
2 Cotton -24 -126 
3 Animal husbandry -54 - 3 
4 Wool -21 - 30 
5 Metallurgy -38 - 34 
6 Coal -67 - 32 
7 Petroleum - mining 12 - 56 
8 Petroleum - refining 25 19 
9 Chemicals 12 - 76 
10 Chemical fibre -21 - 29 
11 Machinery -24 - 58 
12 Building materials -49 - 51 
13 Wood 160 - 60 
14 Food processing -10 - 4 
15 Textiles -64 - 31 
16 Apparel -64 - 71 
17 Paper -36 - 59 
18 Miscellaneous manufacturing 73 - 59 
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Table 2. Effects of a ten per cent devaluation of the official exchange rate 
on industry outputs and trade (percentage changes). 
Production Imports Exports 
Crops -0.10 12.7 14.2 
Cotton -1.79 8.1 18.3 
An.Husbandry 0.27 13.2 14.0 
Wool -3.24 8.1 15.1 
Metallurgy -0.13 10.5 16.8 
Electricity -0.03 15.8 9.5 
Coal 0.21 13.6 13.2 
Petroleum 
- Mining 0.04 21.4 0.2 
- Refining 0.01 20.5 1.4 
Chemicals -0.04 11.5 15.1 
Chemical fibres -0.42 5.8 25.6 
Machinery -0.07 10.9 16.3 
Building Matis 0.01 13.9 12.9 
Wood -0.05 10.2 16.6 
Food Proc. 0.03 12.9 13.8 
Textiles 0.64 14.6 11.6 
Apparel 1.04 13.4 12.9 
Paper -0.01 12.1 15.2 
Misc.Mfg. 0.86 12.9 12.3 
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Table 3. Effects of removing trade distortions on the production and trade 
of crop commodities 
Industry 
Crops 
Animal Husb. 
Chemicals 
NRP 
- 7 
-54 
12 
Impact of Liberalisation 
Prodn. Exports 
- percentage -
0.03 2.00 
0.01 -0.61 
0.01 0.11 
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Imports 
-0.94 
0.70 
-0.32 
CHAPTER 7 
TRADE LIBERALISATION IN TAIWAN'S POULTRY SECTOR 
AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Sung - Cheng Lee* 
INTRODUCTION 
'frade liberalisation policy was officially imposed in Tuiwan in October 1987 
primarily in response to pressure from the Sino-American trade surplus. 
In January 1988, specific policies for the poultry sector were announced. 
Since then an important issue for policy makers has been the economic 
implications of policy changes on the structure of the chicken industry 
as well as on the entire agricultural sector. 
This paper intends to assess the impacts of trade liberalisation policies on 
the development of the poultry industry in Thiwan. Some of the policy 
implications with special reference to the Sino-American trade negotiations 
are also discussed, followed by practical recommendations that could help 
the industry to better adjust to the new environment. 
This paper uses an econometric model of the Taiwanese poultry sector to 
estimate the relevant supply responses and the market demands for chicken 
products at both the retail and the farm levels. The impacts of changes 
in chicken prices due to imports are used to estimate the benefits and costs 
of trade policy change. Details of the econometric model used here can 
be found in Lee (1989). 
MARKET POfENTIALS FOR CHICKEN PRODUCTS 
By simulating the Taiwanese poultry sector model, the impacts on the 
demand and supply of poultry are derived. Tables 1 and 2 summarise the 
• Professor, Department of Agricultural Economics, National Tu.iwan University, Tu.iwan. Substantial 
technical material relating to the econometric model used in the paper has been omitted from this edited 
version. Readers requiring the original version should contact the author. 
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simulation results. Table 1 shows that chicken prices at the farm level can 
vary between $1.20 to $6.80 per head with price elasticities of supply varying 
from 2.14 to 6.27. The estimated supply of chicken ranges between 579 
thousand head and 689 million head. 
Table 2 reports chicken prices at the retail level. They range between $4.27 
and $9.91 per head with associated price elasticities of supply ranging from 
3.1to22.2. The estimated supplies of chicken range between 617 thousand 
head and 686 million head. 
Assuming a price elasticity of demand for chicken products of -0.93, the 
estimated number of chickens demanded are in the range of 140 million 
to 307 million head. This study has also estimated that the price elasticities 
of demand for chicken at the farm level ranges between -0.26 and -0.64. 
The associated quantity demanded is similar to that above. 
From Table 3, it can be seen that the equilibrium market price varies 
between $4.23 per head at the farm level, and $7.30 per head at the retail 
level. The market equilibrium quantity is 186 thousand head. The· above 
results indicate that the marketing bill for chicken products accounts for 
42 percent of the retail price, and that the producer's share is 58 percent. 
Based on the estimates of price elasticities of demand and supply at both 
the farm and retail levels, it can be deduced that the supply curves in both 
markets are more elastic than the demand curves. This finding indicates 
that chicken product prices in the domestic markets will vary in an 
oscillating pattern if trade liberalisation policy allows imports of chicken 
into Taiwan. 
The findings also suggest that domestic producers are more vulnerable to 
world market fluctuations. This fact should draw the government's attention 
in the proce;;s of policy formulation. 
IMPORT POTENTIALS OF CHICKEN PRODUCTS 
AND FEEDGRAINS 
Having estimated the market supply and demand, Table 3 reports the 
estimates of import demand for chicken products and feedgrains. The 
results show that when the retail market price of chicken is at $7.30, there 
is an excess demand for chicken. It is estimated that imports of 103 
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thousand head of chicken valued at $751 thousand will be required at this 
price. 
When the price is lowered by IO percent the excess demand for imports 
increases to 92.7 million head valued at $620 million {Table 3). 
This study also estimated the cross-price elasticities of feedgrains with 
respect to chicken price. These range between 3.45 and 7.17. The 
corresponding derived demands for feedgrains are calculated to lie between 
1367 tonnes and 8.4 million tonnes. We observe that Taiwan will start to 
import chicken at prices below $7 .29. 
This empirical result suggests that there exists a positive relation between 
chicken product prices, quantity demand of feedgrain and the total 
expenditure on feedgrain. This implies that increases in the imports of 
chicken, will adversely affect the imports of f eedgrain. 
Based on the 1988 official statistics of the Council of Agriculture, the total 
import of feedgrain was 5 million tonnes, accounting for about 74 percent 
of the total quantity of feedgrains demanded in the domestic market. Given 
that chicken production accounts for about 73 percent of total poultry 
production, it is calculated that the total quantity of feedgrain demanded 
for poultry production is 2.5 million tonnes, representing about 37 percent 
of the total quantity of feedgrain used in Taiwan. 
Table 4 reports the increase in chicken imports and the decrease in the 
import demand for feedgrains at various domestic retail prices for chicken. 
For example, at a retail price of 7.30, the derived demand for feedgrain 
imports is equal to 1 million tonnes, valued at $391 million. In this case, 
the import of chicken will result in foreign exchange savings of $390 million. 
If the retail price drops to $4.27, the total import of feedgrains drops to 
1020 tonnes for a total value of $398,000. In this case the foreign exchange 
savings from the imports of chicken amounts to $1,038 million. 
ASSESSMENT OF TRADE LIBERALISATION 
Assuming that increased imports of chicken represent a cost and decreased 
feedgrain imports represent a benefit, the impacts of trade liberalisation 
policy on Taiwan's chicken sector can be assessed. 
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The simulated results indicate that if the retail price of chicken is lowered 
by 5 percent due to imports as a result of trade liberalisation the import 
demand for feedgrains decreases to 193 thousand tonnes. This represents 
a decrease of $75 million in the value of feedgrain imports. The economic 
impacts of trade liberalisation are measured as the net change in foreign 
exchange savings of $158 million. 
If the retail price of chicken decreases by 10 percent, i.e. the domestic retail 
price drops to $6.69, then imports of chicken increase to 63 million head 
valued at $439 million. The resulting decrease in the import demand for 
feedgrain is 359 thousand tonnes, valued at $140 million. In this case the 
net economic impact of trade liberalisation is a decrease in the foreign 
exchange saving to $299 million. 
Hence, it is clear that the lower the price of chicken, the bigger the savings 
of foreign exchange in terms of lower demand for feedgrains. 
The above findings have two implications. Firstly, domestic producers of 
chicken suffer more and the total revenue of chicken producers is highly 
vulnerable. Secondly, if feedgrain import is also under free trade 
arrangement in the domestic market, then the decreases in the imports of 
feedgrains from the United States is likely to produce an adverse impact 
on US feedgrain producers. 
In summary, this study shows that the increased revenue from US chicken 
exports to Taiwan is completely offset by revenue losses from lower exports 
of US feed grains. This finding can serve as further evidence for bargaining 
in the Sino-American trade negotiation. 
CONCWSION 
Trade liberalisation seems to be an inevitable outcome given the current 
debate within the GATI. Thi wan has been on the track of trade liberalisation 
since 1987, and has in the process faced experienced pressures mostly as 
a result of structural change in the economy. 
The agricultural sector in Taiwan has also been the most adversely affected 
sector as a result of trade reform. In this respect the government needs 
to give special consideration to the agricultural sector. It is clear that the 
repositioning of the agricultural sector and its policies have become the 
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most urgent issues in meeting the external challenges for trade reform. 
Historically, the annual arrangement for feedgrain purchase has been 
institutionalised in order to control Taiwan's trade surplus. The result has 
been an increase in the agricultural trade deficit. If the_ government is to 
effectively care for the future development of the agricultural sector, then 
action must be taken to ensure that imports of chicken would not be 
necessarily associated with the annual procurement of imported feedgrains. 
Our results show that under free trade the exports of chicken from the 
us will be completely offset by decreases in feedgrain imports from the 
US. Taiwan should try to have this important point recognised in the trade 
negotiation in order to effectively reduce the external pressures for trade 
liberalisation. 
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Table 1. Simulated Estimates of Supply and Demand for Chicken at 
Farm Level in Taiwan, 1988 
Change Supply at Farm Level Demand at Farm Level 
in 
Domestic Chicken Price Supply Price Demand 
Chicken Price Elasticity Elasticity 
price ($) 
(000 hd) (000 hd) 
70% 6.84 2.14 689,270 -0.64 139,549 
50% 6.03 2.46 517 ,670 -0.61 151,064 
30% 5.23 2.81 355,980 -0.58 164,746 
10% 4.42 3.22 216,097 -0.54 181,286 
* 4.22 3.33 185,963 -0.53 185,963 
5% 4.22 3.33 185,874 -0.53 185,977 
1% 4.06 3.43 163,280 -0.53 189,917 
** 4.02 3.45 157 ,860 -0.52 190,929 
- 1% 3.98 3.48 152,533 -0.52 191,952 
- 5% 3.82 3.58 132, 170 -0.51 196,163 
-10 3.62 3.71 108,898 -0.50 201,705 
-30% 2.81 4.30 40,657 -0.44 227,590 
-50% 2.01 5.09 8,825 -0.36 261,560 
-70% 1.20 6.27 579 -0.26 308,366 
* the price level is the simulated market equilibrium price level 
** the price level is the average price level of our survey 
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Table 2. Simulated Estimates of Supply and Demand 
at Retail Level in Taiwan, 1988 
Change Supply at Retail Market Demand at Retail Market 
in 
Domestic Chicken Price Supply Price 
Chicken Price Elasticity Elasticity 
price Level of Supply of Demand 
($) (000 hd) 
70% 9.91 3.10 686,727 -0.93 
50% 9.10 3.71 516,058 -0.93 
30% 8.30 4.47 355,205 -0.93 
10% 7.49 5.46 215,974 -0.93 
"' 
7.29 5.76 185,963 -0.93 
5% 7.29 5.76 185,874 -0.93 
1% 7.13 6.02 163,366 -0.93 
*"' 7.09 6.09 157,965 -0.93 
- 1% 7.05 6.16 152,657 -0.93 
- 5% 6.89 6.45 132,362 -0.93 
-10% 6.69 6.85 109,257 -0.93 
-30% 5.88 8.99 40,998 -0.93 
-50% 5.08 12.85 9,025 -0.93 
-70% 4.27 22.20 619 -0.93 
* the price level is the simulated market equilibrium price level 
"'* the price level is the average level of our survey 
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Demand 
(000 hd) 
139,660 
151,159 
164,814 
181,304 
185,963 
185,977 
189,900 
190,908 
191,927 
196,118 
201,631 
227 ,336 
260,923 
306,755 
Table 3. Impacts of Free Trade on the Domestic Chicken Sector in Taiwan. 
Changes Farm Sector Retail Sector 
in 
Domestic Chicken Quantity Producer Chicken Quantity Consurner 
Chicken Price Total Price 
price Level Supplied Revenue Level Demanded Expenses 
($) (000 hd) (000 $) ($) (000 hd) (million $) 
70% 6.84 689,270 4,717,257 9.91 139,660 1,384 
50% 6.03 517,670 3,126,129 9.10 151,159 1,376 
30% 5.23 355,980 1,863,007 8.30 164,814 1,368 
10% 4.42 216,097 956,977 7.49 181,304 1,359 
"' * 4.22 185,963 786,194 7.29 185,963 1,356 "' 5% 4.22 185,874 785,675 7.29 185,977 1,356 
** 4.02 157,860 635,507 7.09 190,908 1,354 
-5% 3.82 132,170 505,499 6.89 196,118 1,351 
-10% 3.62 108,898 394,545 6.69 201,631 1,349 
-30% 2.81 40,657 114,574 5.88 227,336 1,338 
-50% 2.01 8,825 17,765 5.08 260,923 1, 325 
-70% 1.20 579 699 4.27 306,755 1,311 
* the price level is the simulated market equilibrium price level 
** the price level is the average price level of our survey 
the positives in the last two columns stand for export quantity, 
and the negative st and for import quantity. 
Source: This table is computed from Tables 1 and 2. 
1988 
Trade Sector 
Quantity Total 
Exported/ Trade 
Imported Value 
(000 hd) (million $) 
549,610 5,447 
366,511 3,337 
191,166 1,586 
34,793 260 
0 0 
-103 -1 
-33,048 -234 
-63,948 -440 
-92,733 -620 
-186,679 -1,098 
-252,098 -1,280 
-306,176 -1,309 
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'1,'able 4. Estitnates of Total Domestic Demand and Import Demand for Feedgrains and Impacts 
on the Net Changes in Total Foreign Exchange in Taiwan, 1988 
Change 
in 
Domestic 
Chicken 
price 
70% 
50% 
30% 
10% 
5% 
0% 
-5% 
-10% 
-30% 
-50% 
-70% 
Retail 
Market 
Chicken 
Price 
($) 
9.91 
9.10 
8.30 
7.49 
7.29 
7.09 
6.89 
6.69 
5.88 
5.08 
4.27 
Farm 
Market 
Chicken 
Price 
($) 
6.84 
6.03 
5.23 
4.42 
4.22 
4.02 
3.82 
3.62 
2.81 
2.01 
1.20 
Export/ 
Import of 
Chicken 
Products 
(000 hd) 
549,610 
366,511 
191,166 
34,793 
-103 
-33,048 
-63,948 
-92,733 
-186,679 
-252,098 
-306,176 
Export/ 
Import 
Value of 
Chicken 
Products 
(000 $) 
5,447,692 
3,337,647 
1, 586' 972 
260,814 
-751 
-234,437 
-440,749 
-620,491 
-1,098,821 
-1,280,852 
-1,309,138 
Total. 
Quantity 
of Feed-
grain 
Import 
(000 tonnes) 
6,340 
4, 116 
2,412 
1,223 
1,003 
810 
643 
502 
146 
23 
1 
Total 
Expenditure 
on Imported 
Feedgrains 
(000 $) 
2,476,362 
1,607,826 
942,078 
478,062 
391,720 
316,357 
251,390 
196,165 
57,399 
9,192 
399 
Net Change 
in Foreign 
Exchange 
(000 $) 
-2,971,330 
-1,729,820 
-644,894 
217,248 
390,969 
81,919 
-189,359 
-424,326 
-1,041,423 
-1,271,659 
-1,308,739 
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CHAPTER 8 
ECONOMIC LIBERALISATION AND AGRICULTURAL 
POLICY AllJUSTMENT IN INDONESIA 
Faisal Kasryno and Achmad Suryana * 
INTRODUCTION 
During the last twenty years, dynamic changes have been taking place in 
the Indonesian rural economy and agriculture. Structural transformation 
of the rural economy is indicated by changes in the share of agriculture 
in GDP and employment. In 1971 the share of agriculture in those macro 
variables were 66.3% and 44.0%, while in 1987 it dropped to 55.0% and 
23.4%, respectively. 
In the late 1960s the country's rural development was characterised by rapid 
growth in food (rice) production, triggered by the use of modern high-
yielding varieties combined with an intensive use of inputs. Since the 
mid-1970s, as a result of extensive development of transportation 
infrastructure, rural areas have ceased to be isolated. This development has 
brought about major impacts on the economic structure of rural areas. 
Most important has been the increased accessibility of rural areas to outside 
regions. This has stimulated two-way physical interactions and the flow 
of information among regions. In addition, the market mechanism has 
worked more effectively. 
During the 1980s, in line with global efforts to reform trade, the government 
of Indonesia (GOI) undertook deregulatory economic reforms. The main 
goal of the reform was to strengthen the country's economy and to sustain 
growth at a reasonable rate. There are some indications that the reforms 
have brought positive changes to the economy. 
The reforms will, of course, affect agricultural trade and comparative 
advantage. Thus, it will also influence the degree of achievement of 
agricultural development objectives. This paper discusses economic reform 
* Director Bureau of Planning, and Head of Policy Analysis Division, Bureau of Planning, Ministry of 
Agriculture, Indonesia. 
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in Indonesia, its impacts on agricultural sectors, and examines agricultural 
policy adjustment alternatives to respond to anticipated structural changes 
in the country's economy. 
ECONOMIC LIBERALISATION 
Structural changes are taking place in the Indonesian economy. The role 
of agriculture has declined in relative terms, and the country's economy 
is approaching a more balanced structure between agriculture and industry 
(including services). Significant deregulation policies have been introduced 
since 1983. The aim of the deregulation policies, as intended by the GIO, 
is not to fully liberalise the country's economy. Rather, they are meant to 
reduce barriers to the community's participation in the economic 
development process, to lower the cost of production activities, and to 
increase economic efficiency and product competitiveness, without 
neglecting important social objectives (Hadi, 1989). 
For a detailed analyses of deregulation policy packages, see Gaol and Salam 
(1989), Simandjuntak (1989), Booth (1988), Mochtar et al. (1988) (\nd 
Pangestu (1987). The first deregulation policy was launched in June 1983 
to liberalise the monetary sector, especially the banking sector. The credit 
ceiling was lifted and interest rates were freed. Trade deregulation began 
in the middle of 1985 with the issuance of President Instruction (lnpres) 
No. 4/1985. The main objective of this policy was to increase efficiency 
and competitiveness of export commodities in international markets. 
Export and import procedures were simplified and the flow of export and 
import goods and documents were smoothed. The policy also involved 
privatisation of some activities related to exports and imports (e.g. customs, 
surveying). 
The deregulation process continued with the issuance of the_ May 1986 
Policy Package. This policy was designed to promote private sector 
participation in non-oil exports, and to attract foreign as well as domestic 
investments. The May 1986 package relaxed some import restrictions to 
enable producer-exporters to obtain inputs at international prices (Hill, 
1987). This deregulation was followed by another Policy Package in October 
1986 which removed or reduced tariffs on imported raw materials, designed 
a new protection (by tariffs) of domestic industry, and created incentives 
for foreign investment. The October 1986 package relaxed the imports of 
321 items which were previously imported under the approved importer 
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licencing systems. The other part of the package dealt with import duties 
on 306 items, about half of which involved increases in tariffs to offset 
any fall in protection from the removal or relaxation of licences (Pangestu, 
1987). 
During 1987 the government issued three policy packages. The January 
1987 Policy Package was designed to simplify import procedures and to 
eliminate or reduce tariffs on four industrial sub-sectors, namely textile, 
steel, machinery/electricity, and automotive industries. The processing of 
industrial licences was simplified in June 1987. A most significant 
deregulation policy was issued in December 1987. This included 
liberalisation of imports and exports by simplifying export procedures and 
tariff reductions for a large number of goods. In brief, the December 1987 
package was designed to tackle problems of export incentives, import 
monopolies, the need to attract foreign investment, and tourist promotion 
(Booth, 1988). 
The October 1988 Policy Package was an attack on the financial system. 
This package removed most of the restrictions on entry to the banking 
sector (Simandjuntak 1989). Among other things, this policy was aimed 
at mobilising domestic funds, promoting non-oil exports, increasing the 
efficiency of banking and financial institutions, increasing control of 
monetary policy implementation, and creating a suitable climate for the 
development of capital markets. In the following month another policy 
package was announced, which focused on shipping and trade. This 
package was also directed at strengthening earlier efforts to increase 
national economic efficiency. 
The latest of the series of deregulation packages was issued in January 
1990. The Ministry of Finance and The Central Bank (Bank Indonesia) 
announced a set of new policy measures as part of the continuing efforts 
to strengthen the financial system and to reduce distortions in the country's 
economy. This policy addressed the problems of liquidity credits and interest 
rates. 
The above series of deregulation policies issued by the government is an 
indication that the government is seriously trying to restructure the 
economy. The deregulation policy aims at a more balanced economic 
structure through the development of non-oil exports and the 
manufacturing sector as well as conformation with GATT agreements. 
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The total value of exports in the first nine months of 1988 was 16.9% higher 
than that in the same period of 1987. The growth in the same period one 
year earlier (from 1986 to 1987) was 31.8%. The increase in export values 
in 1987 was due to a number of factors, namely the September 1986 
devaluation, the increase in international prices of some commodities, and 
the deregulation policy packages. But the share of each factor in the growth 
in export values is not known. Booth (1988), however, suggests that the 
devaluation might have been a decisive factor. Contrary to Booth, 
Simangjuntak (1989) and Mochtar (1988) explicitly argued that the 
deregulation packages were the most important factor for the increase in 
export values. Simandjuntak (1989) further explained that the increase in 
merchandise imports was a reflection of investment growth on export-
oriented industry. The share of investment to the total approved foreign 
investment rose from 40 % in 1987 to 64 % in 1988. The share was higher 
in the case of domestic investment, which rose from 54% to 74%. 
The value of agricultural product exports in the January-September 1988 
period was 13.9% higher than that in the same period of 1987. Growth 
in exports of agriculture-based industrial products was much higher. Among 
others, the growth of export values of processed rubber was 40.1 %, 
vegetable oil was 143.5 %, processed food was 36.4% (Table 1). This 
indicates that the deregulation packages do have a positive impact on the 
promotion of agricultural exports and the agricultural sector as a whole. 
AGRICULTURAL TRADE AND COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 
Structure of Agricultural Exports 
In nominal term, export values of agricultural products have increased 
significantly since 1982. The share of agriculture in total export earnings 
rose from only 7.2% in 1982 to 18.9% in 1988. However, the share of 
agriculture in non-oil exports in the last three years fell from 41.6% in 1986 
to 34.2% in 1987 and 31.2% in 1988. 
This decreasing trend in agricultural exports reflects the higher rate of 
growth of non-oil exports compared to that of agriculture. In 1988, for 
example, the value of non-oil exports grew at a rate of 39.2%, but the value 
of agricultural exports rose only 13.9%. By definition, commodities that 
are grouped into agricultural products consist mainly of primary goods 
or unprocessed products. Meanwhile, agricultural-processed products such 
as processed rubber, processed food, and vegetable oil are categorised as 
104 
Toward Freer Trade 
industrial products. As mentioned earlier, the growth rate of exports of 
these products was high. 
Estate crops are dominant in agricultural exports. Up to the mid-1980s, 
around 85 % of agricultural export values was from these crops. Since 1984 
the share has gradually declined, and in 1988 it was reduced to 75.9%. The 
export value of fishery products grew at a higher rate. In the 1970s the 
share of this sub sector in agricultural exports was less than 9%, but rose 
to an average of 11 % during 1980-1985, and has increased further to 19.8 % 
in 1988,. The other two sub sectors, namely food crops and livestock, in 
terms of their share to total agricultural exports, had a stable performance. 
The share of food crop and livestock exports during the 1975-1988 period 
were 3 to 4 % and l to 2 %, respectively. 
At present the country is a net exporter of estate crop products and a net 
importer of food items. naditionally, Indonesia has a large share in 
international markets for rubber, palm oil, tea, coffee, tobacco, and cassava 
and recently has been experiencing a high growth rate of cacao exports 
(Thble 2). On the other hand, the country is a growing importer of soybean, 
wheat and corn (Table 3). A noticeable change occurred in the mid-1980s 
when Indonesia shifted from being the world's largest rice importer to being 
self-sufficient in the country's main staple food. 
Cassava products are the major food crop exported. Skins have been the 
major livestock product exported and shrimps was the dominant category 
in fishery exports but its share has gradually declined. In estate crop exports, 
rubber, coffee, tea and palm oil were the dominant products. During the 
last 15 years the shares of those main products in total export values of 
agriculture were not significantly changed, even though new export 
commodities have been developed in fisheries and estate crop products. 
Comparative Advantage 
There is no doubt that Indonesia has comparative advantage in production 
and export of estate crop products, especially of tropical commodities. 
Resource endowments, including a relatively abundant labour supply, and 
long historical experience in estate practices are factors which support the 
advantage of the country in the estate crop sub-sector. ·In addition, the 
strong commitment of the government on rehabilitation and new planting 
expansion have further promoted the development of this sector. 
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The food crop sector follows a different path of development. Rice has 
been the major concern of the government for many years. The aim has 
been the achievement of self sufficiency. As a consequence, resource 
allocation is biased toward efforts to increase rice production, while other 
food crops have not received similar attention. Nonetheless, Indonesia has 
an economic comparative advantage for major food crops, as indicated 
by two studies done by Rosegrant et al. (1987) and Kasryno et al. (1989), 
based on estimation of domestic resource costs. 
Since Indonesia is a large country anG its agro-ecological system varies 
greatly among regions, both studies have suggested the existence of different 
comparative advantages for food crop export promotion among regions. 
Both studies have divided the country into seven almost similar regions, 
namely West Java, Central Java, East Java, Sumatera, Bali and Nusa 
Tenggara, Kalimantan, and Sulawesi (in Rosegrant) and South Sulawesi 
(in Kasryno). 
Results of both studies (as summarised in Table 4) have indicated that: 
(1) Indonesia has a comparative advantage in export production of rice, 
corn, soybeans and dried cassava; (2) all parts of the country have 
comparative advantage in exporting cassava; (3) some regions have 
comparative advantage in rice, corn and soybeans. The country has no 
comparative advantage in exporting sugar. Based on Kasryno's study, West 
Java and East Java have no comparative advantage in exporting corn and 
soybeans, while results of Rosegrant's analysis indicates that only West Java 
province has no comparative advantage in these two commodities. 
Kasryno's study also presents domestic resource cost ratios for livestock 
products. Chicken meat, swine meat and beef were reported to be 
economically efficient with potential to be exported. On the other hand 
chicken egg and milk are economically inefficient as export products 
(Table 5). 
In brief, Indonesia has comparative advantage in export promotion of 
agricultural products, namely estate crops, food crops and livestock 
products. 
Support Programmes 
The GATT contracting parties generally recognise that if substantial 
progress is to be made in improving international trade in agriculture, the 
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wide range of support programmes that protect agriculture in each country 
must be subject to negotiation. Because of the varied and complex types 
of policies used by countries, many GATT proposals suggest the use of 
an aggregate measure of support (AMS) which can capture the effects of 
the wide variety of policies in a single yardstick or measurement. One of 
the AMS's that has gained popular acceptance is the Producer Subsidy 
Equivalent, called PSE (Magiera, 1989). The PSE is defined as the income 
that would be necessary to compensate farmers for the removal of all 
government policies. The PSE is normally expressed as total government 
transfers as a percentage of the value of farm output (USDA 1989 and 
Magiera 1989). 
In calculating PSE's, total government transfers usually inclulde those that 
are specifically targeted to agriculture. Such policies include market price 
policies, income support, input subsidies, marketing subsidies and long 
term structural policies (Schwarts, Magiera and Mervene 1988). 
Magiera (1989) has calculated the PSE for Indonesian agriculture for the 
1982-86 period to be 24.4%. Compared to the PSE's of other countries 
as estimated by USDA (1989) for the same period (Skully in Magiera, 1989), 
Indonesia's PSE is lower than those in many developed countries (United 
States 24.6%, Canada 31.0%, EC-10 35.4% and Japan 71.7%). On the other 
side, Indonesia's PSE is higher than that of Argentina (22.l % ), Brazil 
(9 .2 o/o ), and India (~ 17 .8 % ). Actually this direct comparison is not really 
valid, since the basket of commodities included in the calculation was not 
the same. However, this rough comparison shows that the magnitude of 
protection administered by the GOI is still much lower than in some other 
(mainly developed) countries. 
Indonesia's PSE for corn and sugar for the period 1982-1986 were lower 
than those for the United States (Table 6). In fact, Indonesia's PSE for 
corn is negative, indicating negative support. PSE for soybean and sugar 
is high as these two commodities are highly protected as· a consequence 
of the policy of self-sufficiency in food items. In contrast, the support is 
low for cassava, which is a major food export commodity, as well as for 
corn which is exported intermittently. 
Support for rice is relatively high, namely 21.7%, and this support accounts 
for 64.7 % of the aggregate PSE. This is understandable since rice is the 
most important commodity in the country, economically as well as 
politically. 
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Although Indonesia has implemented a number of economic reforms since 
1983, production and trade in the major agricultural commodities remain 
highly regulated. Current policies to gradually reduce subsidies on fertiliser, 
interest rates and irrigation have all led to a reduction in the support for 
agriculture production. Subsidies on pesticides have already been lifted. 
The fertiliser subsidy is gradually being reduced. 
Reforms and deregulation of agricultural trade have taken place and will 
continue to in the future. Non-tariff barriers for some agricultural 
commodities will gradually be replaced by tariffs and some of the tariffs 
will also be reduced. However, trade for strategically important agricultural 
commodities such as rice, sugar, soybean and milk will remain regulated. 
The objective of this trade regulation is to stabilise the domestic market 
for both producers and consumers. 
The government also controls the allocation of vegetable oils between 
domestic and export markets, imposes tariffs on crude vegetable oil imports, 
and controls the domestic price of CPO. These policies have negative 
impacts on farmers' income, consumer welfare, as well as trade in palm 
oil (Madecor 1990). Vegetable oils are the only estate crops which are highly 
regulated by the government. The argument for this policy is that cooking 
oil is one of the nine essential goods for Indonesians, so that meeting the 
domestic needs and maintaining price stability are the major concerns of 
the government. 
The recent financial reform (the January 1990 Policy Package) has reduced 
subsidies on all farmer loans. Interest rates that must be paid by farmers 
or smallholders are to follow prime commercial rates, which are currently 
16% p.a. This reform has affected farmers' income and reduced incentives 
to invest in agriculture. Due to the long term nature of investment in 
agricultural infrastructure, especially for estate crops, livestock and fisheries, 
special regulations on interest rates for these investments are needed. 
The above policy reforms will, of course, have an impact on the levels of 
production and farmers' income. To maintain the growth of production 
and income· at reasonable rates, the subsidy reduction (or elimination) 
policies must be accompanied by output pricing policies based on the 
market mechanism, and an increase in production efficiency through the 
improvement of production technology. 
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AGRICULTURAL POLICY ADJUSTMENTS 
During the 1990's, the role of agriculture in the Indonesian economy will 
remain important. As indicated in the agricultural development objectives, 
agriculture is expected to provide adequate foodstuffs at reasonable prices 
for the ever growing population, to provide employment opportunities for 
rural residents, and to alleviate poverty. In addition it supports the 
industry/manufacturing sector and generates foreign exchange earnings 
through the supply of raw materials. Also, it should contribute to 
sustainable development. These roles must be performed in a changing and 
more liberalised economy. 
In general, economic liberalisation involves two activities. One is to convert 
all trade barriers into import tariffs. This step will make domestic prices 
more responsive to world prices. The other activity involves a reduction 
in support to agriculture and an elimination of any gap between domestic 
and world prices. This would eliminate the overcapacity that currently exists 
in agriculture, particularly in the industrialised countries (Magiera, 1989). 
Based on several studies of agricultural reforms, Magiera (1989) concludes 
that the policies of agricultural support programmes of the industrialised 
countries have depressed world trade in many agricultural products. As 
a result, multilateral trade reforms by the industrialised countries would 
raise world prices for most agricultural products. For Indonesia, the impact 
of trade reform in agriculture is two-fold. First, it would provide new export 
markets and opportunity to expand and diversify its export markets and 
export commodities. Second, the country is a net importer of foodstuffs 
and if the increase of prices in world markets is transmitted to the domestic 
market, then higher food costs must be paid by domestic consumers, 
including a large part of the rural population. In addition, support to 
industry and to export development is being frustrated by the increase in 
prices of raw materials. 
Three adjustments in agricultural policies and programmes are proposed 
in response to the structural change and reforms that are taking place in 
the economy. The first proposal is regionalisation or zoning of agricultural 
production based on economic comparative advantage. As discussed earlier, 
not all provinces or regions in the country have the same comparative 
advantage in a specific commodity. Production of specific agricultural 
products must be directed toward regions which have the highest 
comparative advantage. Recently, ideas have been developed to promote 
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food production outside Java, mostly in Sumatera and Sulawesi, whereas 
estate crops production appears to be economically more feasible to be 
developed in Sumatera and Kalimantan, while fishery and livestock 
production are to be concentrated in the eastern part of Indonesia. 
In fact, based on the distribution of planted-acreage and production of 
agricultural commodities during the last twenty years, changes in regional 
patterns of production have reflected comparative advantages (Kasryno 
1990). The production of corn, soybean, cassava and sugar are moving 
from Java to Sumatera. The location of estate crop production (rubber, 
palm oil, coffee) has moved away from a single production centre in 
Sumatera to almost all provinces in Sumatera and Kalimantan. The share 
of Java as the main beef production centre has dropped, and the role of 
Nusa Tenggara and Sulawesi has become more significant. However, Java 
is still a dominant production region for rice. The share of Java in the 
country's rice production during the last twenty years remains around 61 %. 
The second proposal relates to the reorientation of agricultural export 
policies. Development of agricultural exports must be viewed not only as 
an effort to increase export volumes and values but also as an effort to 
improve other agricultural development issues. Dillon and Suryana (1989) 
suggested the following adjustments in agricultural export policies; (1) 
development of agricultural exports must be aimed at increasing their added 
value, and the development of post-harvest and processing technologies 
which are suitable to agro-industry and development in rural areas is a 
necessary condition; (2) development of agricultural exports must be 
achieved through export commodity diversification and product 
development must follow efficiency and comparative advantage principles; 
(3) development of agricultural exports must be accompanied by efforts 
to diversify export markets in order to reduce heavy dependency on a few 
markets, which also means reducing the risk from instability in export 
earnings; (4) development of agricultural exports must be implemented by 
developing products which have large backward linkages, so as to obtain 
large multiplier effects on agriculture production activities. In this way, 
agricultural export development will be able to increase farmers' incomes 
and employment opportunities in agricultural production activities. 
The third proposal involves broadening the scope of the agricultural sector. 
Agriculture, seen as a production sub-sector, cannot absorb all the 
additional labour force in rural areas and, in fact, the proportion of 
employment in agriculture tends to decline in the major rice and other food 
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crops producing areas. The potential for rural economic development is 
to link the narrow definition of agriculture with other sub-sectors which 
are closely related to agricultural production. Thus, the agricultural sector 
in a broad sense includes agriculture production, processing of agricultural 
products, farm mechanical and chemical industries, and supporting services 
such as marketing and trade of agricultural inputs and outputs. 
Data on labour allocation and the source of income in rural areas show 
that agriculture is currently an important sector in providing employment 
and household income. However, the importance of the agricultural 
production sub-sector in both employment and income was less in the 
relatively more developed regions (represented by Java provinces) compared 
to that in the less developed regions (represented by outside Java). In West 
Java agriculture (farming activities) provided 34.3 % of employment, while 
in West Sumatera and South Sulawesi the percentages were 53. 7 and 52. 7 % 
(Table 7). In Java less than 40 % of household income was from agriculture, 
while in outside Java the percentage was above 50% (Table 8). 
Those figures suggest that the rural economy is moving away from 
agriculture and toward a more diversified structure as the level of economic 
development increases. Thus, one may expect that with the on-going 
economic reforms, the structure of the rural economy will become more 
diversified, and that the policies and programmes on agricultural and rural 
development will no_ longer be suitable if they focus only on agricultural 
production. 
Based on the above arguments, it is suggested that in formulating policies 
on employment in rural areas, focus should be given not just to employment 
in agricultural production, because greater opportunities lie outside the 
narrow range of agricultural production. As an integral part of this 
approach, a training programme for the rural labour force to meet the 
qualifications or requirements for employment outside the agricultural 
production sector is necessary and must be undertaken on a continuing 
basis. 
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Indonesia is in the process of structural change in its economy, towards 
a broadening of its economic resource base and a deepening of the spectrum 
of economic development. This diversification process has been pursued 
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through greater reliance on the market mechanism. To stabilise domestic 
prices and to protect domestic producers and consumers of strategic 
(important) commodities, trade in these commodities is still regulated. 
However, protection of these commodities is generally lower than in most 
developed countries. 
To induce long term investment in agriculture some incentive policies are 
still required. These incentives are in the form of provision of investment 
in infrastructure, research and extension. 
To maintain comparative advantage in most agricultural commodities, 
substantial progress needs to be made in diversifying technological packages 
of agricultural commodities. Improvement in research, resource allocation 
and expansion of sources of funds are needed. 
Structural adjustment in agriculture, which is necessary in response to 
changes and reforms of the national economy, includes establishment of 
appropriate production locations based on agro-ecological factors and 
comparative advantaget diversification of the agricultural sector to expand 
domestic and export market potentials, and integrated commodity and area 
developments which rely on the market mechanism and private 
entrepreneurship and participation. 
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Table 1. Selected Indicators of Export Performance: Indonesia 
Jan .. Sept Jan-Sept Shares in Change 
1987 1988 Total Exports 1987-1988 
- (US$ million) - - percent -
Total Exports 12,261 14,337 100.0 16.9. 
Oil and gas 6,339 6,094 42.5 ~3.9 
Non-oil 5,922 8,243 57.5 39.2 
Agricultural products 1,198 1,365 9.5 13.9 
Industrial products 4,561 6,624 46.2 45.3 
Wood products 1,656 2,104 14.7 27.1 
Metal products 496 829 5.8 67.4 
Textiles 706 1,006 7.0 42.4 
Processed rubber 648 908 6.3 40.1 
Processed rattan 103 73 0.5 -29.6 
Vegetable oil 133 325 2.3 143.5 
Furniture 18 46 0.3 155.6 
Glass products 18 66 0.5 259.0 
Paper 70 104 0.7 48.0 
Processed food 69 94 0.7 36.4 
Fertiliser 53 81 0.6 51.4 
Non-oil minerals 159 244 1.7 53.6 
Source: BPS, Bulletin Ringkas, December 1988, as compiled by 
Simandjuntak (1989). 
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Table 2. Export volume of selected estate crops: Indonesia 
Year Rubber Palm oil Coffee Tea Cocoa 
--------~--------~--------~---- ('000 mt) ----------------~-------~----·-
1970 577 159 101 37 0.1 
1975 619 386 128 46 1.1 
1980 956 502 239 74 4.7 
1985 1000 519 283 90 30.2 
1986 958 567 298 79 33.2 
1987 1014 471 286 90 37.2 
1988 1132 853 299 93 61.3 
Average Annual 
Growth rates, 
1980-87 0.8% -0.9% 2.6% 2.8% 34.4% 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Central Bureau of Statistics. 
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Table 3. Export and import of selected food crops: Indonesia 
Year Rice Corn Soybean Cassava Sugar Wheat 
-----------------------... ·-----.. ·- ('000 mt) ------------.. -- 111111 ·----------------
1970 (771) 282 0 n.a. (127) (624) 
1975 (670) 51 0 299 (150) (843) 
1980 (1213) (5) (193) 386 (548) (1281) 
1985 0 (52) (301) 543 (4) (1511) 
1986 0 (60) (359) 428 (113) (1626) 
1987 0 220 (600) 825 (122) (1603) 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Central Bureau of Statistics. 
Note: Figures in parentheses are imports. 
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Table 4. lndDnesian Economic Comparative Advantage 
for Selected Exported Food Crops, as Indicated by Domestic 
Resource Cost Ratiost 1986. 
Commodity 
Rice 
Corn 
Soybeans 
Dried cassava 
Sugar 
19851 
0.68 - 1.02 
0.76 - 1.02 
0.59 - 1.26 
0.38 - 0.51 
4.82 - 5.76 
Source: 1 Rosegrant et al., (1987) 
2 Kasryno et al., (1989) 
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0.37 - 0.70 
0.72 - 1.53 
0.56 - 1.59 
0.26 - 0.46 
Toward Freer Trade 
fable 5. Indonesian Economic Comparative Advantage for Export 
Livestock Products, as Indicated by Domestic Resource 
Cost Ratios, 1986. 
Domestic Resource 
Commodity Region Cost Ratio 
Chicken Meat Lampung 0.35 
Bog or 0.25 
Chicken Egg Lampung 0.22 
Bogar 1.01 
Swine Meat Bali 0.25 
Java 0.60 
Beef NTT, free grazing 0.29 
West Java, fattening 0.55 
Milk 
Imported breed Semarang 2.85 
Boyolali 2.36 
Cross breed Semarang 1.67 
Boyolali 1.45 
Source: Kasryno et al. (1989) 
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Table 6. Indonesia and the United States: 
PSE's by commodity: 1982-1986 
lndonesia1 United States2 
--------------------------- (~) ---------------------------
Aggregate 
Rice 
Corn 
Soybeans 
Cassava 
Wheat 
Sugar 
24.4 
21.7 
-2.1 
47.5 
2.9 
n.a. 
62.8 
n.a. = not available 
Source: 1 Magiera (1989) 
2 USDA (1989) 
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25 
n.a. 
27 
8 
n.a. 
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fable 7. Labour allocation by rural households: Indonesia, 1984 
Economic 
Sector 
Agriculture (farming) 
Farm labour 
Non Farm labour 
Industry 
Service (trade, 
transport, etc.) 
West 
Java 
34.3 
25.6 
12.4 
2.6 
25.1 
Province 
West 
Sumatra 
South 
Sulawesi 
( % ) --------------------------
53. 7 52.7 
9.3 9.5 
11.5 1.4 
1.2 1.4 
24.3 25.2 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total labour allocation 
(Man hour/year) 
Source: Kasryno (1988) 
100.0 
2619 
121 
100.0 
2702 
100.0 
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Table 8. Pattern of rural household income: Indonesia, 1987. 
Region Agri- Industry Service/ Salary Others Total 
culture Trade 
--------------------------- ( o/o) --------------------------- (Rp.000) 
Java 
West Java 26.6 2.5 12.9 55.7 2.0 653.1 
Central Java 48.2 3.4 10.6 36.4 1.4 527.4 
East Java 36.7 13.4 7.1 39.7 2.2 668.7 
Sumatra 
North 
Sumatra 49.5 2.5 3.1 43.7 1.2 959.6 
Others 52.7 3.4 8.7 33.6 1.6 921.6 
Sulawesi 
South 
Sulawesi 59.3 7.1 7.1 25.5 1.0 740.4 
Others 60.4 6.2 8.8 24.2 0.4 805.4 
Kalimantan 50.6 3.8 9.6 34.5 1.5 821.8 
. 
Source: National Socio Economic Survey 1987. 
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PHILIPPINE TARIFF AND NON-TARIFF POLICIES: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR ASEAN TRADE 
L.S. Cabanilla* 
INTRODUCTION 
It is now a well known fact that the Philippines is one among several 
developing economies in Asia that have attempted an import-substitution 
strategy for development. It has also been well documented that this strategy 
bas failed to attain for the economy its avowed development goals. As 
pointed out by Bautista (1981), 'high tariff rates on finished products and 
low rates on intermediate inputs and capital goods that characterised the 
country's tariff structure have had the undesirable effect of inhibiting export 
growth and backward integration while promoting inefficiency in the use 
of domestic resources and slow growth of industrial development. In the 
1970s, fiscal incentives granted by the Board of Investments under the 
Investment Incentives Act (RA 5186) and Export Incentives Act (RA 6135) 
and a more flexible exchange rate policy served to provide offsetting benefits 
to export-oriented firms'. Bautista, Power and Associates (1979) pointed 
out, however, that the past fiscal incentives were not enough to neutralise 
the biases in incentives created by the tariff structure. 
One major specific effect of the import substitution strategy has been the 
biases against the agricultural sector of the economy exerted by tariff as 
well as non-tariff policies. Export taxes on agricultural products, which 
served as important sources of government revenues until the early 1980s, 
were clear penalties to the agricultural sector. Past exchange rate policies 
which overvalued the domestic currency likewise penalised the agricultural 
export sector, in favour of the import-substituting industrial sector (APST, 
1986; Balisacan, 1989). 
In a more general fashion, Medalla (1986) describes past tariff policies 
under the IS strategy as characterised by the progressivity of tariff rates 
according to the stage of processing. She notes that the 'escalation' of tariff 
• Associate Professor and Chairman, Department of Economics, College of Econdmics and Management, 
University of the Philippines at Los Banos, College, Laguna, Philippines. 
123 
Tariff and Non-Tariff Policies in the Philippines 
rates where raw materials are accorded low tariff rates, capital goods 
intermediate rates, and final goods (especially non-essentials) high rates, 
results in highly disproportionate effective protection rates (EPRs). This 
further results in an incentives structure which produces a biased and 
inefficient resource allocation. Thus, the specific effect as described above 
is rather inevitable. As Medalla further notes, 'the tariff on imports, in 
effect, imposes a general penalty (tax) on exports by defending an 
undervaluation of foreign exchange (over-valuation of the local currency), 
thereby creating an inherent bias against exports'. 
A comprehensive trade liberalisation programme has been implemented 
in 1981 to correct the negative effects of past tariff and non-tariff policies. 
Several studies have been done to evaluate the effects of this programme 
(e.g. Bautista, 1981; Clarete, 1989; Fabella, 1989). 
This short paper briefly reviews the results of these evaluations, presents 
an update of the tariff rate structure of the Philippines, and discusses some 
implications of the current tariff and non-tariff reforms for ASEAN trade. 
The latter is important in the face of increasing protectionism among the 
major importers of ASEAN products. 
THE PHILIPPINE TRADE LIBERALISATION PROGRAMME 
The latest trade liberalisation programme of the Philippines, which took 
effect in 1981, is a major attempt to correct the weakness of past 
liberalisation efforts. For example (see Alburo and Shepherd, 1986) the 
exchange decontrol programme in 1962, while liberalising commercial 
exchange, effectively activated a protective tariff code which somehow 
retained the same bias as the control era. 
In general, Jhe Philippine Trade Liberalisation Programme attempts to 
reduce the level and variance of tariff rates and remove non-tariff barriers 
to trade. The programme has thus been dichotomised into two - Tariff 
Reforms and Import Liberalisation. The former involved lowering of the 
maximum allowable tariff of 100 to 50 percent and the replacement of the 
seven-rate category in 1985 to a five rate category in 1988. On the other 
hand, the latter attempts to eliminate quantitative restrictions and other 
non-tariff barriers to trade. To date, there are more than 2,100 items that 
are liberalised. 
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Tables 1 to 3 show the distribution of tariff rates in the Philippines in 1980, 
1985 and 1988. At a glance, the figures in the tables reflect the nature of 
reforms that have evolved during the Trade Liberalisation Period. First, 
it will be noted that in 1980, there were seven categories of rates with 10 
percent and 100 percent as the lowest and highest allowable rates 
respectively. In 1985, this was reduced to six categories with 5 percent as 
the lowest and 50 percent the highest allowable rate. The number of 
categories was further reduced to five in 1988 and this time, the lowest 
rate category is 10 percent. As can be seen, the effect of the reduction in 
the number of rate categories was a decrease in the variability of tariff 
rates in the country. In 1980, the standard deviation of tariff rates was 32 
percent. This decreased to 15 in 1985 and 1988. 
It will also be noted that primary and semi-processed agricultural products 
(Section 1 to 4) suffered relatively large reductions in tariff protection. 1 
Animals and animal derivatives, for example, suffered a decline of tariff 
protection by about 30 percentage points between 1980 and 1985. This is 
equivalent to a 52 percent decline in tariff protection - one of the largest 
declines in protection during the period 1980-1985. Whereas in 1980, the 
average tariff rates of agricultural products were at least 14 percentage 
points higher than the overall average tariff (Table 1), this declined to about 
only two percentage points in 1985 (Table 2) and close to nil in 1988 
(Table 3). 
Finally, it will be noted that the number of tariff lines have almost doubled 
between 1980 and 1985, and tripled between 1980 and 1988. This is 
consistent with the international effort to improve the accuracy of 
classifying internationally traded commodities, more particularly under 
the Harmonised System (HS) of Commodity Classification. 
Table 4 shows a listing of the Non-Tariff Measures (NTM) applied to traded 
commodities in the Philippines. It should be noted that out of the 222 
tariff headings covered by NTMs, 70 fall under the agricultural (primary 
and processed) sector. The agricultural sector uses the most number of 
NTMs ranging from sanitary regulations to import licensing but this does 
not bear direct correlation to the degree of protection from foreign 
competition as it does not show the relative number of products actually 
covered. Besides, 
'fhis is also pointed out in Clarete (1989). 
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most of these measures are really intended to prevent the entry of pests 
and diseases into the country. 
A more appropriate measure of the extent by which NTMs protect a certain 
sector would be to calculate the NTM coverage ratio (Clarete, 1989). This 
refers to the ratio of the number of regulated products to the total number 
of products of a sector. This is not done here due to insufficiency of date 
but Clarete reports that from 1986-1988, the NTM coverage ratio for 
industry is higher than for agriculture. This implies that agricultural 
products have been liberalised much faster than the products of the 
industrial sector. 
PHILIPPINE-ASEAN TRADE 
In the face of an increasing protectionist stance of the major trading 
partners of developing countries like the Philippines and other ASEAN 
countries, looking at prospects of increasing intra-ASEAN trade would 
always open up comforting alternatives. Economic ministers of ASEAN 
have worked hard in exploiting the potential of greater intro-ASEAN trade, 
with the signing of the Agreement on ASEAN Preferential 'Itading 
Arrangement (PTA) in 1977 serving as a concrete evidence of this effort. 
Although evaluations of the effects of PTA on intra-ASEAN trade have 
not shown encouraging results, the continued interest by ASEAN in 
pursuing the goals set out to be achieved from this agreement will in itself 
serve as a strong driving force for improved intra-ASEAN trade. 
Commodities covered under the ASEAN PTA have increased from a mere 
71in1976 to over 12,000 in 1987. The margin of preference (MOP) accorded 
to each member country has also increased. 
In conjunction with the trade liberalisation programmes of some countries 
including the Philippines, the increase in the MOP would certainly be 
beneficial especially if the liberalised commodities have high ASEAN 
import values. In this section, the new tariff structure of the Philippines 
will be examined in relation to the existing trade flows between the 
Philippines and other ASEAN countries. 
It should be noted that before the Philippines embarked on its trade 
liberalisation programme, it had the highest average tariff rate within 
ASEAN. In 1978, it has an average tariff rate of 44 percent; after 
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liberalisation, its average tariff declined by a third making it the ASEAN 
country with the third lowest average tariff (Tuble 5). In fact, it will be 
noted that the slight decline in the ASEAN overall tariff level is mostly 
attributed to the decline in Philippine tariffs as most of the other countries 
increased their average tariff. 
During the past two decades, the Philippines always had a negative trade 
balance with ASEAN. Trade with Singapore appeared to be most favourable 
particularly during the 1980s when the Philippines experienced an increasing 
trade surplus. On the other hand, trade with Malaysia and Indonesia (due 
mainly to oil imports from these countries), were most unfavourable. 
During the 1980s, Philippine imports from ASEAN grew at an average rate 
of 6.2 percent per year compared to an average annual rate of growth in 
exports of 3.0 percent. This inevitably resulted in an increasing trade deficit 
particularly towards the latter part of the 1980s. Coincidentally, this 
phenomenon occurred during the trade liberalisation programme of the 
Philippines. It would thus be interesting to learn whether or not the existing 
tariff structure would have any bearing on the trade balance of the 
Philippines vis-a-vis the ASEAN region. 
The average tariff rates on the Philippine's top ten exports to other ASEAN 
members is arvund 12 percent (9.0 percent with Philippines excluded from 
the averaging). This is slightly lower than the Philippines average tariff 
rates on its top ten imports from ASEAN (15 percent). Even the NTMs 
applied by other ASEAN countries on Philippine exports to ASEAN are 
relatively less than those that are imposed by the Philippines on the same 
groups of commodities. Thus it would seem that the tariff and non-tariff 
measures are not sufficient explanators of the observed behaviour of trade 
between the Philippines and other ASEAN countries. 
Here lies the strength of the argument that the historically overvalued 
exchange rate is an important explanatory factor in the behaviour of the 
Philippines trade balance. Estimates show that the exchange rate has been 
overvalued by as much as 20 percent (Medalla, 1979), artificially cheapening 
imports and making Philippine exports more expensive. Real exchange rates 
during the past two decades, are, in fact, reportedly low (Fabella, 1989). 
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CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
The trade liberalisation programme of the 1980s is one of the major policy 
reforms that the Philippines has embarked upon. It is also one of those 
policies which has strong and long term repercussions for the other ASEAN 
countries. Apart from the internal effects of the programme, (e.g. 
adjustments of effective protection of production activities and hence 
allocation of domestic resources), it likewise affects trade prospects between 
the Philippines and the rest of ASEAN. 
While the Philippine-ASEAN trade is quite thin, representing only 5 percent 
of total Philippine exports and imports (Manaloto, 1990) cursory analysis 
of available date shows that trade has been increasing reasonably fast, 
particularly towards the end of the 1980s. In fact, Philippine's imports from 
ASEAN have grown at 6 percent per year during the ILP period of the 
1980s. Although this would appear superficially unfavourable, it would 
bring forth long term benefits in terms of a more efficient allocation of 
domestic resources consistent with the country's comparative advantage. 
Hopes for the trade creation effects of the ASEAN-PTA remain strong. 
Several loopholes and weaknesses, however, have been pointed out by 
ASEAN scholars. Among these are the following (Naya, 1987): 
1. Tariff reductions under the PTA were negotiated on the basis of 
defined commodity classifications. With these fine commodity 
classifications, the countries would go on exchanging large lists of 
concessions without much effect. Many commodities had little 
practical value in terms of effective trade creation because of their 
low trade content. 
2. The voluntary, product-by-product approach used in the initial period 
contributed to the selection of items with low trade content. Countries 
were willing to volunteer items that did not significantly affect 
domestic industries. 
3. The large exclusion list constrained the expansion of intra-ASEAN 
trade. It was observed that there was a general tendency for the 
percentage of goods excluded to increase with the import value range. 
4. The tariff reduction offered on the items was low to permit a 
significant impact on potential imports, except for items with 
extremely high price elasticities of import demand. However, there 
is no indication that items under the PTA have high price elasticities. 
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Furthermore, production cost in ASEAN manufacturing is often high 
relative to export prices of other major exporters of manufactures. 
Turiff preferences, therefore, have to be substantial to bring the price 
below the level of competing items. 
5. As tariffs are reduced, NTMs tend to ·have an increasing effect of 
limiting trade expansion. In fact, it has been noted that products 
entitled to tariff concessions under the ASEAN PTA are also faced 
with NTMs that effectively nullify preferential access. Moreover, the 
product lines that seem to be most affected by NTMs are commodities 
with good prospects for expanded trade, such as food, chemicals, 
transport equipment, and the mechanical and electrical machinery 
sector. 
The general reductions in the tariff rates of goods under the current trade 
liberalisation programme of the Philippines will serve as a complementary 
force to the ASEAN-PTA in improving trade with other ASEAN countries. 
Lower tariff rates in conjunction with increasingly higher Margin of 
Preference would ultimately result in a larger trade creation effect. 
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Table 1. Distribution of tariff rates; Selected Items and Total: 1980 ~ 
""I 
S; 
Tariff Rates 
~ 
Cl ;::r 
~ 
BrN Number of Standard ~ 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 70% 100% Items Mean Deviation ::s 
~ 
I Animals and animal ~ S; 
derivatives 7 1 3 0 7 5 17 40 64.5 35.10 ~ 
II Plant products 3 13 6 1 11 21 18 73 59.3 30.10 ~ ~ III Fats and edible oils 2 0 6 1 6 2 2 20 49.0 26.40 ~· 
IV Food; beverage, and tobacco 6 5 6 0 4 6 41 68 74.4 34.50 ;;· 
v Minerals and fuels 33 18 l 0 8 0 0 60 18.7 13.20 
-General Tariff Schedule 322 219 9 126 238 43.1 32.20 
~ 
206 W3 1323 (!!I 
Source:. Tariff and Customs Code of 1978. (Lifted from Bautista, 1981) ~ .... !"-. 
-
'.S' 
~ Note: Figures in parentheses are percentages of total number of items under each BTN section. "6 :;· 
~ 
Table 2. Distribution of tariff rates; Selected Items and Total: 1985 ~ 
., 
S; ~ 
Tariff Rates § 
I:),. 
BTN Number of Standard ~ 
5% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% Items Mean Deviation :::i ~ 
I Animals and animal ... $.; 
derivatives 17 11 l 3 1 32 65 29.00 io.so ~ cl' II Plant products 1 8 23 12 2 63 109 37.20 15.20 :::: 
III Fats and edible oils 4 12 6 3 29.20 
!"') 
0 11 36 11.90 ~-
IV Food, beverage, and tobacco 2 16 10 12 6 65 111 38.0 15.90 5· 
v Minerals and fuels 0 60 29 9 1 0 99 15.10 7.00 
-;:so. 
General Tariff Schedule 30 557 540 459 165 544 2295 27.90 15.00 ni 
"o (1.3) (24.3) (23.5) (20.0) (7.2) (23.7) (100.0) ;:so. 
-· 
-
Source: Tariff and Customs Code of 1982. (Lifted from Bautista, 1981) ~· ::;; ~ 
.... ::· 
Note: Figures in parentheses are percentages of total number of items under each BTN section. ~ 
Table 3. Distribution of tariff rates; Selected Items and Total: 1988 ~ $; ~ 
Tariff Rates § ~ 
BTN Number of Standard ~ 
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% Items Mean Deviation ~ ~ 
"t 
I Animals and animal s ~ 
derivatives 87 44 63 9 78 281 28.11 15.82 ~ 
II Plant products 33 65 48 4 154 304 35.95 15.27 ~ 
III Fats and edible oils 6 17 9 22 26 80 35.63 13.31 ~· 
IV -Food, beverage, and tobacco 20 30 15 10 147 222 40.54 14.46 s· 
v Minerals and fuels 102 39 10 4 0 155 14.58 7.29 s. !\ 
General Tariff Schedule 1579 1314 1168 530 1390 5981 28.06 15.02 ~ (26.4) (22.0) (19.5) (8.9) (23.2) (100.0) ;::: 
:i3" ;:; 
Source: Tariff and Customs Code of 1988 '15 ... s· 
Note: Figures in parentheses are percentages of total number of items under each BTN section. ~ 
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Table 4. Philippine Non-Tariff Measures for selected Items, 1988 
Number of Tariff 
Section Type of NTM Headings 
I 29 
a) DIL +QR 9 
b) SR 9 
c) DIL +QR + EP 2 
d) SR + DIL 2 
e) DIL + SR + EP 1 
0 QR 3 
g) SR+ EP 2 
h) DIL 1 
II 21 
a) DIL + PR 4 
b) DIL + IP 1 
c) DIL 3 
d) QR 8 
e) DIP +SR + EQ 1 
f) ST + DIL 1 
g) IP + DIL + PR 1 
h) EP J 
III 6 
a) SR 5 
b) DIL + SR 1 
IV 14 
a) SR 2 
b) DIL + SR 4 
c) DIL 5 
d) DIL + EQ I 
e) QR I 
f) DIL + IP 1 
Notes: DIL = Discretionary Import Licensing 
QR = Quarantine Regulation 
SR = Sanitary Regulations 
EP = Export Prohibition 
IP = Import Prohibition 
PR = Phytosanitary Regulations 
EQ = Export Quota 
ST = State Trading · 
DIP = Discretionary Im.port Prohibition 
Source: ASEAN, 1988. Consolidated List of NTMs Maintained by 
ASEAN Countries. 
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Table 5. Comparison of Simple Average Tariff Rates among 
ASEAN Countries, 1978, 1984. 
Country 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Thailand 
Singapore 
Source: a. Bautista (1981) 
19788 
............. percent .............. .. 
33.0 32.57 
15.3 25.00 
44.2 29.17 
29.4 30.65 
5.6 6.42 
b. Philippine Tariff Commission (1985) 
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CHAPTER 10 
MANAGING THE IMPACTS OF 
AGRICULTURAL TRADE LIBERALISATION IN TAIWAN 
Rhung-Jieh Woo* and 1Su-1hn Fu** 
INTRODUCTION 
To achieve greater liberalisation of trade in agriculture and bring all 
measures affecting imports and exports under strengthened and more 
effective GATT rules and disciplines is one of the ultimate objectives of 
the current GATT round of multilateral trade negotiations. Although there 
are still some disputes on several issues among different interest groups, 
the general directions and procedures to be followed have been agreed at 
the Geneva meeting held in April 1989. GATT signatories have agreed that 
a fair and market·oriented agricultural trading system should be established 
in the long run and that the reform process should focus on the reduction 
of trade distortions. 
In response to the global liberalisation trend with respect to agricultural 
trade, the government in Thi wan has recognised that fundamental reforms 
and adjustments in agriculture must be undertaken. Various adjustments 
have been made to reduce import barriers as well as several agricultural 
products. However, the move towards free trade still involves significant 
changes in domestic and trade policies. Continuous adjustments toward 
a system with minimum distortions in production, consumption and trade 
of agricultural products is necessary. At the same time, a process of 
adjustment with minimum costs is also desirable. 
The general objective of this paper is to propose practical approaches of 
agricultural adjustment in Tuiwan which could meet the objectives of trade 
liberalisation while easing the transitional costs. 
* Associate Professor, Department of Agricultural Economics, National Tuiwan University. 
•• Associate Research Fellow, Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Tuiwan. 
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PRODUCTION, CONSUMPTION AND TRADE: AN OVERVIEW 
Since 1962, the value of agricultural production in Taiwan has been less 
than that of industrial production. Since the same time the rate of increase 
of agricultural production has been much slower than that of industrial 
production. In 1988, the total value of agricultural production was 161,647 
million New Thi wan Dollars, about 6 per cent of the country's Net Domestic 
Product (NDP). However, a historical comparison shows that the value 
of agricultural production in 1988 is about 23 times that of 1953. 
Although the share of agriculture in the NDP has declined substantially, 
agriculture still represents an important sector in Taiwan since agriculture 
occupies over two thirds of the land area in Taiwan. 
Table 1 shows the production,, consumption and foreign trade for major 
agricultural products in Taiwan in 1988. Of the seven categories listed, 
cereals have the largest production followed by vegetables, meats and fish. 
Table 1 also shows the import and export of agricultural products in Th.iwan. 
The proportion of imports to domestic production is largest for wheat, 
corn, sorghum, beef, powdered milk and soybeans. ·Banana, pork and fish 
products have the largest exportproduction ratio compared to other 
products exported. 
The self-sufficiency ratios indicate that Tuiwan is self-sufficient m 
vegetables, fruits, pork, poultry, fish, fresh milk and sugar. 
However, Taiwan imports wheat, corn, beef, powdered milk, soybeans and 
some rice in order to meet domestic requirements. 
In addition to the principle of comparative advantage, several studies have 
shown that the high levels of self-sufficiency as well as the large volumes 
of import for selected agricultural products may be the result of domestic 
agricultural policies and trade policies in Taiwan. Hence, one should first 
investigate the characteristics of these policies and their relevance in Tuiwan 
before developing appropriate strategies for trade liberalisation. 
POLICY INSTRUMENTS FOR GOVERNMENT INTERVENTIONS 
The rationale for government intervention in the agricultural sector in 
Thiwan include the following: 
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1. to. stablise the supply of agricultural commodities 
2. to stablise the market price of agricultural commodities 
3. to narrow the gap between farm and non-farm income 
4. to ensure food security 
5. to improve farm productivity 
To carry out the above goals, the government of Tuiwan uses tariffs and 
non-tariff import regulations as well as domestic commodity programmes. 
The different policies are summarised in Table 2. Since Tuiwan is one of 
the major importers of foodstuffs in Asia, tariffs and . regulations for 
imports will be emphasised in the fallowing discussion. 
One of the purposes of using tariffs for agricultural products is to provide 
production incentives for domestic producers. Turiff s can also be used to 
counter the effects of export subsidies from other countries. In this respect 
import tariffs have a direct effect on stabilising the domestic market price. 
Import tariffs apply to most agricultural products with favoured rates to 
those countries having bilateral agreements with Taiwan. Seasonal tariffs 
are also used during harvest periods for selected fruits. In general, the 
nominal tariff rates on agricultural products have been reduced substantially 
over the last few years with further cuts predicted over the next few years. 
Import regulations used in Taiwan can be classified into two categories: 
Import Controlled and Import Permitted. Import Controlled is carried out 
through a licensing procedure by the Bureau of Foreign Trade (BOFT). 
This regulation applies to selected agricultural products listed in Table 2. 
Import Permitted can be classified into four types: 
1. Permitted/Free, (F) means product to be permitted free for import. 
2. Permitted/Restricted Area, (RA) means products can be imported from 
some restricted areas or countries, including those with which Tuiwan 
has bilateral trade agreements. 
3 .. Permitted/License, (L) means products can be imported with a license 
(or agreements) from authorised government agents and the BOFT. 
4. Permitted/Di~ease Restricted Area, (RDA) restricts (or prohibits) 
imports from areas or countries with cholera or other specific diseases. 
'Import controlled' policies have a positive effect on the stabilisation of 
market supply for those products controlled. They also have an indirect 
effect on the moderation of market prices for those products. 'Import 
permitted' policies help not to only stabilise prices and supplies for domestic 
agricultural products, but also to prevent entry of diseases from overseas. 
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In addition to the objectives already discussed, domestic agricultural 
commodity programmes are used to enhance the level of farm income, and 
to ensure food security for major food crops such as rice. Long-term 
research and extension programmes may be used for improving farm 
productivity. The other major agricultural policy instruments used include 
price support, deficiency payment, marketing order, soil conservation and 
rice conversion programmes. However, input subsidies, disaster payments, 
crop and livestock insurances and research and extension programmes are 
relatively insignificant in Tuiwan. 
MEASURES OF GOVERNMENT INTERVENTIONS 
The information from Tub le ~ summarises the various policies and the 
commodities to which they are applied. Table 3 also shows the nominal 
tariff rates, the type of import regulation and commodity programmes used 
for the major agricultural products in Taiwan. 
These products are categorised into five groups: cereals, meats, milk, 
tobacco and sugar, and fruits. 
Cereals 
All cereals including rice, wheat, soybeans, corn and sorghum have a low 
nominal import tariff rate. Imports of cereals are permitted with licensing 
from BOFT. Price support programmes are the major policy instrument 
used for cereals. The corresponding PSE's for the 1982-1986 period for 
the different cereal products are relatively high, ranging from 28.l per cent 
for rice to 74.3 per cent for sorghum. 
Rice is the biggest food crop in Tuiwan with a relatively high self-sufficiency 
rate and limited imports and exports. Rice has been supported via 
guaranteed prices and marketing quotas since 1974. While these 
programmes help meet the food security objectives they have also resulted 
in a rapid expansion of rice production in Tuiwan. In an effort to reduce 
the resulting surpluses, the government has introduced a rice plant 
conversion programme as well as a soil conservation programme since 1984. 
Under these programmes rice farmers are paid to convert part of their 
paddy into non-rice crops or simply to keep their land idle. 
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Wheat, soybeans, corn and sorghum, have low self-sufficiency rates and 
imports are necessary to meet domestic requirement (Table 1). Domestic 
wheat production is mostly contracted with the Taiwan Tobacco and Wine 
Monopoly Board, an official agency with the sole right to market wheat 
purchased at a guaranteed contract price. Other crops are purchased at 
guaranteed prices by mills which receive the differences between the 
guaranteed price and market prices from the government. 
Meats 
The meat products listed in Table 3 are the major types of meat consumed 
in Taiwan. Beef is mostly imported while Taiwan is self sufficient in both 
pork and chicken. On average, meat products have higher nominal import 
tariff rates than cereals with chicken having the highest import tariff at 
40 per cent in 1990. 
The major trade regulations for meat products include the 'import 
permitted' policies. Beef is permitted for import ('restricted area'), whereas 
the import of chickens is permitted with a license issued by BOFT. Price 
support programmes constitute the main form of government intervention 
in the meat sector. 
Milk 
The import of fresh liquid milk is subject to import tariffs of as much 
as 40 per cent. The production of fresh milk is regulated through a contract 
system. Milk producers have production contracts with dairy companies 
and receive a guaranteed price. Processed milk powder however is permitted 
to be imported freely. 
Tobacco and Sugar 
Producers of tobacco and sugar have production contracts with the Bureau 
of Tobacco and Wine Monopoly Trading and the Taiwan Sugar Cane 
Company. The type of import regulations used for Tobacco are 
PermittedLicense, whereas import controlled policies are applicable to sugar 
and their preparations. The nominal tariff rates for tobacco and sugar are 
around 30 per cent for each commodity (see Table 3). 
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Fruits 
The nominal tariff rates for fruits range from 15 per cent to 50 per cent 
depending on the type of fruit. The type of import regulation and 
commodity programmes also depends-on the specific fruit but generally 
include one or more of the broad policies discussed earlier (see Table 3). 
AD.TUSTMENTS TOWARD FREE TRADE 
Although there are still several policies which interfere with agricultural 
production, consumption and trade in Tu.iwan, reforms have been 
implemented to reduce the tariff and non-tariff barriers as well as 
production subsidies in recent years. 
During the past decade, import tariffs on agricultural products in Taiwan 
have been reduced significantly. The weighted 'real' tariff rate has decreased 
from 9.5 per cent to 5.5 per cent between 1979 and 1988. By 1993 the average 
'real' tariff rate is expected to be roughly 3.5 per cent. A timetable for further 
tariff reductions on 528 items of agricultural products has been drawn up. 
The government in Taiwan seems to be sincere in reducing tariff barriers. 
However, in order to make the adjustment process less painful, tariff 
reduction should be gradual as well as pre-announced so that resource 
reallocation could proceed more smoothly. 
In Tuiwan, import licenses are the major form of non-tariff import controls 
and apply to most agricultural products. Import licensing regulations will 
have to be modified to meet the new GATT disciplines. In this case too, 
the agricultural sector needs considerable time can get to make the 
adjustment less costly. 
A timetable that gradually liberalises selective industries in sequence might 
avoid unforseen impacts of liberalisation. 'Tu.riffication' of the existing non-
tariff import barriers, as suggested by the United States, is one of the 
practical approaches to eliminate non-tariff trade barriers. 
According to the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), the 
average level of producer subsidy equivalents (PSE) in Thiwan between 1982 
and 1986 was 19 per cent while the figures for the United States, the EC 
and Japan were 24, 35 and 72 per cent respectively. Based on this 
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comparison, Th.iwan's agriculture does not benefit from excessive subsidies. 
All direct and indirect subsidies affecting agricultural trade are included 
in the current Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations. In 1987, the United 
States proposed the phasing out of all subsidies affecting farm trade by 
the year 2000. In 1988, the US presented a proposal under which some 
income support would be permitted under two headings (1) income transfers 
decoupled from production and marketing and (2) food aid programmes. 
In addition, there is a general view within the OECD that decoupled 
payments should not be included in PSEs when measuring levels of 
producer subsidies. In this respect, 'decoupling' has become a popular 
concept in many countries involved in agricultural trade liberalisation. 
In the future, decoupled farm support could be adopted in Taiwan for the 
purpose of supplementary farm income. Price policies which distort 
production and, in turn, affect trade should be frozen and eliminated 
gradually. 
DECOUPLING SUBSIDIES FROM PRODUCTION 
The main obJective of the current GATT negotiations on agriculture is to 
reduce import barriers and the adverse impact of subsidies on agricultural 
production and trade. As pointed out by Hathaway (1987), the negotiations 
are not concerned with the amount of income being transferred to the farm 
sector as long as such transfers are fully decoupled. If governments find 
it necessary to provide income to their farmers beyond what they receive 
from world market prices, governments still would be able to make income 
transfer payments unrelated to agricultural production. 
Decoupling of income support involves providing government transfer 
payments to farmers independent of their current and future levels of 
production and commodity prices. One of the goals of decoupling is to 
make farmers' planting decisions responsive to market signals while 
maintaining income or cushioning the expected income declines. 
Proposals for the achievement of trade liberalisation which involve 
decoupling can be represented by a broad spectrum of possibilities. At one 
end of the spectrum according to Collins and Vertrees, a decoupled payment 
would have no short or long-term effect on production At the other end 
of the spectrum, a decoupled income support would not directly distort 
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farm price or short-run marginal return but might indirectly affect 
production in the medium to long term. 
Realistically, it is difficult to identify transfer payments that would not 
affect the recipients' production decisions in some manner. For instance, 
the payment could be used to acquire more efficient equipment that could 
affect future profits. This, in turn, would affect decisions to produce and 
to remain in farming. Nevertheless, decoupling does represent a practical 
approach to support farm income and at the same time help lower the level 
of distortion in production. 
APPROACHES TO SMOOTH THE ADJUSTMENT PROCESS 
It is generally agreed that freer trade in the world will necessarily benefit 
every nation. Based on this, trade liberalisation has become very popular 
among many nations. However there are costs involved in implementing 
policies in order to achieve freer trade and these costs can be substantial. 
To smooth the adjustment process and minimise the resulting impacts from 
freer trade has become one of the major issues facing most nations 
concerned with freer trade. 
In the case of Taiwan, undoubtedly, various degrees of damage would occur 
to different industries when tariffs, non-tariff barriers and production 
subsidies are gradually reduced. There are several approaches which might 
help in easing the transitional costs while at the same time maintaining 
farmer's welfare. 
In Tuiwan, long-term growth in farm income has not kept pace with income 
growth in the non-farm sector. Farm income support has been one of the 
major objectives of agricultural policies and will be continued in the future. 
Under a decoupled system, full-time farmers could still receive direct 
payments from the government if their per capita incomes fall below a 
minimum level without necessarily affecting their production decisions. 
Transition from the present price support policies to decoupled income 
support policies should be gradual. In.the first stage, guaranteed purchase 
programmes should be modified to price guarantees with deficiency 
payments. Next, the deficiency payments should be decreased gradually 
and be eliminated after certain periods of time. After then, a decoupled 
income support programme could be implemented. 
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Many other policies can supplement those that are decoupled in order to 
make the adjustment process smoother. For instance, the government could 
be more active in improving the efficiency of the domestic agricultural 
marketing system in order to narrow the gaps between prices paid by 
consumers and those received by farmers. In addition, the agricultural 
finance system could be improved to provide better financial services. 
Insurance systems for farqiers, such as crop insurance, health insurance, 
social insurance and retirement planning, are also areas where improvement 
is possible. 
Furthermore, efforts should be made to promote agricultural resource 
reallocation. Existing regulations or laws which restrict resource allocation 
should be modified or eliminated. At present, farm lands in Tuiwan are 
required to be owned by farmers and be used for agricultural purposes. 
Many farmers, mostly part-time farmers, are not willing to sell their land 
even. though farming is not profitable. They hold their farm land hoping 
that the land will be assigned to other uses someday and that land prices 
will increase. If effective policies could be adopted to eliminate the 
expectation of windfalls, many part-time farmers might release their farm 
lands and leave the agricultural sector. This, in turn, might help in 
expanding the average farm size thereby improving farm productivity. 
Moreover, the government should give more attention to improving public 
utilities in rural areas. Medical, educational and recreational facilities are 
to be improved in order to provide farmers with a better environment and 
a standard of living comparable to that of the non-farm sector. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The trend towards agricultural trade liberalisation is likely to persist in the 
future. Like many other economies, Taiwan is striving to follow the rules 
of free trade. Although much effort has been made to reduce trade 
distortions, there is still room for improvement. In the coming years, existing 
tariffs, non-tariff barriers and subsidies which distort production, 
consumption and trade will be gradually reduced and eventually eliminated. 
When moving toward free trade, several principles are to be followed during 
the adjustment process. First, liberalisation should be gradual and pre-
planned. Second, the urgency and the degree of liberalisation for different 
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commodities should depend on theircharacteristics. Third, measures which 
can increase farm income and welfare but do not distort production and 
trade should be adopted to smooth the process of adjustment. 
In the short run, timetables for trade liberalisation should be prepared. 
Damage due to liberalisation should be compensated. However, the 
compensation should be reduced over time. In the long run, regulations 
on farm land should be reformed to assist resource reallocation. Farm size 
should be enlarged to increase farm productivity. The agricultural sector 
should be restructured to promote high-value, high-technique industries. 
Full-time farming should be encouraged and farmers should be well trained 
in order to increase productivity. A more efficient marketing system for 
agricultural products should be established. More attention should be paid 
to environmental protection. In addition, various welfare programmes 
should be implemented to improve the welfare level of farmers. 
In conclusion, the process of adjustment toward free trade could be painful 
and costly. However, if proper approaches are implemented to achieve freer 
trade the welfare levels of farmers could be maintained or even improved. 
In this respect, the costs of adjustment might be reduced and the process 
of adjustment made smoother. 
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Table 3: Nominal Import Tariff Rates, Import Regulations and Commodity 
Programmes for Selected Agricultural Commodities in Taiwan, 1990 
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23.4 
NA 
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NA 
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NA 
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Source: 1. Council of Agriculture, Taiwan~ 
2. USDA, 1988, Agriculture in the Uruguay Round: Analyses of 
government support, AAO, ERS, USDA, ~ashington, oc. 
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PART III 
Decoupling Farm Support: 
A Viable Option? 
CHAPTER 11 
DECOUPLING AGRICULTURAL PROGRAMMES: 
THEIR COSTS AND BENEFITS 
Stephen L. Magiera and Praveen M. Dixit* 
INTRODUCTION 
It is clear from the proposals that have been tables before the GATT for 
the Uruguay Round that the agricultural negotiations should cover only 
those policies that distort trade. The United States proposal (July 1987), 
for instance, calls for the elimination of all protection and support to 
agriculture which distort trade. Bona fide food aid, disaster payments, and 
decoupled payments would be allowed under the GATT. Other proposals, 
although emphasizing different solutions to world agricultural trade 
problems, also focus only on those policies that distort trade. 
The desire to transform existing mechanisms for supporting farm income 
into policies that will be less trade-distorting has generated considerable 
interest in decoupled income support to farmers. Indeed, decoupled income 
support is considered by some as a possible panacea to the world 
agricultural trading problems. It is one means of cushioning the expected 
declines in farm incomes that would follow agricultural policy reform in 
a manner that would be acceptable to GATT contracting parties. 
Over time, the term 'decoupling' has taken on several different connotations 
and definitions. The term has even been used in reference to any government 
programme which does not distort trade, including those that do not involve 
direct payments. For this paper, however, we limit use of the term to direct 
payments to farmers. 1 If neither. the implementation nor the removal of 
a payment has any impact on production, the payment is fully decoupled. 
One can also think of partially decoupled programmes in which the link 
between programme payments and output is partially broken. 
* Economists at the Economic Research Service, US Department of Agriculture. Views expressed in this 
paper are those of the authors' and not necessarily those of the US Department of Agriculture. 
1 Any programme wl;lich targets government payments only to the farm sector will inject liquidity into 
the sector and. will likely have some impact on farm output even if payments are not tied to the level 
of output. This problem is ignored throughout the remainder of the paper. 
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If decoupled payments are to be a viable alternative to existing farm 
programmes, they must be acceptable both internationally and domestically. 
While international acceptance of such a concept may be readily 
forthcoming because they are minimally trade-distorting, domestic 
endorsement could be more difficult. For a decoupled programme to be 
domestically viable, it must be politically acceptable, financially 
manageable, and administratively feasible. 
Under some definitions, decoupling requires that payments be made 
independent of whether or not a farmer continues to produce. Such 
payments are politically unpopular with farmers since they resemble welfare 
programmes and violate the ideals of a 'fair wage for a fair day's work'. 
Farmers may also be suspect of any direct payment programme because 
the cost falls squarely on the budget. This makes the payments very 
transparent and vulnerable to budget cuts in the future. 
The financial costs of direct payment programmes is another major source 
of concern regarding decoupled programmes. The primary motivating force 
behind some countries' participating in the current negotiations may be 
the high treasury costs of government programmes; A switch from price 
support policies to direct payment programmes transfers the costs of farm 
support from consumers directly to the budget, creating the potential for 
even larger budgetary costs. Because budgets are subject to limits via the 
legislative process whereas high food prices usually are not, direct payments 
may not be an attractive alternative domestically in these countries. This 
is in spite of the fact that, in either case, consumers ultimately pay 
whether it be through high food prices or through high taxes. 
There are also practical difficulties with designing truly decoupled 
programmes. The information requirements necessary for such programmes 
could be large, particularly if the basis for payment depends on 
circumstances specific· to the individual farm. Similarly, the bureaucratic 
infrastructure necessary to collect this information and to implement the 
programmes may need to be expanded. 
Any policy reform that includes decoupled income support to farmers can 
be expected to influence world agriculture substantially. Our objective in 
this paper is to study the economic consequences of decoupling agricultural 
support in industrial market economies. We examine the trade-o_f fs between 
the international acceptability (i.e. the degree of trade distortion) of several 
types of direct payment programmes and their domestic acceptability 
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(budgetary costs). 
The study examines three alternative direct payment programmes. These 
represent only a sampling of the types of direct payment programmes that 
have been suggested for the Uruguay Round, and are certainly not 
exhaustive. Indeed, a larger array of direct payment schemes may well be 
advocated if the Uruguay Round results in a substantial elimination of 
all bqrder measures, and direct payments are the only remaining mechanism 
to transfer income to farmers. 
The budgetary costs of each decoupling alternative are analysed with respect 
to three different payment options. The payment options are designed to 
capture the most likely extremes in treasury costs associated with decoupling 
programmes that maintain overall income transfers to farmers. Payments 
schemes designed to meet a more limited set of policy objectives (supporting 
Jow income farmers, preserving the environment, etc,) could cost much less. 
THREE DIRECT PAYMENT SCENARIOS 
The three direct payment programmes that are examined for this study are: 
decoupled payments under free trade (FREETRADE); a payment 
entitlement guarantee scheme in which producer payments are limited to 
100 per cent of base production (PEGlOO); and a payment entitlement 
guarantee scheme in which producer payments are limited to 80 per cent 
of base production (PEG80)2• 
For the FREETRADE scenario, we assume that the industrialised countries 
eliminate all existing government programmes that transfer income to the 
farm sector. Thus, all border measures and other forms of agricultural 
support are eliminated. At the same time, these countries compensate 
producers for the loss of government assistance through decoupled direct 
payments. The payments are independent of the level of production and 
the farmer's decision on whether or not to produce. They are assumed to 
have absolutely no impact on production, consumption or trade. 
Under the payment entitlement guarantee (PEG) scenarios, the 
industrialised countries eliminate all border measures, but make direct 
payments to farmers based on the amount produced up to the pegged 
2 The Producer Entitlement Guarantee scheme has been proposed by Blandford, de Gorter and Harvey 
(1988). 
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quantity - 100 per cent of 1986 production of PEGIOO and 80 per cent 
of 1986 production for PEG80. In other words, payments increase directly 
with the amount produced but are guaranteed only up to the pegged 
quantity. Production above the pegged quantity, or level eligible for support, 
receives no additional payments. 
Under the PEG scenarios, all demand-side distortions are eliminated. 3 
Whether or not production is distorted will depend on the relationship 
between the pegged quantity and free trade production. The PEG payments 
are tied directly to the quantity produced and affect producers' marginal 
revenues up to the pegged quantity. If the pegged production quantity is 
below free trade levels, production occurs at free trade levels and the 
payments are substantially decoupled. If the pegged production quantity 
is above free trade levels, production occurs at the maximum level eligible 
for support and continues to be distorted. 
The PEG· schemes involve policies which are very similar to current US 
grain programmes. To implement a PEG, however, several change would 
be required. Policies which drive a wedge between US market prices and 
world prices - the export enhancement programme for example - would 
be eliminated. Also, US base acreage and programme yields would be frozen 
and subject to international rules and discipli:q.e, and the loan rate would ' 
be eliminated. As a result, farmers would no longer receive a guaranteed 
minimum price. We also assume that farmers would no longer be required 
to idle acreage in order to participate in the programmes. However, farmers 
will not receive additional payments if idled acreage is brought into 
production since payments are limited to either 100 per cent or 80 per cent 
of 198687 production. 
The '0-92' provisions of the 1985 Food Security Act are potentially a step 
towards decoupling. Farmers who participate in US grain programmes and 
who take advantage of this provision receive deficiency payments even 
though they do not produce. Few farmers have taken advantage of this 
provision, however. By producing, they can receive both the deficiency 
payment and a guaranteed minimum price. Payments under '0-92' would 
qualify as decoupled under our FREETRADE scenario if all other aspects 
of US programmes were eliminated, particularly the loan rate. 
3 Technically, demand under the PEG scenarios is slightly distorted. This is because the world price levels 
attained under these scenarios are not identical to those under free trade. 
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THE MODELING FRAMEWORK 
The analysis is conducted utilising the Economic Research Service's 
SWOPSIM modeling framework (Roningen, 1986). SWOPSIM is a 
comparative static, PSE/CSE based model. 4 The version of SWOPSIM used 
for this report is designed to represent world temperate and subtropical 
zone agricultural markets in 1986/87. Twenty-two agricultural commodities 
are included in the model: beef, pork, mutton, poultry and eggs, dairy 
including manufacturing milk, butter, cheese, and other dairy products, 
soybeans and soybean products, other oilseeds and oilseed products, cotton, 
sugar and tobacco. The world is divided into eleven regions: seven represent 
the industrial market economies, three characterise developing countries, 
and one represents the centrally planned economies. Additional details on 
the model can be found in Roningen and Dixit, 1989. 
As with any large scale model, SWOPSIM's design reflects the question 
being asked. SWOPSIM was built to analyse full trade liberalisation by 
the industrial market economies over the medium term. It was not built 
to examine the budgetary details of various policy alternatives or the micro 
details of various programme designs. Hence, for purposes of this study, 
the model is used to illustrate a set of issues rather than provide precise 
production/budgetary estimates. 
PRODUCTION IMPLICATIONS OF ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS 
The production implications of the three direct payment scenarios are 
presented in Table 1 and Figure 1. Agricultural production in industrial 
market economies (IME's) decline by 3.2 per cent under the FREETRADE 
scenario. Since decoupled payments by definition have no impact on 
production in this scenario, the production impacts are identical to those 
that would occur under free trade without decoupled payments. Farm 
income, however, would be different because countries are allowed to off set 
· the farm income losses that would occur with the elimination of all other 
forms of government support. 
Under PEGlOO, all border measures are eliminated but farmers receive 
direct payments which offset the loss in price supports and which are limited 
4 PSEs and CSEs refer to producer and consumer subsidy equivalents, respectively. Roningen and Dixit 
(1989) define the terms and discuss their use in the modelling framework. 
155 
Decoupling Agricultural Programmes 
to 100 per cent of each country's production base. Because all border 
measures are removed, demand-side distortions are eliminated. Demand 
for agricultural products in the industrialised countries increases and world 
prices rise. Production, on the other hand, is no lower than the base period 
levels because producers continue to produce 100 per cent of their 
production base in order to receive government payments. In addition, 
efficient producers in each country who can profitably produce at the new 
set of higher world prices expand production. The net impact is an overall 
increase in production in nearly all countries. 
The PEG80 scenario results in production impacts which are very similar 
to those under FREETRADE. Agricultural production in industrialised 
countries declines by 2.8 per cent, compared with 3.2 per cent under 
FREETRADE. This is because the 80 per cent production base is below 
the free trade levels of production for most commodities in nearly every 
country. Thus, production in most countries will occur at free trade levels. 
Exceptions are the highly protected producers in Japan and Other Western 
Europe. Agricultural production in Japan, for example, declines by 12.5 
per cent under PEG80, compared with 18.4 per cent under FREETRADE. 
Because highly protected countries maintain a higher level of output under 
PEG80 than would occur under FREETRADE, countries with relatively 
low levels of agricultural support produce somewhat less. In New Zealand, 
for example, agricultural production increases by 8.8 per cent under PEG80, 
compared with a 9.8 per cent increase under FREETRADE. A country 
with low levels of agricultural support, like New Zealand, may therefore 
find a PEG scheme less attractive than free trade unless pegged quantities 
are substantially below current production levels. 
The decoupled nature of the PEG scenarios, particularly PEGlOO, is not 
readily apparent from a comparative static analysis. While PEGlOO may 
remove none of the supply-side distortions existing in the base period, 
producers no longer. have the incentive to expand production in order to 
receive additional government payments. As a result, producers will not 
expand production if payment levels are increased or if supply curves shift 
out because of technological progress. This is illustrated in Figure 2. 
Assume that a country operates a simple target price scheme in which the 
difference between the target price (TP) and world price (WP) is made up 
by an open-ended deficiency payment. With supply curve S, production 
would be at Q in the presence of government programmes while production 
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would occur at Q* if no programmes existed. Now suppose that the country 
simply changes its legislation and limits the production level on which 
payments are made to 100 per cent of base period production (Q). Such 
a change has no impact on current production and thus removes none of 
the production distortions that currently exist. Over time, however, assume 
that the supply curve shifts out. At S1, production remains at Q, but the 
programme is less distorting than in the base period because production 
would occur at Q' in the absence of government programmes. With the 
supply curve at S', the programme becomes fully decoupled for all practical 
purposes. 5 Producers respond at the margin to world prices and production 
increases to Q'. The increase in production in this situation is unrelated 
to the level of government payments. 
Payment Options 
Our emphasis so far has been on the production implications of the three 
direct payment alternatives. Whether any of these schemes would· be 
acceptable to countries also depends on the budgetary costs of the 
programme. The scenarios themselves in part deter.mine budgetary costs 
- whether payments are made on 80 per cent or 100 per cent of base period 
production for example. In addition, costs will depend on whether payments 
are based on some measure of income or production, and how payments 
vary with either. 
Government budgetary outlays are evaluated for each of the three scenarios 
under three payment options. In selecting these options, we assume that 
the primary objective of governments is to continue permanent income 
transfers to farmers. The options differ in how these incomes transfers are 
measured. It should be noted that savings could be achieved if programmes 
were designed more efficiently and if payments are targeted to more limited 
segments of the farm population. These payments might be used to achieve 
other government policy objectives - adjustment assistance for losses in 
asset values due to the removal of farm programmes, preservation of the 
family farm, supporting small or low income farmers, and certain 
environmental objectives. However, the extent to which these other 
objectives can be met with the direct payment programmes is beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
' If S' is the aggregate supply curve for the agriucltural sector as a whole, some inefficient producers 
may continue to produce with a supply curve S, The PEG payments continue to affect these farmers' 
marginal production decision and thus production within the country will remain distorted. 
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The three payment options are as follows. Under Option A, government 
transfers are fixed at the same level of transfers to producers that occurred 
in the base period. These transfers are calculated for each commodity and 
country as the per-unit PSE times the amount produced (100 per cent of 
1986/87 production for FREETRADE and PEGlOO and 80 per cent of 
1986/87 production for PEG80). 6 The second option, Option B, is the same 
as Option A except that the per-unit payment is allowed to vary with world 
prices. If world prices increase, the per-unit payment is allowed to vary 
with world prices. If world prices increase, the per-unit payment falls and 
vice versa. Under Option C, it is assumed that a payment scheme can be 
devised which just offsets any producer surplus losses that might occur 
under each direct payment alternative. 1 The changes in budgetary costs 
from 198687 levels for each payment option and under each decoupling 
scenario are presented in tables 2, 3 and 4. 
Option A: Per-Unit Payments Maintained at Original Levels 
When per-unit payments are based on the original level of transfers to the 
farm sectors in each IME country, (option A, Tu.ble 2), government 
budgetary costs increase substantially from 1986/87 levels for all direct 
payment scenarios. This is particularly the case for Japan and the European 
Community (EC), for which most agricultural support is provided indirectly 
by consumers through high prices and is therefore off-budget. 
Costs, however, differ across scenarios. Under FREETRADE and PEGIOO, 
treasury costs increase by $184 billion for all IME's because farmers receive 
payments on their entire production base. Under PEG80, payments are 
limited to only 80 per cent of the production base, and the budgetary cost 
increases are markedly less ($54.8 billion). Even so, PEG80 would be 
expensive in some countries. Budget costs increase by more than $23 billion 
in Japan and by nearly $30 billion in the EC over 198687 levels. 
Option A points to one basic finding: implementation of this option 
involves large treasury costs independent of the decoupling alternative 
• For all scenarios, we use the 'literal' definition of the PSE. That is, the PSE is the amount of income 
accruing to farmers as a result of all government programmes. In practice, the interpretation of the term 
'income' varies with the programme for which the PSE is being calculated. Also, PSE's include government 
programmes for research and for infrastructure development, etc. 
7 Producer surplus is defined as returns to fixed factors and is similar to net farm income. 
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chosen. The treasury outlays could be reduced by lowering the production 
base on which payments are made. But, for the budgetary costs to be no 
greater than 1986/87 levels, the pegged quantities on which payments are 
made would have to be considerably lower than 80 per cent of 1986/87 
production. 
Option B: Per-Unit Payments Vary with World Price Changes 
Since all scenarios lead to world price increases, governments can realise 
considerable savings on the cost of direct payment programmes if these 
price increases are allowed to offset payments to farmers {option B, Table 
3}. For the industrialised countries as a whole, these savings could be 
between $45-60 billion. In moving from Option A to Option B, treasury 
cost increases for IME's decline from $84.3 billion to $27 .3 billion under 
FREETRADE, from $84.3 billion to $53.9 billion under PEGIOO, and from 
$54.8 billion to only $10.3 billion under PEG80. The budgetary cost 
increases differ across the scenarios for two reasons. First, the world price 
increases under PEGSO and FREETRADE are significantly higher than 
those under PEG80. Under Option B, these price increases are used to offset 
budgetary outlays, thus reducing the cost of PEG80 and FREETRADE 
in comparison of the production base under PEG80. This further reduces 
the cost of PEG80 in comparison with the other scenarios. 
Two inferences can be drawn concerning Option B. First, substantial cost 
savings might be achieved if payment rates are allowed to fluctuate with 
world prices. Second, countries like the European Community and Japan 
would still face increased budgetary outlays. For PEG80, these cost increases 
are $9.4 billion for the EC and $18.6 billion for Japan. 
Option C: Payments Offset Producer Surplus Losses 
Options A and B rely on gross revenues as their income measure and will 
usually over-compensate producers for the elimination of current farm 
policies. This is illustrated for option A in Figure 3. Assume that a country 
operates a simple target price scheme in which the difference between the 
target price (TP) and world price (WP) is due to some type of border 
measure. With supply curve S, production would be at Q' in the presence 
of government programmes while production would occur at Q* if no 
programmes existed. Under Option A, the total compensation to farmers 
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for the removal of the border measure is (TP - WP) x Q', or areas A+ B. 8 
Additional treasury savings can be generated, however, if a payment scheme 
can be designed which just offset producer surplus losses - area A. Table 
4 presents the treasury cost changes associated with each of the scenarios 
for such a payment option. 
Under FREETRADE, a programme that just offsets producer surplus 
losses would cost IME's only $13 billion more than current programmes. 
The treasury costs would be only slightly higher ($13.6 billion) if such a 
scheme was implemented for PEGSO. Under PEGSO, the market gains from 
reform are much less, producer losses are larger, and the cost of offsetting 
these losses are larger. The costs would be especially high for the European 
Community ($13.l billion), and Japan ($19 billion). 
Thus, payments which just offset the producer surplus losses resulting from 
trade reform would generally be cost effective for most IME's under the 
PEG80 and the FREETRADE decoupling schemes. The United States, in 
particular, would incur less treasury outlays than in 198687. For Japan and 
the European Community, on the other hand, the treasury costs would 
be higher than in 1986/87, independent of the scenario. 
In comparison to a fully decoupled programme, a PEG80 scheme where 
payments just offset producer losses may be difficult to implement. Not 
o~ly are payments based on net farm income rather than on a per-unit 
basis, but the production base on which payments are received must be 
fixed. It is not clear how a compensation scheme that incorporates both 
of these features could be implemented. 
AN EVALUATION OF DECOUPLING OPTIONS 
Most decoupling options will be significantly more expensive than current 
policies for those countries which support agriculture indirectly through 
high food prices. These cost increases can be reduced if countries allow 
the world price increases from trade reform to offset producer payments, 
if producer payments are limited to producer surplus losses, or if payments 
are limited to a small production base. 
8 Under Option B, the total compensation would be (TP-WP*) x Q where WP* is the new world price 
resulting from multilateral trade reform. 
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The budgetary cost increases under PEG80 with offsets for world price 
increases (Option B) are actually. lower than those of a fully decoupled 
programme that just offsets producer surplus losses (Option C). Thus, 
payment Option B with payments limited to 80 per cent of the production 
base may represent a viable alternative to a programme of fully decoupled 
payments. Also, such a scheme may be more acceptable to farmers since 
production is required in order to receive payment. 
Option B, in which payments vary with world prices, might be easier to 
design than programmes to offset producer surplus losses since many 
current programmes that offer significant support to the farm sector already 
operate with a target price. 9 There are, however, several major problems 
with implementing a PEG scheme. For one, there is a direct relationship 
between supply-side distortions and the base on which payments are made. 
As the payment base declines, the payment schemes for more commodities 
and more countries become more decoupled and production becomes less 
distorted. At issue, then, is how the production base eligible for support 
is to be negotiated. 
Our model estimates that even the 80 per cent payment base leaves some 
distortions on the supply side. Countries with low levels of protection, 
Australia and New Zealand for example, might find such distortions 
unacceptable. In order to remove all supply-side distortions, the payment 
base would have to be reduced even more and perhaps vary by country. 
It is unclear how such a reduction might be negotiated without definitive 
knowledge of the production distortions caused by policies in each 
country. 10 Also, some countries might find such negotiations unacceptable 
since they appear to involve negotiation of production targets andor market 
shares. In actual fact, only the entitlement to payments would be negotiated, 
not actual production levels. 
Rather than negotiate the base eligible for support, an alternative might 
be to negotiate the payment rate itself. The base eligible for support could 
then be fixed at 100 per cent of base period production. Lower payment 
rates would force some inefficient producers out of production and might 
9 An example of a programme to offset producer surplus losses from the eliminatin of current programmes 
might be a guaranteed net-farm income programme. The net-farm income guaranteed, in this case, would 
be that existing during the base period and could be obtained from farm income tax records. To our 
knowledge, no such programme exists in the industrialised countries. See Finkle and Furtan (1988). 
10 The payment base which would remove all supply-side distortions for every commodity/country depends 
among other things on supply/demand elasticities for every commodity in every country, Negotiators may 
not accept our model's result that an 80 per cent payment base is close to free trade. 
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lead to a more balanced reduction of support across countries. However, 
such an alternative might only be acceptable internationally so long as the 
payment rate is not negotiated to zero. Otherwise, there would be no reason 
for countries that currently rely on market price supports as their primary 
mechanism for supporting farm incomes to take on the additional step 
of implementing a PEG. For these countries, the PEG does not represent 
an alternative if they must both eliminate all border measures and reduce 
the PEG payment rate to zero. 11 
Perhaps the most serious problem with allowing the payments to vary with 
world prices (Option B) under PEG80 is that the budgetary costs appear 
reasonable only because of the model-generated increases in world prices. 
The increases in prices are likely to be irrelevant if governments are required 
to immediately remove all border measures and implement decoupled 
income support. 
The initial increase in cost of farm income support in the EC under Option 
B is $20 billion even under the assumption that payments are made only 
on 80 per cent of the production base. In order to make these costs more 
manageable, a transition period would be necessary. This would create new 
administrative difficulties since some countries would need to add a new 
policy of direct payments limited to a fixed production base while keeping 
their current set of policies in place during the transition. For countries 
which support market prices through a target system, this involves lowering 
that target price as border measures are eliminated while introducing a new 
fixed target price off which direct payments are determined. 
CONCWSIONS 
Ideally, countries should pursue programmes that can meet their various 
agricultural policy objectives without distorting trade. Decoupling support 
has received considerable attention as one such programme. This paper 
examines three decoupling alternatives. Each involves international and 
domestic trade-offs. All direct payment programmes will be less attractive 
than border measures to some countries since they involve higher budgetary 
u As mentioned earlier, this paper focusses on programmes to permanently transfer income to farmers. 
Reducing the PEG payment rate to zero implies the elimination of such transfers. 
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costs. This is in spite of the fact that consumers ultimately pay for the 
programme in either case. 
Budgetary costs can be signific~ntly reduced if payment rates reflect the 
world price increases that are expected from trade reform, are based on 
producer net farm income losses, or are limited to a small production base. 
Fully decoupled programmes are the most acceptable internationally 
because they lead to undistorted trade patterns. A producer entitlement 
guaranteed programme with a small production base would lead to similar 
trade patterns and would also be more appealing to farmers since they are 
required to produce in order to receive payment. However, producer 
entitlement guarantees would involve difficult negotiations over the 
production base eligible for support in each country. 
Decoupling Agricultural Programmes 
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Figure t. Agricultural production responses in the United States, the EC 
and Japan under various direct payment scenarios 
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Figure 2. Decoupling and Production Entitlement Guarantee (PEG) 
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Figure 3. Compensation under producer surplus offset scheme 
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Table 1. Agricultural production implications of 
various decoupling alternatives 
Country 
or region 
Australia 
Canada 
EC-12 
Japan 
New Zealand 
Other fJ. Europe 
United States 
Industrial !11arket 
economies 
Aggregate world price 
FREETRADE 
----percent 
6.8 
-2.7 
-4.7 
-18.4 
9.8 
-11. 4 
- . 5 
-3.2 
changes for agricultural 
commodities 22.1 
1611 
PEGlOO 
change from 
2.6 
.3 
.2 
0 
.8 
.7 
. 3 
.4 
11. 9 
PEG80 
base----
6.4 
-3 
-4.3 
-12.S 
8.8 
-10.8 
- . 5 
-2.8 
20.6 
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Table 2. Changes in treasury costs when per-unit payments are based on 
original transfers (Option A) 
Country 
or region FREETRAOE PEGlOO PEG80 
- - -billion $ change from ba:se---
Australia/New Zealand 0 0 - . 3 
Canada 2 2 .8 
EC-12 40.3 40.3 29.l 
Japan 30 30 22.9 
United States 6.2 6.2 -1. l 
Ot:her Western Europe 5.8 5.8 3.4 
Industrial l'Rarket 
economies 84.3 84.3 54. 8 
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Table 3. Changes in treasury costs when per-unit payments vary with world 
prices (Option B) 
Country 
or region FREETRADE PEGlOO PEG80 
- - -billion $ change from base - - -
Australia/New Zealand -1. 6 -1. 6 -1. 6 
Canada -1. 7 - . 3 ·2 
EC-12 15.1 23.3 9.4 
Japan 24.3 26.9 18.6 
United States -10.5 -l. 9 -14.3 
Other Western Europe l. 7 7.5 . 2 
Industrial market 
economies 27.3 53.9 10.3 
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Table 4. Changes in treasury costs when payments offset producer surplus 
changes (Option C) 
Country 
or region FREETRADE PEGlOO PEG80 
- - -billion $ change frora base---
Aus tralia/Ne'.,.r Zealand -1. 6 -1. 6 -1. 6 
Canada -2.1 -1. 3 -2 
EC-12 9.1 13.1 9.9 
Japan 18.9 19 18.4 
Unit:'.ld States -11. 8 -6.1 -ll.6 
Ot:her western Europe .5 3.3 . 5 
Industrial Market 
economies 13 26.4 13.6 
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P2 
CHAPTER 12 
PRACTICAL APPROACHES TO DECOUPLING FARMER 
SUPPORT: THE NEW ZEALAND EXPERIENCE 
Doren Chadee~ Ronnie Horesh** and R WM Johnson** 
INTRODUCTION 
Government intervention in agriculture in most industrialised countries 
has led to substantial increases in the output of agricultural products over 
the last twenty years. As a result, most agricultural producers and exporters 
have made aggressive use of border measures and subsidies in order to cope 
with surplus agricultural products. By the early 1980's government 
expenditures on agricultural support programmes had reached 
unprecedented levels in most western countries. Increasing pressure on the 
treasuries of these countries led to a commitment on their behalf for 
reforming agricultural production and trade. This commitment was 
formalised when agriculture was explicitly included in the GATT Uruguay 
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN's) launched in 1986. 
With the Uruguay Round now drawing to its end, it has become obvious 
that progress in world agricultural trade liberalisation has been quite 
modest. Part of the reason for the slow progress lies in the fact that 
agricultural trade liberalisation involves modifications of existing domestic 
policies. These policies differ widely across countries and a common 
measuring yardstick for the purpose of comparison has not been agreed 
upon yet. As such it has been extremely difficult to reach any concensus 
on implementing changes on a multilateral basis. Secondly, drastic changes 
to programmes that are designed to support and stabilise the income of 
farmers can be quite difficult to implement from both an economic and 
a political standpoint. 
Unlike most other OECD countries, New Zealand has almost completed 
a unilateral liberalisation of its agricultural sector. In this paper, we outline 
the New Zealand experience at implementing these reform measures, how 
• Centre for Agricul!ural Policy Studies, Massey University, Palmerston North. 
** Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Wellington, New Zealand. 
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they were achieved and what the current situation is. Hopefully, the New 
Zealand experience will provide some guidance to others on decoupling 
agricultural support from production and some of the challenges that such 
reform represent. 
Part 1 of this paper briefly overviews the concept of decoupled support. 
Part 2 looks at the objectives of decoupled support, and how these would 
condition its definition for the purposes of any agreed GATT disciplines. 
Some of the disadvantages of decoupled policies are discussed; the Producer 
Entitlement Guarantee scheme is described and the issue of whether 
developed and developing countries should be treated differently is briefly 
examined. Part 3 overviews the New Zealand experience at decoupling 
agricultural support followed by some concluding remarks in the last 
section. 
DECOUPLING: AN OVERVIEW 
Decoupling generally refers to any form of support to farmers where such 
support does not exert influence on production or factors of production. 
The level of output produced is independent of the amount of support 
delivered by a fully decoupled assistance measure. Decoupled support is 
consistent with market orientation in that it does not affect farmers' 
decisions about how much to produce. It does not interfere with trade, 
or in any way distort trade patterns. Its main objective is to support incomes 
and this it does in a more direct, and less trade-distorting way, than market 
price support or border protection. Decoupled support also has the 
advantage that it does not suppress demand for agricultural products as 
does market price support. 
The concept of the decoupled subsidy has received a lot of attention in 
the GATT Uruguay Round of MTN's for agriculture and could continue 
to grow in importance beyond this Round. It is an agreed objective of the 
Round that disciplines may be agreed upon, eventually, to monitor and 
to gradually reduce the assistance delivered by agricultural support policies. 
Decoupled subsidies, however, may be exempted from some of these 
disciplines. In this respect, decoupled forms of assistance are likely to 
become a more important source of support for the agricultural sector in 
the future. 
Before examining further the definition of decoupled assistance it is 
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instructive to overview briefly the current situation with respect to 
agricultural support in the OECD member countries and the potential 
economic gains from a widespread movement from coupled toward 
decoupled support. 
Currently, market price support and deficiency payments account for nearly 
75 percent of total support to farmers in the OECD countries (OECD 1989). 
These forms of support have led to a panoply of widely documented 
resource allocation distortions, losses of economic efficiency, heightened 
trade tensions, and ~omestic budgetary, environmental and food quality 
problems (OECD 1987, 1988 and Body 1987). The bulk of the assistance 
they offer goes to the larger farmers, and they also tend to destabilize world 
markets. The costs of coupled support then, are borne widely, and not 
least by the developing countries. 
General economic policies in many less developed countries (LDC's) also 
tend to discriminate against agriculture. For instance, taxes on farm output 
tend to create a bias against the agriculture sector. Governments in LDC's 
usually attempt to off set such biases using price stabilisation policies, input 
subsidies and consumer subsidies (World Bank 1986). Previous studies have 
shown that such policies tend to be inefficient. Those LDC's which have 
a bias in favour of agriculture tend to use border measures to achieve this 
result. 
The question that arises then relates to the potential benefits that a shift 
towards decoupled support hase to offer. Recent studies indicate that 
developed countries would benefit significantly from such a shift. A recent 
OECD study has estimated that if all border measures in the six main 
OECD agricultural trading countries or regions (Australia, Canada, EC, 
Japan, New Zealand and the US) in 1986-88 were removed and the same 
levels of budgetary support given to farmers via direct payments, such a 
shift in the composition of farm support policies could yield gains to 
consumers equivalent to 0.8 percent of their real income (OECD 1989/90). 
Given that agriculture and food processing together account for only about 
6 percent of total OECD output this represents a significant gain in 
efficiency. 
Similarly, another study has estimated that if the OECD countries had 
cut their tariffs on agricultural commodities by 50 percent, developing 
countries' income would have increased by US$922 million in 1977 and 
their export revenues by almost US$6 billion. Total export revenue would 
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have risen by 11 percent; exports of low-income countries would have risen 
by 8.5 percent (Valdes and Zietz). Since the level of protection in the OECD 
countries has increased since 1977 the benefits of liberalisation would clearly 
be substantially greater to-day. 
Further evidence of substantial gains from widespread decoupled support 
in LDC's has been provided by Tyers and Anderson. This particular study 
has estimated that developing countries, as a group, would gain 
approximately US$28.2 billion if they, alone, liberalised. Their study 
simulated the effects of removing distortions in border prices by 16 
individual and four regional groups of developing countries, and removal 
of overvalued exchange rates. 
Clearly, significant gains are to be achieved by shifting from coupled to 
decoupled support for farmers. Yet, as the OECD points out in a recent 
report (OECD 1990), 'In only a few [OECDJ countries are there direct 
income measures which are generally unrelated to outputs or inputs in 
production'. The reasons for the slow shift from coupled to decoupled 
support system for agriculture are outlined below. 
DEFINITION OF DECOUPLED SUPPORT 
The pure decoupled subsidy would be paid to farmers in such a way that 
it would not exert influence on any of their decisions which affect output. 
There are several problems with this tentative definition. An exploration 
of the issues may lead to a more practical and operationally useful 
definition. 
The first issue relates to the definition of 'farmers', that is, the question 
of who is to receive the support? One consideration is whether farmers 
are to be treated differently from others. If not, the issue of the definition 
of 'farmer' does not arise. But because farmers have been recipients of 
coupled support in the past it may be thought politically realistic to disburse 
decoupled assistance solely to 'farmers1• Furthermore, farmers in the 
developed countries typically own too many assets to qualify for benefits 
under most schemes intended for the general population. A means of 
deciding who is a farmer for the purpose of receiving decoupled support 
may therefore be required. 
For this purpose 'farmers' may be defined in terms of the time they spend 
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farming, or the proportion of income received from farming. In either case, 
would-be recipients of support would have an incentive to produce. Also, 
it may be undesirable for environmental and other reasons, to attempt to 
remove all forms of support payable to farmers in marginal areas who, 
in the absence of any support, would leave the land. Decoupled support 
would ideally be limited to those who had received coupled support in the 
past, or who are currently oq the land, whether or not they are producing 
anything (though token amounts may be permitted). 
Note though that being on the land, or having received coupled support 
in the past, are necessary but need not be sufficient qualifications for the 
receipt of decoupled support: receipt can also be made contingent on other 
factors such as the undertaking of conservation or land improvement 
projects. 
Another problem with the definition given above concerns 'decisions 
affecting output': the amount of each farmer's decoupled subsidy should 
be totally independent of the volume of output that he or she produces 
(or intends to produce) currently and in the future. This last qualification 
is important: a subsidy could still be decoupled if it were paid to farmers 
on the basis of past levels of production as long as it does not influence 
future levels of production. However, a policy cannot be classified as 
decoupled if benefits to farmers are correlated with the volume of inputs 
purchased after the implementation of the policy. 
A subsidy, therefore, could be defined as 'decoupled' provided it is payable 
in an amount independent of inputs and outputs produced in the season 
for which the subsidy is paid, or in future seasons. This independence is 
to be over the entire range of each farmer's potential production, from 
zero output upwards. If a subsidy is to be considered decoupled the farmer 
will receive the same amount of subsidy regardless of whether he or she 
decides to produce nothing (or a token amount) or whether he or she 
decides to produce something. 'Output' here means agricultural output, 
and should also be taken to refer to any product, marketable or not, which 
can be used as an input into the production of any agricultural product. 
The implications of this definition are examined further by considering 
four policy examples. 
(1) Exit Grants: These are paid to farmers on condition that they retire 
permanently from farming. These grants would be the ideal example of 
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the decoupled subsidy. 
(2) Research and Development (R+D): Bona fide research programmes 
undoubtedly affect farm production in various ways. One of the most 
common impact of R&D on farm firms is that R&D effectively reduces 
the firm's average cost of production. But the relationship between 
expenditure on R + D and supply is difficult to identify, not only for 
analysts, but for farmers themselves. It is this latter point that is important: 
as far as farmers are concerned they will appear to receive the same (zero) 
benefit from most bona fide R + D expenditure if they produce nothing 
as they would if they produce something. This is a result of the national 
nature of most R + D programmes. Benefits are widely distributed over 
many farmers, and take a long time to materialise. 
Nevertheless policies which are designed both to support farmers in ways 
which will induce a supply response and to appear to be R + D programmes 
are not beyond the scope of the imagination. Programmes which are sub-
national in scope would be particularly suspect. Decoupled R + D 
programmes would be precompetitive and the information they generate 
would be publicly available. It is important that R + D, and other categories 
of expenditure which are agreed in the GATT to be 'decoupled', be 
monitored, and disciplines imposed on policies which contravene the spirit 
of any liberalisation agreement. 
(3) Canada's Western Grains Stabilisation Act guarantees the aggregate 
net cash flow of Canadian cereal farmers at a level not below the previous 
five-year average. Participation is voluntary and the Federal Government 
contributes two-thirds of its costs. Because this subsidy is paid not 
according to price, but according to the difference between actual income 
and the average of past years' levels it has been argued that it is a decoupled 
subsidy. 
This argument is difficult to sustain. In any one season the government's 
contribution to the farmer is equivalent to two-thirds of the difference 
between the farm's cash flow and the five-year average. The five-year average 
cash flow will be closely correlated to the volume of production in the 
previous five years. By expanding production farmers can expect to raise 
their five-year average cash flow, and so increase the government subsidy 
when a shortfall occurs. 
The WGS programme appears to contravene the objective of the Cairns 
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Group for agriculture in that market signals to farmers are significantly 
attenuated by the government subsidy element of the scheme. It is also 
clear that this programme falls outside the boundaries of the definition 
of 'decoupled' offered above: in seasons where their cash flow falls short 
of the five-year average farmers would receive more of the government 
subsidy component by producing more output. 
(4) Supply Management: While the definition of decoupled support given 
above serves to exclude price support policies from the 'decoupled' category 
of policy, we need also to consider the joint interaction of price supports 
with supply controls. Where supply controls are binding an increase in the 
support price will not induce an increase in supply, if, as is usually the 
case, the support price is already higher than the world price. Should such 
product price increases be classified as decoupled subsidies and therefore 
be exempt from any agreed disciplines on non-decoupled policies? Product 
price increases of this nature would entrench existing production patterns 
in subsidising countries and so inhibit movement toward market-oriented 
trade. Furthermore, the impacts on farmers' decision making for instance, 
would distort production and potentially trade. In this respect, supply 
management programmes could be classified as coupled. Genuinely 
decoupled policies would not encourage farmers to maintain production 
at levels beyond those evoked by world market prices. If governments require 
the effect on incomes that price increases under supply controls would 
generate they could simply transfer funds to farmers at levels proportional 
to their past output. 
The above examples make it clear that support policies form a continuum 
between the totally coupled and the totally decoupled. The suggested 
definition given above draws the line at the point where the connection 
between increased output and increased subsidy becomes obvious to farmers 
and so critically influences their production decisions. However it may be 
more helpful, in advancing the GAIT negotiations, to list a narrow category 
of policies which would be classified as decoupled, as well as to attempt 
to define, as far as possible, criteria for such policies. Equally pertinent 
is the fact that this point on the continuum is fairly easy to identify. But 
it is not a foolproof definition. Ideally therefore all subsidies should be 
subject to agreed reduction disciplines with ad hoc exclusions granted only 
for genuinely decoupled support, of which bona fide research and 
development would be an example. 
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PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF DECOUPLING 
Although it is widely accepted that by decoupling farm programmes from 
production there are substantial gains to be made both in developed and 
in less developed countries, many countries prefer to bear the costs 
associated with coupled policies by maintaining the status quo. Then the 
question arises as to why most countries do not move towards decoupled 
support policies. From governments' point of view decoupled payments 
have several practical disadvantages. These include: 
* inter-sectoral distribution - in contrast to market price support, 
decoupled payments are made in the form of explicit payments to 
farmers, however defined. Their visibility, and the fact that they will 
be made independently of output, would raise questions about why 
people in other sectors, who might be equally poor, receive no such 
payments. 
* eligibility within the farm sector - again, in contrast to market price 
support policies, decoupled payments require governments to specify 
the recipients. Criteria could be based on income levels, or on a 
requirement to fulfil certain conditions; for example, land conservation 
or withdrawal of resources from farm production. In any case, invidious 
choices as to which farmers shall receive the payments will have to be 
taken. 
* new policies, and associated administrative procedures, would have to 
be set up to replace established ones. 
* the supply response to new support systems may be uncertain. 
It may be politically unrealistic to expect widespread adoption of schemes 
which were not correlated at all with the income lost from the removal, 
or progressive reductions, of coupled support. With schemes which replace 
coupled support by assistance decoupled from past as well as future 
production there would be enormous practical problems in determining 
by how much to compensate farmers. This problem is more complicated 
than determining the revenue lost from the removal of coupled support. 
It requires assessment of the alternative uses of farm resources. Some, 
mostly the bigger farms, would have more opportunities for diversification 
out of agriculture than others. Invidious judgements would have to be made 
about the extent of the alternative income sources enjoyed by (or open to) 
the farm household, though there could, as in New Zealand, be ex-post 
assessment of actual taxable income levels. 
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If new forms of inconie support were not intended to compensate, to some 
degree, for the amount by which a farmer's coupled assistance is reduced, 
then those farmers currently producing large volumes, and so benefiting 
most from price supports, would become big losers. These farmers would 
exert strong political opposition to any agreement which targeted subsidies 
correlated to past production. Opposition would be further incited by the 
highly visible nature of income support schemes not linked to production. 
Several direct income payment schemes that have been proposed within 
the OECD are likely to be afflicted by problems of this sort. 
PRODUCTION ENTITLEMENT GUARANTEE - PEG 
The Production Entitlement Guarantee (IATRC 1988) may provide a useful 
half way house between existing price support schemes and fully decoupled 
support. The PEG is a preset limit on the quantity of production eligible 
to receive support payments. This limit mu~t be less than would be produced 
in response to market prices. For large farms only a fraction of their total 
production would receive support payments and the rest would be sold 
at the open market price. Most of the production of small farms, though, 
would be supported. Under this scheme, therefore, only the quantity of 
output over the level which is eligible for support would be determined 
by its value on the world market. The PEG scheme has several merits 
(Blandford and de Gorter): 
* the total amount of price support can be reduced 
* support can be more readily and flexibly targeted at smaller farms 
* farmers are encouraged to produce efficiently, both within and beyond 
their guaranteed level 
* as a commodity-based policy it may be politically more acceptable than 
fully decoupled lump sum type payments. 
PEGs can be made tradeable. Because they would be more valuable to low-
cost rather than high-cost farmers the latter could be bought out by their 
more efficient neighbours. New entrants to farming would either have to 
purchase (or lease) PEGs or produce all their output at world market prices, 
without PEG payments. If PEGs were not tradeable they would freeze 
existing production patterns and so lead to efficiency losses. 
The first step under a PEG scheme would be to phase out all border and 
domestic support measures. Then the support price, and the quantity of 
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production entitled to receive support would be fixed. The initial issue of 
PEGs would be at the discretion of national governments but may need 
to be negotiated internationally to conform with any' GATT disciplines on 
internal support. 
However, in keeping with its status somewhere between fully coupled and 
decoupled assistance, the PEG scheme has several problems, common to 
both coupled and decoupled support: 
* PEGs would not be immune from political pressure to increase assistance 
if there were a downturn in market prices. 
* PEGs, in common with decoupled support generally, involve highly 
visible budgetary support, rather than by taxing consumers. 
* PEGs for each farm would have to be decided involving complex and 
invidious decisions. 
* Output up to the PEG would have to be monitored for each farm, so 
that it can receive the assisted price. 
SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT (S+D) FOR 
LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
Another important issue related to decoupled support involves the 
treatment of less developed countries. Two questions are relevant here: 
(1) how are bona fide infrastructural programmes which benefit the 
agriculture sector to be regarded? and 
(2)shou1d such programmes be treated differently for LDC's? 
There is likely to be a difference of degree of concentration between 
infrastructural programmes and R + D expenditure. The latter is generally 
channelled through national research and extension agencies. The 
relationship between R + D expenditure and production incentives is thereby 
obscured, in the eyes of the farmer. 
With infrastructural programmes, however, the relationship is not 
necessarily so obscure. Many infrastructural programmes would channel 
benefits to only small groups of producers, according to their location, 
range of products or other distinguishing characteristic. Particularly 
questionable would be sub-national expenditure targeted at inputs whose 
use is closely correlated with output. Nevertheless we should not want to 
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see bona fide programmes, particularly those in LDC's, subject to the same 
disciplines as the more obvious supply-inducing policies. 
The solution may therefore be, as with research and development 
expenditure, to monitor all infrastructural support, with particular scrutiny 
given to those programmes which have an agricultural bias and those which 
are sub-national in scope. This monitoring process would probably require 
a greater degree of transparency than is current for policies of this.type. 
In particular the conditions for qualification for infrastructural support 
should be explicit. Further, if a developed country's infrastructural 
programme is to be classified as decoupled the onus would be on that 
country's government to show that more than x percent of the country's 
farmers will benefit, and that more than y percent of the benefits will accrue 
to non-farmers. The rationale for such a criterion is that if x and y are 
sufficiently high the· programme would be an inefficient way of giving 
coupled support to farmers and any supply response would be fairly small. 
A criterion expressed in this way, perhaps with lower values for x and y, 
could also be used for LDC's. It is envisaged that LDC's would be so 
defined according to objective criteria (such as GDP per head) and that, 
as they become more developed they would follow the same discipline 
applying to developed countries. 
DECOUPLED SUBSIDIES IN NEW ZEALAND: WELFARE GRANTS 
The welfare schemes that are currently available to the rural sector in New 
Zealand are described in this section followed by a short discussion of 
whether such support is independent of production incentives. The schemes 
described below are the most evident ones currently available to farmers 
as well as to the general public in some cases. There may be other categories 
not presently evident to the authors. For the purposes of the following 
discussion, it is useful to distinguish between: 
(1) persons in employment (with minimum hours per week for part-time 
employed); 
(2) persons unemployed but seeking work; 
(3) persons with children; and 
(4) self-employed proprietorsindividual taxpayers 
(a) non-farm 
(b) farming 
( c) drought areas. 
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The range of welfare and income supplements available to farmers as well 
as to the general public are summarised in Table 1. 
In terms of general benefits, it is not possible to identify amounts paid 
to rural people as compared with non-rural people. What is clear is that 
Family Benefit and Family Support are the only benefits payable to families 
irrespective of occupational groups. All other schemes, however, have some 
criteria which target the particular group they are meant to serve. Some 
of the above schemes that are directly or indirectly relevant to the farm 
sector are briefly described below. 
(1) Family Benefit 
A child allowance of $6.00 per week per child is paid as of right to all 
parents on children up to the age of 15 years or, if a full time student, 
up until the end of the year in which 18 years is reached. Arrangements 
are made for lump sum payments up to a period of 52 weeks for first 
children, and children starting school. Prior to l October 1986, the Family 
Benefit could be capitalised and used for home ownership purchase. 
This benefit was drawn by 437 ,287 families in the March year to 1989; 
covering 877,204 children and costing $258.4 million (excluding Family 
Support). This scheme is administered by the Department of Social Welfare 
and does not influence production in any way. 
(2) Family Support 
Family Support is extra income for families caring for their children over 
and above the Family Benefit. It is payable through the tax system as a 
rebate or by direct payment through Social Welfare. Family Support is 
abated for annual incomes before tax of $17,000 per year or more and for 
a 6 child family is eliminated where the family income is over $40,000 per 
year. 
Income tested beneficiaries have their Family Support entitlement 
automatically incorporated by the Department or Social Welfare in their 
benefit. If they receive income from an extra source, this can only be 
assessed by Inland Revenue when their tax return is processed. 
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The expenditures on Family Support were $180.3, $397.3 and $415.5 million 
in 1987, 1988 and 1989 respectively. As in the previous case, Family Support 
is fully decoupled. 
(3) Special Needs Grants for Financial Hardship 
Emergency grants may be granted on grounds of financial hardship to those 
who do not qualify for the ordinary Unemployment Benefit. This payment 
is available to the self-employed and others who have sudden loss of income 
or whose venture may have failed. Assistance is paid through a Special 
Needs Grant. Since farmers cannot qualify for Unemployment Benefit, 
a special assistance programme has been made available to them since 1986, 
as discussed next. Farmers can get grants on a long term basis without 
meeting requirements that recipients must be looking for other work and 
willing and able to take up job offers. Although this scheme places farmers 
at an advantage (sectoral advantage) to other self-employed persons, the 
amount of assistance is not related to the level of farm production. 
(4) Special Assistance to the Farming Sector 
A package for assisting the farming sector due to the downturn in the 
economic climate was· announced by Government on 2 July 1986, with part 
of this package being the provision of Special Needs Grants to farmers 
in order to provide for essential day-to~day living expenses. Grants are made 
available to farmers who are in a critical financial position with no funds 
or no access to funds to meet their day-to-day living expenses. The criteria 
for payment are: 
1. the farming operation is in financial difficulty and is not producing 
sufficient income to meet essential living expenses; 
2. there is no significant off-farm income; 
3. there are no assets unconnected with the farm operation which can 
be readily converted to cash; 
4. a decision has been made to sell the farm and the asking price is 
realistic; or the family is in the active process of evaluating the on-
going viability of the farm. 
Social Welfare believes such grants should not be paid for such purposes 
for longer than 6 months. Applicants must re-apply every 6 weeks. In 1989 
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total expenditure under the Special Assistance to the Farming Sector was 
approximately $319,285. In this case too, the amount of assistance is fully 
decoupled from farm output. 
(5) Adverse Events Family Income Support 
This programme was introduced in November 1988 when the East Coast 
of the South Island was declared an adverse event area due to a prolonged 
drought. This programme is funded by the Ministry of Agriculture, but 
is administered by the Department of Social Welfare. Applicants must be 
resident in the declared adverse event area. The basis of the application 
is a statutory declaration that the applicant is in difficulty because of the 
drought. 
An adverse event area was also declared on the East Coast of the North 
Island due to drought in May 1989. Assistance measures for this area were 
announced in March 1990. These also included Adverse Events Family 
Income Support, but with somewhat different criteria. In 1989 some 3500 
farmers received approximately $22.6 million under this scheme. 
(6) Exit Grants 
At the time of the introduction of the Adverse Events Family Income 
Support Scheme additional government support was provided for non-
viable farmers to encourage them to leave farming. Providing a sale took 
place, the government undertook to ensure that the departing farmer's assets 
were made up to the value of $45,000. Some 300 grants were made under 
this programme. 
DISCUSSION 
This section addresses the question of whether New Zealand's experience 
with welfare grants in agriculture can provide guidance on decoupling 
agricultural assistance from production (and hence trade distorting) 
incentives. Based on the extent of welfare grants available in New Zealand 
and the past experience with production subsidies some conclusions are 
reached on the extent of decoupling in New Zealand agriculture in the 
current policy framework. 
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As pointed out earlier, the ideal decoupled subsidy would be paid to farmers 
in such a way that it would not exert influence on any of their decisions 
which affect output. Subsidy payments could be a recognition of a number 
of social and economic objectives pursued by governments. The EEC argues 
that its subsidies are social in character and hence are not provided for 
economic reasons. Such things as retaining people on the land, preserving 
the countryside and maintaining minimum incomes are all counted as social 
objectives. 
Hence the question that arises is whether countries (like those in the EEC) 
could potentially reach such social objectives by different means than by 
blanket all-embracing support for farm prices. If such could be achieved, 
then production levels and input use might relate more closely to those 
which would have prevailed in the absence of blanket subsidisation. 
In the case of New Zealand the social objectives being pursued at the present 
time include: 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
prevention of financial hardship 
protection of the sick, disabled, etc. 
protection of the aged 
assistance in emergencies, including climatic emergencies and recovery 
assistance for economic disasters and recovery 
A review of the government programmes available to the rural sector 
indicates that there does not appear to be an explicit welfare policy for 
rural people in terms of rural population goals or maintaining the 
countryside in its present form. There is also no firm identifiable policy 
for rural communities. The concept is 1Jasically one of a welfare safety net 
for protection of all people at some minimum standard. 
The welfare safety net is necessary, in part, because earlier social and 
economic goals of full employment and balance of payments surpluses 
have been replaced by market and efficiency goals. In a full employment 
society, the minimum standard of living can be delivered by minimum wages 
and job spreading, with less emphasis on delivery by welfare payments. 
Similarly, agricultural assistance directed toward increased exports assisted 
marginal farmers to stay in farming, and also kept people in agriculture 
and rural communities at levels higher than were warranted by undistorted 
market prices and economic necessity. In turn, such assistance kept more 
schools open in rural areas, maintained small businesses in rural 
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communities and maintained levels of services such as health and roading 
at higher than otherwise levels. It is doubtful if these were the open goals 
of such programmes. 
From 1962 to 1984 agricultural assistance policy was dominated by export 
lead growth priorities arising out of the recurrent balance of payments crises 
of the 1950s. For present purposes it is useful to discuss agricultural 
investment incentives separately from guaranteed minimum price schemes. 
These policies were introduced to increase production of exportable goods 
by second best methods in a fixed exchange rate environment. They 
contributed to the defined social objectives outlined above, but only as 
a by-product of their main aims. 
The investment incentives operating in this period were tax write-offs for 
land development, standard values for livestock for tax assessment, the 
Livestock Incentive Grant Scheme (1976) and the Land Development 
Encouragement Loan Scheme (1978). These measures were aimed at the 
developing farmer with scope for greater farm. production. They were 
designed to fund more easily the expansion of output the nation desired. 
In effect, they subsidised the cost of land development through an 
investment incentive. These measures tended to encourage farmers to bring 
more land into production rather than to intensify existing land use. 
During the middle of the period 1962 to 1984, policy measures were 
introduced to provide greater security in farming. Land development was 
seen to be at risk if farmers were uncertain of future returns and sudden 
changes in returns. Their response to such risk factors was thought to be 
a slowing down of the land development process. Minimum price schemes 
had been developed in the immediate post-war period for milkfat, apples, 
meat and wool, with varying degrees of support being provided. In 1976, 
both the meat and wool minimum price support schemes were re-engineered 
to provide higher miniml}.m price guarantees and mechanisms for 
replenishing the necessary buffer funds. In 1978, the Supplementary 
Minimum Price Scheme was introduced whereby milkfat, meat and wool 
prices would be topped up to provide desirable incomes for producers. In 
effect, incomes were designed to be not only secure, but sufficient to 
maintain a high level of re-investment in farm development and output. 
Both the investment incentives and the guarant~ed minimum price schemes 
were oriented to investment, growth and output. Neither were instituted 
for 'welfare' reasons. Both could be said to have slowed down economic 
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adjustment to changing economic circumstances which would otherwise 
have been required as market realities changed. On the other hand, both 
schemes could be said to have encouraged structural adjustment through 
increased and guaranteed incomes and investment incentives which funded 
new opportunities and directions. 
Since minimum prices were applied across the board, they raised incomes 
for all producers and probably protected the weak, the marginal and the 
non-viable. In this sense the support schemes then in place constituted a 
type of social welfare payment to those who would have otherwise been 
a burden on welfare funds. 
Welfare assistance in the form of Direct Income Support to the rural sector 
has increased since 1984 following the dismantling of the investment 
incentives and minimum price schemes, and the general decline in the 
profitability of farming. Universal benefits were available before these 
changes and have continued since. Income smoothing and loss write-offs 
through the tax system have been preserved as well. However as farming 
profitability declined through 1985 and 1986, it became apparent that the 
weak, the marginal and the non-viable farm units were not protected by 
the existing social welfare provisions. As a result, the Special Assistance 
to the Farming Sector Scheme was devised for farmers to meet temporary 
financial distress requirements. 
This was the only mechanism whereby farm owners and their families could 
receive a full welfare benefit. Family Benefit and Family Support for 
children are payments based on the number of children in the family and 
are not designed to maintain the whole family. The Guaranteed Minimum 
Family Income Scheme is restricted to people on low wages and is not 
available to farmers as self-employed. In the case of the South Island 
drought relief scheme, it seems likely that in most cases of natural disaster, 
this kind of welfare assistance would probably be needed whether or not 
production incentives and price support were in place. 
However, farmers in New Zealand remain more vulnerable to climatic and 
financial adversity than they were under previous subsidy programmes. 
Existing schemes do provide some compensation to farmers who are 
adversely affected by natural disasters. However, New ?.ealand's farm sector 
remains highly vulnerable to changes in the external environment. For 
example. fluctuating world commodity prices and the currency exchange 
rates are largely beyond the control of farmers. To the extent that the 
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agricultural sectors in the rest of the world are still highly protected, 
unilaterally decoupling agriculture has introduced new forms of risks into 
agriculture. From a global efficiency standpoint, an interesting question 
that arises is whether New Zealand farmers are receiving the right market 
signals from the rest of the world. Unless the level playing field is achieved, 
market signals (based on international comparative advantage) are bound 
to be distorted. 
Welfare assistance (Direct Income Support) is oriented to financial need 
and is normally targeted to defined groups. Only those programmes 
introduced for relief in the economic downturn could be said to be 
substitutes for earlier production incentives in the sense that while 
guaranteed minimum prices were in place, a special assistance scheme for 
farmers would not be needed. There is no equivalent to the investment 
incentives such as the Livestock Incentive Scheme and the Land 
Development Encouragement Loan Scheme. Social Welfare still view the 
Adverse Events Family Income Support scheme and the Special Assistance 
scheme as subsidies to farming as they believe the conditions are more 
generous than for other sectors. 
Among some of the measures that have been proposed for decoupling 
agricultural support from production the PEG seems to be receiving lots 
of attention. From New Zealand's perspective, PEG could be expensive 
to implement in the sense that additional administrative structures have 
to be set up in order to monitor whether farmers are abiding to their 
respective PEGs. Even for developing countries, monitoring production 
can become an administrative and financial burden. 
Direct income support delivered via the 'welfare' system seems to have 
worked well in New Zealand and the process has been partly facilitated 
by the existing institutional setup. For example the working of direct income 
support scheme can be monitored closely through the existing tax system. 
In this respect, developing countries that do not yet have a well developed 
tax system might ~perience some difficulties in implementing direct income 
support schemes. To the extent that direct income support schemes can 
be fully decoupled and are in general financially and administratively quite 
attractive they should be considered as serious candidates for decoupling 
agricultural support in the rest of the world. 
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CONCWDING REMARKS 
Decoupling farm support programmes from production still represents a 
major challenge to most western nations. There are tremendous political 
and administrative difficulties involved in determining which farmers shall 
receive what level of decoupled support. There are also significant political 
problems associated with switching from a system of price support to 
mechanisms such as direct income support. Any movement away from 
coupled support is also likely to lead to a fall in farmers' asset values. 
In certain ways New Zealand has been more fortunate than other developed 
countries: high support levels have a short history in New Zealand, and 
farming systems did not come to depend on them to the same extent as 
in other countries. This paper has shown that farmers in New Zealand no 
longer receive subsidies that are linked directly to production. It can be 
deduced that when income supporting subsidies were in place, the need 
for targeted welfare assistance was reduced. Once the income supports were 
removed, the need arose for welfare type schemes based on financial need 
and not on production objectives. These welfare schemes provide de-
coupled support for the farming community as defined at the beginning 
of this paper and hence have in effect displaced part of the earlier broad 
assistance provided to agriculture. 
The New Zealand experience has shown that a fully decoupled agricultural 
sector is possible. Farmers can survive the withdrawal of coupled support, 
to the benefit of the wider economy. Nevertheless there have been problems 
and the New Zealand experience can offer some guidance for countries 
wishing to implement decoupled policies. Under previous subsidy 
programmes farmers in New Zealand were insulated from many of the 
problems caused by climatic threats, or changes in the macro economy. 
In the absence of such programmes, governments could usefully encourage 
farmers to adopt risk management techniques such as drought strategies 
and insurance cover for adverse events in order to be better prepared in 
a world of freer trade and market realities. 
As the OECD points out, 'multilateral action should not be seen as 
excluding unilateral action. To do so may involve foregoing the very 
substantial benefits from [agricultural policy] reform simply because of 
an inability of the countries concerned to harmonise their policy changes. 
A move to direct income support could provide such a signal while at the 
same time creating room to manoeuvre for governments in handling the 
social and political costs associated with reductions in assistance.' 
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